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Dedication
Machan Tibor Richard-nak (1939-2016), aki szerette a 
gondolatokat, a vitákat, a szabadságot és az életet, és aki jobb 
hellyé tette a világot.
For Tibor Richard Machan (1939-2016), a lover of thought, 
discussion, liberty, and life who made the world a better place.
1Preface
“From Maximus: mastery of self and vacillation in nothing; 
cheerfulness in all circumstances and especially in illness. A 
happy blend of character, mildness with dignity, ready to do 
without complaining what is given to be done.”1
—Marcus Aurelius, Meditations
Who am I? What is freedom and how do I achieve it? What is a 
good life and how do I achieve that? How do I live the life of a 
free and responsible person? How am I related to others? How 
should I behave and how should I expect others to behave? For 
what am I responsible and for what not?
Should some people use force to control others? How does 
control through the state function and what are its effects? What 
is self-control, what are its benefits and its costs, and how do I 
achieve it?
Young people may be especially likely to pose those questions, 
but those questions are not only for youth—they’re for every 
stage of life. 
They’re what this short book is about. Such questions aren’t 
topics only for professors of ethics and metaphysics; they’re 
questions for every thinking person. They’re questions for you. 
Moreover, understanding freedom and responsibility involves 
much more than some narrow intellectual specialization; serious 
thought on those questions must also draw on economics and 
history and psychology and neuroscience and sociology and art 
and spirituality and so much more. You’ll find all of that in the 
book in your hands.
The ideas in this book can help you to live a happier life—to 
be a better friend, co-worker, student, family member, citizen, 
thinker, businessperson, in short: to be a better person. You can 
achieve a life of freedom. Freedom is not aimless irresponsibil-
ity, but is inseparable from responsibility. Grasping both is an 
adventure, an act worthy of a human being.
2Freedom and responsibility will also help you to create or 
to strengthen free societies. A key to freedom is to understand 
that we live freely together, not in isolation, but in societies and 
communities. It means that just as our freedom is respected, we 
respect the freedom of others. We accept the responsibility to 
respect the rights of others. To live freely is to live with respect 
for the rights of others, as well as for one’s own. To live freely is 
to refuse to submit passively to control by the state, but to be 
responsible for one’s own choices.
This is not a book of secret truths that, grasped in an instant, 
will solve all your problems. In fact, achieving a life of self-control, 
freedom, and responsibility takes effort, but it is within your 
power. Such effort can be heroic, but need not be; normally, it’s 
about slowly acquiring the habits of responsibility. Several chap-
ters discuss the practices and institutions that help us to achieve 
those habits. They show us the benefits of improving our self-
control and contain directly useful insights and tips for achieving 
self-control, as well as guides to other works that will help you 
progress further on the path to freedom and responsibility.
Solving social problems requires effort, but effective coordi-
nation of effort requires freedom and is generally hindered—not 
helped—by force. Various chapters explain the history of self-con-
trol and how societies of free and responsible individuals have 
solved and can solve complex problems and how, through free-
dom, we can achieve peace and prosperity. 
Each chapter of this book can stand alone. You can read them 
in any order; no chapter requires that you have already read an-
other. You can “dip into” the book without having to read it all. 
You may find some parts engaging and others less so. It’s your life 
and you can spend it as you wish. I do hope, though, that some 
small part of your life will be spent on the chapters in this book, 
because what they offer may make the rest of your life better, freer, 
and—ultimately—happier.
Tom G. Palmer
Amsterdam, The Netherlands
March 30, 2016
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The Great Choice
By Tom G. Palmer
Can there be freedom without responsibility, or responsibility without 
freedom? Can we choose to be free and responsible? Why should it 
matter? Here the terms are clarified, the issues defined, and the case 
made for choosing the life of responsibility and freedom. 
“They [the holders of authority] are so ready to spare us all 
sort of troubles, except those of obeying and paying! They 
will say to us: what, in the end, is the aim of your efforts, the 
motive of your labours, the object of all your hopes? Is it not 
happiness? Well, leave this happiness to us and we shall give 
it to you. No, Sirs, we must not leave it to them. No matter 
how touching such a tender commitment may be, let us ask 
the authorities to keep within their limits. Let them confine 
themselves to being just. We shall assume the responsibility 
of being happy for ourselves.”2
—Benjamin Constant
Each of us faces a great choice. Shall I quietly accept the system 
of state control or shall I stand up for self-control? Self-control 
offers a life of freedom and responsibility. It enables us to realize 
our dignity in peace and harmony with others. It is a life worthy 
of a human being. It’s the foundation for prosperity and progress. 
State control offers a life of obedience, subservience, and fear. It 
promotes the war of all against all in the struggle for the power 
to control the lives of others. Self-control is a clear and simple 
principle applicable to all: every person gets one and only one 
life to live. State control has no clear and simple principle and 
4invites conflict as individuals and groups struggle to control the 
state, and thus each other, or to evade control by others.
Free people are not subservient, but neither are they uncon-
trolled. They control themselves. Taking control of your life is 
an act of both freedom and responsibility. In fact, the two are 
so closely connected that one cannot hold onto one without 
the other.
Dependent children tend to seek freedom without responsibil-
ity; independent adults embrace both. The life of freedom and 
responsibility offers satisfactions only available to those who take 
control of their own lives. The life of freedom and responsibility 
is the life of an adult, rather than a child; of a citizen, rather than 
a subject; of a person, rather than an object. Our own well being, 
our happiness, is not something that we can expect from others 
or that is delivered to us by the state. Governments are properly 
instituted among men, after all, not to secure our happiness, but 
to secure our right to the pursuit of happiness. We are responsible 
for being happy ourselves.
Responsibility and Freedom 
Responsibility: For some the word conjures up images of old 
people lecturing young people about sitting up straight, doing 
their homework, and writing thank-you notes to elderly aunts. 
Unsurprisingly, we’re expected to think it’s boring, tedious, a di-
version from our enjoyment of our freedom. The goal of freedom, 
the images suggest, is to escape responsibilities.
In fact, embracing responsibility is neither boring, nor tedious, 
nor a diversion from freedom. Being responsible entails at times 
doing things that are unpleasant or even great sacrifices, but em-
bracing responsibility provides the greatest of human satisfactions. 
Embracing one’s own responsibility is in fact an adventure and 
an act of daring. We deserve to be free because we can be held 
accountable for our acts; because we can make choices; because 
we can exercise self-control. Responsibility is not a burden we 
must bear to be free; the awareness that “I did that” is what makes 
freedom a prize worth fighting for. Responsibility is the key to 
the realization of freedom.
We do not deserve our freedom merely because we have desires 
5or impulses. We deserve to be free—to control our own lives—
because we are morally accountable: to each other, to God (for 
those who believe), and to our own consciences. As one of history’s 
most influential moral philosophers wrote hundreds of years ago,
A moral being is an accountable being. An accountable being, 
as the word expresses, is a being that must give an account of 
its actions to some other, and that consequently must regulate 
them according to the good-liking of this other.3
Adam Smith went on to explain that the development of 
moral consciousness entails accountability not only to others 
but to ourselves, for what we seek is not merely to be praised, 
but to be praise-worthy, two goals that may resemble each other, 
but which “are yet, in many respects, distinct and independent 
of each other.”4
As social creatures, we seek to become praise-worthy, or “admi-
rable,” but “in order to attain this satisfaction, we must become 
the impartial spectators of our own character and conduct. We 
must endeavor to view them with the eyes of other people, or as 
other people are likely to view them.”5
Becoming impartial spectators of our own character and 
conduct enables us to earn our own self-esteem. As Smith noted, 
“The man who applauds us either for actions we did not perform, 
or for motives which had no sort of influence upon our conduct, 
applauds not us, but another person. We can derive no sort of 
satisfaction from his praises.”6 Such satisfaction is possible in no 
other way than by embracing responsibility.
Freedom: For some the word conjures up images of “anything 
goes,” of disorder, chaos, immorality, license. Unsurprisingly, they 
consider freedom frightening. As a consequence, many have 
believed that order and virtue must be imposed at the expense 
of freedom. They equate responsibility with submission to the 
commands of others. Some have even promised that such submis-
sion, although it may destroy what we ordinary people consider 
our freedom, promises a higher freedom, one far superior to 
what they dismiss as merely empirical or “bourgeois” freedom. 
They promise an ecstatic freedom that can only be found when 
6our actions are directed by the wise and the good, or at least the 
powerful.
Freedom is not the same as license; responsibility closely con-
nects freedom with virtue and self-command. The connection was 
made clear by one of history’s greatest champions of freedom, a 
man who was born a slave in Talbot County, Maryland: Frederick 
Augustus Washington Bailey, a man who achieved freedom for 
himself and for millions of others. He is known by the name he 
chose for himself: Frederick Douglass. Douglass wrote in 1845—as 
a former slave who liberated himself—of the “holidays” allowed 
to slaves by their captors. Such moments of seeming freedom were 
portrayed as acts of benevolence by the slaveholders, but were in 
fact deployed as “safety-valves, to carry off the rebellious spirit of 
enslaved humanity.”7 The slaveholders sought to sink their cap-
tives in depravity, rather than offer them a respite from slavery:
Their object seems to be, to disgust their slaves with freedom, 
by plunging them into the lowest depths of dissipation. For 
instance, the slaveholders not only like to see the slave drink 
of his own accord, but will adopt various plans to make him 
drunk. One plan is, to make bets on their slaves, as to who 
can drink the most whisky without getting drunk; and in 
this way they succeed in getting whole multitudes to drink 
to excess. Thus, when the slave asks for virtuous freedom, the 
cunning slaveholder, knowing his ignorance, cheats him with 
a dose of vicious dissipation, artfully labeled with the name 
of liberty. The most of us used to drink it down, and the 
result was just what might be supposed: many of us were led 
to think that there was little to choose between liberty and 
slavery. We felt, and very properly so, that we had almost as 
well be slaves to man as to rum. So, when the holidays ended, 
we staggered up from the filth of our wallowing, took a long 
breath, and marched to the field—feeling, upon the whole, 
rather glad to go, from what our master had deceived us into 
a belief was freedom, back to the arms of slavery.8
For Douglass, freedom was found not in the drunkenness and 
vice encouraged by the masters, but in the dignity of self-assumed 
7responsibility. He learned the measure of freedom when he, as 
he put it, “got hold of a book entitled The Columbian Orator” 
and was captivated by a dialogue between a master and a slave 
in which the slave refutes the master’s arguments for slavery and 
persuades the master to emancipate him.9 The effect of those ar-
guments on Douglass was powerful: “Freedom now appeared, to 
disappear no more forever. It was heard in every sound, and seen 
in every thing. It was ever present to torment me with a sense of 
my wretched condition. I saw nothing without seeing it, I heard 
nothing without hearing it, and felt nothing without feeling it.”10
Attempts to substitute state control for self-control generate 
unintended consequences that are often far worse than the situ-
ations that state control is ostensibly intended to improve. The 
intentions of legislators or administrators are one thing and 
the consequences of changing incentives are another. To take 
two prominent examples, Professor Jeffrey Miron of Harvard 
University exposes the terrible unintended consequences of the 
“War on Drugs” (crime, overdoses, spread of diseases, and more) 
in his chapter for this volume and journalist Lisa Conyers in 
her chapter examines the dependency that is created by welfare 
state policies, usually, but perhaps not always, as an unintended 
consequence of those policies.
One can never legislate or choose outcomes directly; all legisla-
tors or rulers can do is to change the incentives that participants 
in social interactions face. Thus, actions may be outlawed because 
the legislators think they’re bad. It does not follow that, after 
the rulers have spoken, no one will take those actions anymore. 
Understanding that, rulers specify punishments, from fines to 
imprisonment to death. It still does not follow that no one will 
take those actions.
• Freedom to produce, buy, sell, and consume drugs is 
restricted or completely suppressed in many countries 
by law. Drugs are illegal in the United States, yet the 
prisons are full of people who produced, bought, sold, or 
consumed drugs despite the legislators telling them not 
to do so. Many millions of people were not dissuaded by 
the prospect of jail sentences, despite the extraordinary 
8violence and the hundreds of billions of dollars deployed 
to change their behavior.11 The experience of alcohol 
prohibition is being repeated; merely banning a substance 
does not mean that people will stop consuming it and is 
likely to generate consequences that the advocates of the 
ban did not anticipate.12
• Responsibility to make decisions about saving for one’s 
retirement all over the world was taken over by govern-
ments, ostensibly to invest their earnings wisely, help them 
to provide for their old age, and create bonds of solidarity 
among generations.13 In the United States wages are taxed 
and the taxes are not invested for the future, but churned 
into a “Pay As You Go” system that is financially indistin-
guishable from a pyramid scheme and that accumulates 
massive “unfunded liabilities” over time. Wage earners were 
told that their compulsory Social Security payments were 
being “matched” by “contributions” from their employers, 
when in fact 100 percent of the “employer contribution” 
came out of their own pockets, as it was money the employ-
ers were paying to hire them and so the money was merely 
taken from the wage earners by government. The money 
was paid out immediately and replaced by nothing more 
than an IOU.14 Rather than creating intergenerational 
solidarity, people were encouraged to lobby for more and 
more payments unrelated to their contributions15 and 
unsustainable burdens were shifted to younger people.16 
The system has already turned “cash negative,” meaning 
that the accounting fiction of the “Trust Fund” has been 
revealed; social security is financed by a pyramid scheme, 
not through “investments” or “savings.”17 When people 
are told that their retirement will be taken care of by 
government, it turns out that they consume more and 
save less. Moreover, when the costs fall on one group and 
the benefits on another, the incentives created lead people 
to seek benefits and avoid costs and generate a myriad of 
conflicts, including intergenerational conflict. Self-control 
is never perfect, but state control is no improvement.
9Freedom and Respect for Law
Harmonious social order is possible only when individuals are 
free to control themselves and to coordinate their actions vol-
untarily with others. A harmonious society rests on respect for 
the freedom of each member. Harmonious social order emerges 
not from commands backed by violence, which are more likely 
to disrupt order than to establish it, but from respect for the 
general rules of free societies that delineate spheres of freedom 
and responsibility for each individual.18 The institutions of free 
societies—including manners and mores, markets and prices, 
persuasion and discussion, debate and deliberation—provide the 
mechanisms by which people coordinate their behavior voluntarily.
Many have believed, and some still do, that order can only be 
created by force guided by reason and will. The planet is littered 
with the graves of the victims of that ideology. The reality of 
attempts to create heaven on earth through such planning has 
been not order but what the economist Ludwig von Mises called 
“planned chaos.”19 Sloane Frost, an expert in health administra-
tion policy and a founder of Students for Liberty, showed the 
irrationality of interventionist “planning” in a study of health 
care provision. As she discovered in her research, rather than any 
coherent and rational order,
We get one intervention piled on top of another, with the bot-
tom so far down hardly anyone remembers how the process 
started. The systems become embedded in daily life, as well, 
so much so that people never bother to ask how they got that 
way. What’s worse, because they’re not coherently planned, 
but lurch from crisis to crisis, they are sometimes described 
not as state interventionism but as “free markets” or “laissez 
faire” by people who don’t take the time to understand the 
network of interventions and to trace out the incentives 
they create, how they affect behavior, and how they lead to 
unintended consequences and then more interventions.20
Commands may be suitable for armies, but in the attempts to rep-
licate the planned orders of armies, command-based interventionist 
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policies in fact disrupt existing and emergent functioning patterns 
of coordination and create not more order, but disorder. Systems 
of general and stable rules succeed where commands fail, because 
they allow people to form reasonable expectations of the behavior 
of others and allow them the flexibility to adapt to changing situ-
ations.21 But even if society could be ordered like a vast army, the 
order that would emerge would be far less complex than the orders 
created by free cooperation. If order can be compared to music, 
the orders of free societies resemble not the cadences of military 
marches but the emergent orders of jazz ensembles.
The rule of law is an essential ingredient in freedom; each 
person, including government agents, bears responsibility for 
observing the rule of law. The rule of law is not the same as issu-
ing or obeying specific edicts, orders, and commands backed up 
by force, but entails general rules, such that
under the rule of law the government is prevented from 
stultifying individual efforts by ad hoc action. Within the 
known rules of the game the individual is free to pursue his 
personal ends and desires, certain that the powers of govern-
ment will not be used deliberately to frustrate his efforts.22
The rule of law makes possible individual freedom, but its 
maintenance requires the widespread acceptance of responsibility 
and self-control within the populations of persons who interact 
in myriad ways that are virtually impossible for other parties to 
monitor. There could never be enough policemen in the world 
to force people to follow and maintain the rule of law if there 
was not already a substantial degree of self-control among the 
people, including government agents. When that self-control—
that responsibility to uphold the law—is eroded, it undermines 
the rule of law, the enjoyment of freedom, and social order and 
coordination. Freedom is the key to the experience of responsibil-
ity, as responsibility is necessary for the maintenance of freedom.
John Locke sharply distinguished between the enjoyment of 
freedom and merely doing what one “lists,” that is, what one is 
inclined to do or merely desires to do, regardless of the conse-
quences for oneself or for anyone else:
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[T]he end of law is not to abolish or restrain, but to preserve 
and enlarge Freedom: For in all the states of created beings 
capable of Laws, where there is no Law, there is no Freedom. 
For Liberty is to be free from restraint and violence from 
others which cannot be, where there is no Law: But Freedom 
is not, as we are told, A Liberty for every Man to do what he 
lists: (For who could be free, when every other Man’s Humour 
might domineer over him?) But a Liberty to dispose, and 
order, as he lists, his Person, Actions, Possessions, and his 
whole Property, within the Allowance of those Laws under 
which he is; and therein not to be subject to the arbitrary 
Will of another, but freely follow his own.23
Just as freedom and law are intimately connected, so are 
freedom and responsibility. They are related functionally and 
positively: as one increases, so does the other, and vice versa. 
Responsibility is the very ground of our freedom, as freedom is 
the ground of our responsibility. Embracing our own freedom and 
our own responsibility strengthens our moral awareness, makes 
us mindful of our relations to others and to our own futures, 
improves our character, develops the habits of the good life in 
community with others, fosters respect for the freedom of others, 
and allows us the satisfaction of saying, “I did that; my life is my 
responsibility and I am accountable for what I achieve.”
Our very personal identity is tied up with our freedom and 
responsibility. Richard Overton, an early libertarian writer and 
activist in England, wrote from his prison cell in 1646,
To every individual in nature is given an individual property 
by nature not to be invaded or usurped by any. For every 
one, as he is himself, so he has a self-propriety, else could he 
not be himself.24
Merely to be oneself, each individual must have a “self-propriety,” 
“else could he not be himself.” Frederick Douglass independently 
discovered the same principle:
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Only look at the condition of the slave: stripped of every 
right—denied every privilege, he had not even the privilege 
of saying “myself ”—his head, his eyes, his hands, his heart, 
his bones, his sinews, his soul, his immortal spirit, were all 
the property of another. He might not decide any question 
for himself—any question relating to his own actions. The 
master—the man who claimed property in his person—as-
sumed the right to decide all things for himself.25
As Overton in his lonely prison cell and Douglass meditating 
on his terrible personal experience of slavery both understood, to 
be oneself one must have the freedom to say “my self.”
The Chinese character for liberty, 自由 (zìyóu), connotes 
also “self-determination” or “to be oneself ” and contains the 
character for self, 自 (zì). In personal discussions with Chinese 
scholar-advocates of liberty I have been told that the Chinese 
characters convey the mutual implication of personal freedom 
and responsibility more clearly than the English words freedom 
or liberty. In what follows I will try to tease out the relationship 
more clearly.
Freedom or License?
The philosopher Plato in his book The Republic has Socrates dis-
parage the character of freedom in a democratic regime. Socrates 
asks his interlocutor, Glaucon,
“In the first place, then, aren’t they free? And isn’t the city 
full of freedom and free speech? And isn’t there license in it 
to do whatever one wants?
“That is what is said, certainly,” he said.
“And where there’s license, it’s plain, that each man would 
organize his life in it privately just as it pleases him.”26
The inevitable outcome of such relations is presented in The 
Republic as chaos and immorality. According to Socrates,
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“And the ultimate in the freedom of the multitude, my friend,” 
I said, “occurs in such a city when the purchased slaves, male 
and female, are no less free than those who have bought them. 
And we almost forgot to mention the extent of the law of 
equality and of freedom in the relations of women with men 
and men with women.”
“Won’t we,” he said, “with Aeschylus, ‘say whatever just 
came to our lips’?”27
Slaves would act as if they were just as free as their masters, and 
women would think they were equal to men, and, well, that can’t 
be allowed, can it? People would even say just whatever they feel 
like saying, and that certainly can’t be allowed.
Plato (through his mouthpiece, Socrates) suggested eliminat-
ing the freedom “to say whatever just came to our lips,” as well 
as abolishing property and the family, at least for the “Guardian 
Classes”; in place of democratic governance he proposed rule over 
the city by a “Guardian Class” that would be educated in virtue 
and thus able to ensure that everyone would know his or her 
place and be true to it. The polity would be guided to virtue by 
those with the education that would enable them to know what 
virtue is; that education is not possible for the many, who must 
be guided by their betters. Many philosophers have followed in 
Plato’s footsteps, all convinced that they are smarter, wiser, and 
better than the rest of humanity and thus it is their duty to accept 
the burden of power and to use that power to guide the behavior 
and even the thoughts of others to virtue, progress, godliness, 
purity, order, or whatever higher purpose they see that we cannot. 
Sadly, for such moral philosophers, perhaps, rarely do those who 
succeed in the struggle for power turn out to be philosophers, 
much less moral, and the regimes the philosophers endorse rarely 
show the neat consistency and coherence they envisaged.28 They 
more frequently devour the arrogant intellectuals who proclaimed 
them in the first place.
Freedom requires establishing not systems of power by means 
of which educated elites control the behavior and lives of others, 
but a rule of law, that is to say, a law of rules, in which each person 
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can control himself or herself within a set of rules that facilitate 
cooperation.29 The rules of the road facilitate the transportation 
of millions of people to millions of different destinations, all 
without a central power issuing commands to them; they’re not 
perfect, but rather simple rules of the road help many millions of 
people to avoid collisions and arrive where they want to be every 
minute of every day. Frequently the rules themselves emerged 
without anyone consciously creating and imposing them; even 
the rules of order emerge without conscious direction and are 
the byproducts of people interacting to achieve their own diverse 
ends. The problem is that most people, including intellectuals, 
despite the evidence before their eyes, find it hard to understand 
how people can coordinate their behavior merely by following 
rules that are applicable to all. They can only imagine order when 
there is someone giving orders. Their eyes are closed to the com-
plex order swirling around them. Free societies are vast systems 
of countless interlocking spontaneous orders, from language to 
traffic to moral norms to fashion to markets for groceries, shoes, 
toothpaste, and furniture. Different legal systems offer a variety of 
rules of order, but none would function if people were incapable, 
without conscious external direction or control, of adjusting their 
behavior to that of others in order to realize their own aims, the 
aggregate results of which are systems of order that could not be 
predicted in their particular details. 
It’s not only philosophers and politicians who extol the use of 
power to control other people. The belief is rather widespread 
that authority, power, or even raw force is the only way to “run 
a society.” Everyone else, they believe, must be controlled. Other 
people are not competent to control themselves or to coordinate 
their actions with others who are in control of their own lives and 
actions. It is a false conceit that conscious direction can coordinate 
the behavior of millions of people better than systems of rules that 
allow people to make their own choices and to coordinate their 
behavior voluntarily, to quote Locke, “within the Allowance of 
those Laws under which they are; and therein not to be subject 
to the arbitrary Will of another, but freely follow their own.”
Free people follow their own wills within the rule of law. They 
are responsible for the consequences of their actions and they 
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are responsible for respecting the rights of others to live as free 
persons. Respect for individual rights and the rule of law creates 
social order and virtuous cycles of cooperation, creation of wealth 
through mutually beneficial exchange, and harmony. Not everyone 
sees it that way, of course. From Plato to Putin, advocates of force 
have called submission to their plans the only way to realize the 
truly good, orderly, virtuous, or prosperous society. In seeking to 
relieve us of the responsibility and the freedom to achieve our 
own happiness, they set themselves over us, degrade us, and to 
realize their schemes are compelled to resort to violence. Their 
visions, to the extent they are implemented, realize neither order, 
nor goodness, nor virtue, nor prosperity. Personal responsibility 
and freedom succeed where arbitrary power and coercion fail. 
Benjamin Constant’s words are as true today as they were in his 
day: “Let them confine themselves to being just. We shall assume 
the responsibility of being happy for ourselves.”30 
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How Brain Chemistry Explains Human 
Freedom and Helps Us to Realize It
By John Tierney
Is willpower like a muscle? Can you exercise it? Can you overwork 
or tire it? Can you nourish it? Experimental psychologists have 
learned a great deal about willpower in recent decades. The good 
news is that much of the knowledge gained has very practical value. 
You can strengthen your willpower, improve your life, and through 
self-regulation set yourself free. John Tierney is a science writer at 
the New York Times and co-author with experimental psychologist 
Roy Baumeister of  Willpower: Rediscovering the Greatest Human 
Strength (New York: Penguin Books, 2011).
On July 4, 1776, as his revolutionary declaration of human liberty 
was being finalized and adopted, Thomas Jefferson also produced 
some less-exalted prose. 
“Pd Sparhawk for a thermometer,” he wrote, dutifully recording 
the precise amount—3 pounds, 15 shillings—he had paid that day 
at John Sparhawk’s shop in Philadelphia. Not even the Declaration 
of Independence could distract him from his determination to 
record every purchase. His obsessive recordkeeping was extreme, 
but the zeal for self-control—for setting goals and monitoring 
behavior—was common among his colleagues. As an adolescent, 
George Washington wrote down a list of 110 “rules of civility” 
covering everything from table manners (“Drink not, nor talk with 
your mouth full”) to morality (“Let your recreations be manful 
not sinful”). The young Benjamin Franklin kept weekly charts 
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of his progress toward thirteen specific virtues. By marking any 
lapses in Temperance, Frugality, Industry, Cleanliness, and the 
other virtues, he aimed to “conquer all that either natural inclina-
tion, custom, or company might lead me into.” The Founding 
Fathers believed in the unalienable human right to liberty, but 
they knew it depended on personal responsibility. To be freed 
from a tyrant’s rule, men had to be able to rule themselves: that 
truth seemed self-evident.
Today it’s even more evident, although it has taken social 
scientists a while to catch up with their forebears. During the 
twentieth century, as researchers studied the irrational and un-
conscious forces in the brain, their faith in self-control waned. 
It was replaced by faith in state control: more and more rules 
and programs to protect us from ourselves. But now, thanks 
to new research, the benefits of self-control have become clear 
again. Social scientists find that it’s the supreme virtue, essential 
to individual success and to harmony in a free society. They’ve 
measured its impact on behavior and begun to understand how 
it operates in the brain. They’ve discovered, to their surprise, that 
willpower is not just a quaint metaphor.
The term “willpower” was introduced by Victorians who shared 
the Founding Fathers’ enthusiasm for self-control. Victorians saw 
themselves as living in a time of transition as the moral certainties 
and rigid institutions of feudal Europe died away. Medieval serfs 
had depended on external forms of control over their behavior: 
the dicta of the lord, the commandments of the church, and the 
rigidly enforced norms of the village. But as farmers moved to 
cities during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, they were 
no longer constrained by village churches and the social pressures 
of small groups. Christian religious upheavals and conflicts had 
made religion more individualistic, and the Enlightenment had 
weakened faith in any kind of dogma. A popular topic of debate 
among Victorians was whether morality could survive without 
religion. As they fretted over moral decay and the social patholo-
gies concentrated in cities, Victorians looked for something more 
reliable than divine grace, some internal strength that could 
protect even an atheist.
They called it willpower because of the folk notion that some 
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kind of force was involved—some inner equivalent to the steam 
powering the Industrial Revolution. People sought to increase 
their store of it by following the exhortations of the Englishman 
Samuel Smiles in Self-Help, one of the most popular books of 
the nineteenth century on both sides of the Atlantic. “Genius is 
patience,” he reminded readers, explaining the success of everyone 
from Isaac Newton to Stonewall Jackson as the result of “self-
denial” and “untiring perseverance.”
The fascination with willpower ebbed in the twentieth century, 
partly in reaction to the Victorians’ excesses and partly due to 
economic changes and the world wars. The prolonged bloodshed 
of World War I seemed a consequence of too many stubborn 
gentlemen following their “duty” to senseless deaths. Intellectuals 
preached a more relaxed view of life in America and much of 
Western Europe—but not, unfortunately, in Germany, where they 
developed a “psychology of will” to guide their country during its 
bleak recovery from the war. That theme would be embraced by 
the Nazis, whose rally in 1934 was featured in Leni Riefenstahl’s 
infamous propaganda film, The Triumph of the Will. The Nazi 
concept of mass obedience to a sociopath was hardly the Victorian 
concept of personal moral strength, but the distinction was lost. 
If the Nazis represented the triumph of the will . . . well, when it 
comes to bad PR, there’s nothing quite like a personal endorse-
ment from Adolf Hitler.
The decline of will didn’t seem like such a bad thing, and after 
the war there were other forces weakening it. As technology made 
goods cheaper and suburbanites richer, responding to consumer 
demand became vital to the economy, and a sophisticated new 
advertising industry urged everyone to buy now. Sociologists 
identified a new generation of “other-directed” people who were 
guided by their neighbors’ opinions rather than strong inner 
moral convictions. The stern self-help books of the Victorian 
era came to be seen as naïvely self-centered. The new best sellers 
were cheery works like Dale Carnegie’s How to Win Friends and 
Influence People and Norman Vincent Peale’s Power of Positive 
Thinking. 
The shift in people’s characters was noticed by a psychoana-
lyst named Allen Wheelis, who in the late 1950s revealed what 
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he considered a dirty little secret of his profession: Freudian 
therapies no longer worked the way they were supposed to. In 
his landmark book The Quest for Identity, Wheelis described a 
change in character structure since Freud’s day. The Victorian 
middleclass citizens who formed the bulk of Freud’s patients had 
intensely strong wills, making it difficult for therapists to break 
through their ironclad defenses and their sense of what was right 
and wrong. Freud’s therapies had concentrated on ways to break 
through and let them see why they were neurotic and miserable, 
because once those people achieved insight, they could change 
rather easily. By midcentury, though, people’s character armor 
was different. Wheelis and his colleagues found that people 
achieved insight more quickly than in Freud’s day, but then the 
therapy often stalled and failed. Lacking the sturdy character of 
the Victorians, people didn’t have the strength to follow up on 
the insight and change their lives. Wheelis used Freudian terms 
in discussing the decline of the superego in Western society, but 
he was essentially talking about a weakening of willpower—and 
all this was before the baby boomers came of age in the 1960s with 
a countercultural mantra of “If it feels good, do it.”
Popular culture kept celebrating self-indulgence for the “Me 
Generation” of the 1970s, and there were new arguments against 
willpower from social scientists, whose numbers and influence 
soared during the late twentieth century. Most social scientists 
look for causes of misbehavior outside the individual: poverty, rela-
tive deprivation, oppression, or other failures of the environment 
or the economic and political systems. Searching for external fac-
tors is often more comfortable for everyone, particularly for the 
many academics who worry that they risk the politically incorrect 
sin of “blaming the victim” by suggesting that people’s problems 
might arise from causes inside themselves. Social problems can 
also seem easier to fix than character defects, at least to the social 
scientists proposing new government policies and programs to 
deal with them.
The very notion that people can consciously control them-
selves has traditionally been viewed suspiciously by psychologists. 
Freudians claimed that much of adult human behavior was the 
result of unconscious forces and processes. B. F. Skinner had little 
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respect for the value of consciousness and other mental processes, 
except as needed to process reinforcement contingencies. In 
Beyond Freedom and Dignity, he argued that to understand human 
nature we must get beyond the outmoded values in the book’s 
title. While many of Skinner’s specific theories were discarded, 
aspects of his approach have found new life among psychologists 
convinced that the conscious mind is subservient to the uncon-
scious. The will came to seem so unimportant that it wasn’t even 
measured or mentioned in modern personality theories. Some 
neuroscientists claimed to have disproven its existence. Many 
philosophers refuse to use the term. If they want to debate this 
classical philosophical question of freedom of the will, they prefer 
to speak of freedom of action, not of will, because they doubt 
there is any such thing as will. Some refer disdainfully to “the 
so-called will.” Some scholars have argued that the legal system 
must be revamped to eliminate outdated notions of free will and 
responsibility.
Meanwhile, though, a few other researchers got interested in 
the topic of “self-regulation,” the term that psychologists use for 
self-control. The resurrection of self-control wasn’t led by theo-
rists, who were still convinced that willpower was a Victorian 
myth. But when other psychologists went into the laboratory 
or the field, they kept happening on something that looked an 
awful lot like it.
Some of the first clues came, by accident, from an experiment 
in which four-year-old children were offered a marshmallow but 
told they’d get a bonus (another marshmallow) if they could resist 
eating it for a few minutes. The point of the experiment, led by 
Walter Mischel of Stanford, was merely to study how children 
learned to delay gratification. But many years later, after hearing 
stories about what had happened to some of the children, Mischel 
and his colleagues decided to track down hundreds of veterans 
of the experiments. They found that the ones who had been able 
to resist the marshmallow temptation at age four went on to get 
better grades and test scores.31 The children who had managed to 
hold out the entire fifteen minutes went on to score 210 points 
higher on the SAT than the ones who had caved after the first half 
minute. The children with willpower grew up to become more 
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popular with their peers and their teachers. They earned higher 
salaries. They had a lower body-mass index, suggesting that they 
were less prone to gain weight as middle age encroached. They 
were less likely to report having had problems with drug abuse.
The benefits of self-control looked even more remarkable once 
other research results were aggregated by Roy Baumeister in Losing 
Control, a scholarly book he wrote in 1994 with his wife, Dianne 
Tice, a fellow professor at Case Western Reserve University, and 
Todd Heatherton, a professor at Harvard. “Self-regulation fail-
ure is the major social pathology of our time,” they concluded, 
pointing to the accumulating evidence of its contribution to 
high divorce rates, domestic violence, crime, and a host of other 
problems. The book stimulated more experiments and studies, 
including the development of a scale for measuring self-control 
on personality tests. When researchers compared students’ grades 
with nearly three dozen personality traits, self-control turned out 
to be the only trait that predicted a college student’s grade-point 
average better than chance.32 Self-control also proved to be a 
better predictor of college grades than the student’s IQ or SAT 
score. 33 Although raw intelligence was obviously an advantage, 
the study showed that self-control was more important because it 
helped the students show up more reliably for classes, start their 
homework earlier, and spend more time working and less time 
watching television.
The results were impressive, but how exactly did they come 
about? What was the mechanism of self-control? How to find 
out what was going on inside those students’ brains? The answer, 
it turned out, was to start with warm cookies.
Radishes, Chocolate, and Glucose
Sometimes social scientists have to be a little cruel with their 
experiments. When the college students walked into Baumeister’s 
laboratory, they were already hungry because they’d been fast-
ing, and now they were in a room suffused with the aroma of 
chocolate chip cookies that had just been baked in the lab. The 
experimental subjects sat down at a table with several culinary 
choices: the warm cookies, some pieces of chocolate, and a bowl 
of radishes. Some students were invited to eat the cookies and 
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candy. The unlucky ones were assigned to “the radish condition”: 
no treats, just raw radishes.
To maximize temptation, the researchers left the students alone 
with the radishes and the cookies, and observed them through a 
small, hidden window. The ones in the radish condition clearly 
struggled with the temptation. Many gazed longingly at the cook-
ies before settling down to bite reluctantly into a radish. Some of 
them picked up a cookie and smelled it, savoring the pleasure of 
freshly baked chocolate. A couple accidentally dropped a cookie 
on the floor and then hastened to put it back in the bowl so no 
one would know of their flirtation with sin. But nobody actually 
bit into the forbidden food. The temptation was always resisted, 
if in some cases by the narrowest of margins. All this was to the 
good, in terms of the experiment. It showed that the cookies 
were really quite tempting and that people needed to summon 
up their willpower to resist them.
Then the students were taken to another room and given ge-
ometry puzzles to work on. The students thought they were being 
tested for cleverness, although in fact the puzzles were unsolvable. 
The test was to see how long they’d work before giving up. This 
has been a standard technique that stress researchers and others 
have used for decades because it’s a reliable indicator of overall 
perseverance. (Other research has shown that someone who keeps 
trying one of these unsolvable puzzles will also work longer at 
tasks that are actually doable.)
The students who’d been allowed to eat chocolate chip cookies 
and candy typically worked on the puzzles for about twenty min-
utes, as did a control group of students who were also hungry but 
hadn’t been offered food of any kind. The sorely tempted radish 
eaters, though, gave up in just eight minutes—a huge difference 
by the standards of laboratory experiments.34 They’d successfully 
resisted the temptation of the cookies and the chocolates, but 
the effort left them with less energy to tackle the puzzles. The 
old folk wisdom about willpower appeared to be correct after all, 
unlike the newer and fancier psychological theories of the self.
Willpower was more than a metaphor. There really was a form 
of mental energy that provided self-control—and that could be 
depleted as it was used to resist temptation. This effect, termed 
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“ego depletion,” was demonstrated in dozens of studies involving 
various temptations and tasks.35 The experiments consistently 
demonstrated two lessons:
1. You have a finite amount of willpower that becomes 
depleted as you use it.
2. You use the same stock of willpower for all manner of 
tasks.
You might think you have one reservoir of self-control for 
work, another for dieting, another for exercise, and, another for 
being nice to your family. But the radish experiment showed 
that two completely unrelated activities—resisting chocolate 
and working on geometry puzzles—drew on the same source of 
energy, and this phenomenon has been demonstrated over and 
over. There are hidden connections among the wildly different 
things you do all day.
You use the same supply of willpower to deal with frustrating 
traffic, tempting food, annoying colleagues, demanding bosses, 
and pouting children. The old line about the frustrated worker 
going home and kicking the dog jibes with the ego-depletion 
experiments, although modern workers generally aren’t so mean 
to their pets. They’re more likely to say something nasty to the 
humans in the household. By tracking people from morning 
through night, researchers in Germany calculated that a person 
typically spends between three and four hours a day resisting 
desires36—the desire to eat, the desire to goof off, the desire to 
give your true opinion of your boss’s latest brainstorm. All these 
acts of self-control reduce your willpower.
There is also another important way that willpower gets de-
pleted, as Baumeister’s lab discovered. After the early experiment 
with cookies and radishes, a young colleague at the lab, Jean 
Twenge, came in one day after spending hours with her fiancé 
deciding what to put in their bridal registry. The decision process 
left her utterly exhausted, and it gave the researchers an idea. They 
did experiments with shoppers in a suburban mall and at the 
online site of Dell computers.37 Sure enough, the more decisions 
that shoppers made, the less willpower they had to solve puzzles 
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and do other tasks. Making decisions depleted the same source 
of mental energy as resisting temptations, leading to a condition 
that was dubbed “decision fatigue.”
After decision fatigue sets in, the brain looks for shortcuts in 
two quite different ways. One shortcut is to become reckless: to act 
impulsively instead of expending the energy to first think through 
the consequences. The other shortcut is the ultimate energy saver: 
do nothing. Duck the decision. That eases the mental strain at 
the moment, but it can be costly in the long run, as researchers 
demonstrated in a study at a German car dealership observing 
customers ordering options for their sedans.38 The car buyers—
and these were real customers spending their own money—had 
to choose, for instance, among four styles of gearshift knobs, 
thirteen kinds of tires and rims, twenty-five configurations of 
the engine and gearbox, and a palette of fifty-six different colors 
for the interior of the sedan.
As they started picking features, customers would carefully 
weigh the choices, but as decision fatigue set in they’d start settling 
for whatever the default option was. And the more tough choices 
they encountered early in the process—like going through those 
fifty-six colors to choose the precise shade of gray or brown for 
the sedan’s interior—the quicker people got fatigued and settled 
for the path of least resistance by taking the default option. By 
manipulating the order of the car buyers’ choices, the research-
ers found that the customers would end up settling for different 
kinds of options, and the average difference totaled more than 
1,500 Euros per car (about $2,000 at the time). Whether the 
customers paid a little extra for fancy tire rims or a lot extra for a 
more powerful engine depended on when the choice was offered 
(early or late) and how much willpower was left in the customer.
As they observed the effects of declining willpower, research-
ers tried to figure out what was going on inside the brain. The 
answer emerged unexpectedly in an experiment that had been 
designed to test an entirely different idea called the Mardi Gras 
theory—the notion that you could build up willpower by first 
indulging yourself in pleasure, the way that Mardi Gras feasters do 
just before the rigors of Lent. In place of a Fat Tuesday breakfast, 
the chefs in Baumeister’s lab whipped up lusciously thick ice cream 
25
milkshakes for a group of subjects who were resting in between 
two laboratory tasks requiring willpower. Sure enough, the deli-
cious shakes seem to strengthen willpower by helping people 
perform better than expected on the next task. So far, so good.
But the experiment also included a control group of people who 
were fed a tasteless concoction of low-fat dairy glop. It provided 
them with no pleasure, yet it produced similar improvements in 
self-control. The Mardi Gras theory looked wrong. Besides tragi-
cally removing an excuse for romping through the streets of New 
Orleans, the result was embarrassing for the researchers. Matthew 
Gailliot, the graduate student who had run the study, stood look-
ing glumly at his shoes as he told Baumeister about the fiasco.
Baumeister tried to be optimistic. Maybe the study wasn’t a 
failure. Something had happened, after all. Even the tasteless 
glop had done the job, but how? If it wasn’t the pleasure, could 
it be the calories? At first the idea seemed a bit daft. For decades, 
psychologists had been studying performance on mental tasks 
without worrying about it being affected by a glass of milk. 
They liked to envision the human mind as a computer, focusing 
on the way it processed information. In their eagerness to chart 
the human equivalent of the computer’s chips and circuits, most 
psychologists neglected one mundane but essential part of the 
machine: the power cord.
To establish cause and effect, researchers tried recharging the 
brain in a series of experiments involving lemonade mixed either 
with sugar or with a diet sweetener.39 Again and again, the sugar 
improved self-control, but the artificial sweetener had no effect. 
Only the sugar provided the glucose necessary to refuel the brain’s 
supply of willpower. The researchers used the sugary drink because 
it produced quick effects in the lab, but they didn’t recommend 
it for everyday use because sugar produces a cycle of glucose 
boom-and-bust. The body converts all sorts of food into glucose, 
and it’s easier to maintain self-control by eating foods that release 
glucose more slowly and consistently (like vegetables and nuts).
As they studied the effects of ego depletion, researchers began 
to think of willpower as a muscle that got weakened as it was used. 
But, like a muscle, could it also be strengthened through exer-
cise? They knew that a quick boost of glucose could temporarily 
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strengthen willpower, but was there a way to gradually build up 
stamina over time? Was there anything to the Victorian notion 
of “building character,” or to Benjamin Franklin’s weekly charts 
and his exercises strengthening self-discipline? It seemed un-
likely, but then another happy accident occurred in Baumeister’s 
laboratory.
Building Character
When they set out to improve people’s willpower, Baumeister’s 
team decided to try several strategies.40 After doing an initial 
test of students’ willpower on some tasks in the lab, they sent 
the students off with varying instructions. One group was told 
to work on their posture for the next two weeks. Whenever 
they thought of it, they were to try to stand up straight or sit up 
straight. Since most of these (or any) college students were used 
to casually slouching, the exercises would force them to expend 
energy overriding their habitual response. A second group was 
used to test the notion that willpower was exhausting because 
of the energy required for self-monitoring (like Jefferson’s zeal 
for tracking his spending). These students were told to record 
whatever they ate for the next two weeks. They didn’t have to 
make any changes to their diet, though it was possible that some 
of them might have been shamed into a few adjustments. (Hmm. 
Monday, pizza and beer. Tuesday, pizza and wine. Wednesday, hot 
dogs and Coke. Maybe it would look better if I ate a salad or an 
apple now and then.) A third group was used to check the effects 
of altering one’s state of mind. They were instructed to strive for 
positive moods and emotions during the two weeks. Whenever 
they found themselves feeling bad, these students should strive to 
cheer themselves up. Sensing a potential winner, the researchers 
elected to make this group twice as large as the other groups, so 
as to get the most statistically reliable results.
But the researchers’ hunch was dead wrong. Their favorite 
strategy turned out to do no good at all. The large group that 
practiced controlling emotions for two weeks showed no im-
provement when the students returned to the lab and repeated 
the self-control tests. In retrospect, this failure seems less surpris-
ing than it did back then. Emotion regulation does not rely on 
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willpower. People cannot simply will themselves to be in love, or 
to feel intense joy, or to stop feeling guilty. Emotional control 
typically relies on various subtle tricks, such as changing how 
one thinks about the problem at hand, or distracting oneself. 
Hence, practicing emotional control does not strengthen your 
willpower.
But other exercises do help, as demonstrated by the groups 
in the experiment that worked on their posture and recorded 
everything they ate. When they returned to the lab after two 
weeks, their scores on the self-control tests went up, and the 
improvement was significantly higher by comparison with a 
control group (which did no exercises of any kind during the two 
weeks). This was a striking result, and with careful analyses of the 
data, the conclusions became clearer and stronger. Unexpectedly, 
the best results came from the group working on posture. That 
tiresome old advice—“Sit up straight!”—was more useful than 
anyone had imagined. By overriding their habit of slouching, the 
students strengthened their willpower and did better at tasks that 
had nothing to do with posture. The improvement was most pro-
nounced among the students who had followed the advice most 
diligently (as measured by the daily logs the students kept of how 
often they’d forced themselves to sit up or stand up straight).
The experiment also revealed an important distinction in self-
control between two kinds of strength: power and stamina. At the 
initial lab session, participants began by squeezing a spring-loaded 
handgrip for as long as they could (which had been shown in other 
experiments to be a good measure of willpower, not just physical 
strength). Then, after expending mental energy on another task, 
they did a second handgrip task to assess how they fared when 
willpower was depleted. Two weeks later, when they returned to 
the lab after working on their posture, their scores on the initial 
handgrip tests didn’t show much improvement, meaning that the 
willpower muscle hadn’t gotten more powerful. But they had much 
more stamina, as evidenced by their improved performance on 
the subsequent handgrip test administered after the researchers 
tried to fatigue them. Thanks to the students’ posture exercises, 
their willpower didn’t get depleted as quickly as before, so they 
had more stamina for other tasks.
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You could try the two-week posture experiment to improve 
your own willpower, or you could try other exercises. There’s 
nothing magical about sitting up straight, as researchers subse-
quently discovered when they tested other regimens and found 
similar benefits. You can pick and choose from the techniques 
they studied, or extrapolate to create your own system. The 
key is to concentrate on changing a habitual behavior. If you’re 
right-handed, you might try using your left hand instead of your 
habitual right hand for brushing your teeth, using a computer 
mouse, opening doors, or lifting a cup to your lips. You could 
try changing your speech habits by forcing yourself to speak only 
in complete sentences, or to always say “yes” instead of “yeah.”
Or you could simply improve your self-control in one aspect 
of your life, as students did in an experiment in Australia.41 The 
researchers, Meg Oaten and Ken Cheng, provided coaching for 
several forms of self-improvement. Some students were given 
membership in a gym and help with drawing up a fitness program. 
Another group was coached to improve their study habits. Others 
worked on their money management by drawing up a budget 
and keeping track of what they spent. All of the students came 
back to the lab from time to time for an exercise that seemed ir-
relevant to their self-improvement programs. They had to identify 
patterns on a computer screen while using self-control to avoid 
a nearby distraction (a video of a comedy routine playing on a 
television). As the weeks went by, the students got progressively 
better at ignoring the temptation of the comedy routine. They 
also made progress toward their various goals. Those in the fit-
ness program got fitter; those working on study discipline got 
more schoolwork done; the people in the money-management 
program saved more money.
But—and here was a truly pleasant surprise—they also got 
better at other things. The students who did the study-discipline 
program reported doing physical workouts a bit more often and 
cutting down on impulsive spending. Those in the fitness and 
money-management programs studied more diligently. Exercising 
self-control in one area seemed to improve all areas of life. They 
smoked fewer cigarettes and drank less alcohol. They kept their 
homes cleaner. They washed dishes instead of leaving them stacked 
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in the sink, and did their laundry more often. They procrastinated 
less. They did their work and chores instead of watching televi-
sion or hanging out with friends first.
By strengthening the willpower muscle, they achieved that 
Victorian goal of building character. The Victorians have a reputa-
tion for repression—and they could be quite odd about sex—but 
they knew that self-control is a form of liberation. That’s why it’s 
the quintessential human virtue. By being able to resist immediate 
impulses, you are free to plan for your own future—and to live in 
a society where your neighbors are free to plan theirs.
The Free Society and Its Friends
As psychologists were identifying the benefits of self-control, 
anthropologists and neuroscientists were trying to understand 
how it evolved. The human brain is distinguished by large and 
elaborate frontal lobes, giving us what was long assumed to be the 
crucial evolutionary advantage: the intelligence to solve problems 
in the environment. After all, a brainier animal could presumably 
survive and reproduce better than a dumb one. But big brains 
also require lots of energy. The adult human brain makes up 2 
percent of the body but consumes more than 20 percent of its 
energy. Extra gray matter is useful only if it enables an animal 
to get enough extra calories to power it, and scientists didn’t 
understand how the brain was paying for itself. What, exactly, 
made ever-larger brains with their powerful frontal lobes spread 
through the gene pool?
One early explanation for the large brain involved bananas and 
other calorie-rich fruits. Animals that graze on grass don’t need 
to do a lot of thinking about where to find their next meal. But 
a tree that had perfectly ripe bananas a week ago may be picked 
clean today or may have only unappealing, squishy brown fruits 
left. A banana eater needs a bigger brain to remember where the 
ripe stuff is, and the brain could be powered by all the calories 
in the bananas, so the “fruit-seeking brain theory” made lots of 
sense—but only in theory. The anthropologist Robin Dunbar 
found no support for it when he surveyed the brains and diets 
of different animals. Brain size did not correlate with the type 
of food.
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Dunbar eventually concluded that the large brain did not evolve 
to deal with the physical environment, but rather with something 
even more crucial to survival: social life.42 Animals with bigger 
brains had larger and more complex social networks. That sug-
gested a new way to understand Homo sapiens. Humans are the 
primates who have the largest frontal lobes because we have the 
largest social groups, and that’s apparently why we have the most 
need for self-control. We tend to think of willpower as a force for 
personal betterment—adhering to a diet, getting work done on 
time, going out to jog, quitting smoking—but that’s probably not 
the primary reason it evolved so fully in our ancestors.
Primates are social beings who have to control themselves in 
order to get along with the rest of the group. They depend on one 
another for the food they need to survive. When the food is shared, 
often it’s the biggest and strongest male who gets first choice in 
what to eat, with the others waiting their turns according to status. 
For animals to survive in such a group without getting beaten up, 
they must restrain their urge to eat immediately. Chimpanzees 
and monkeys couldn’t get through meals peacefully if they had 
squirrel-sized brains. They might expend more calories in fighting 
than they’d consume at the meal.
Although other primates have the mental power to exhibit 
some rudimentary etiquette at dinner, their self-control is still 
quite puny by human standards. Experts surmise that the smartest 
nonhuman primates can mentally project perhaps twenty minutes 
into the future—long enough to let the alpha male eat, but not 
long enough for much planning beyond dinner.43 (Some animals, 
like squirrels, instinctively bury food and retrieve it later, but these 
are programmed behaviors, not conscious savings plans.) In one 
experiment, when monkeys were fed only once a day, at noon, 
they never learned to save food for the future. Even though they 
could take as much as they wanted during the noon feeding, they 
would simply eat their fill, either ignoring the rest or wasting it 
by getting into food fights with one another. They’d wake up 
famished every morning because it never occurred to them to 
stash some of their lunch away for an evening snack or breakfast.
Humans know better thanks to the large brain that developed 
in our Homo ancestors two million years ago. Much of self-control 
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operates unconsciously. At a business lunch, you don’t have to 
consciously restrain yourself from eating meat off your boss’s 
plate. Your unconscious brain continuously helps you avoid social 
disaster, and it operates in so many subtly powerful ways that 
some psychologists have come to view it as the real boss. This 
infatuation with unconscious processes stems from a fundamental 
mistake made by researchers who keep slicing behavior into thin-
ner and briefer units, identifying reactions that occur too quickly 
for the conscious mind to be directing. If you look at the cause 
of some movement in a time frame measured in milliseconds, 
the immediate cause will be the firing of some nerve cells that 
connect the brain to the muscles. There is no consciousness in 
that process. Nobody is aware of nerve cells firing.
But the will is to be found in connecting units across time.44 
Will involves treating the current situation as part of a general 
pattern.45 Smoking one cigarette will not jeopardize your health. 
Taking heroin once will not make you addicted. One piece of 
cake won’t make you fat, and skipping one assignment won’t ruin 
your career. But in order to stay healthy and employed, you must 
treat (almost) every episode as a reflection of the general need 
to resist these temptations. That’s where conscious self-control 
comes in, and that’s why it makes the difference between success 
and failure in just about every aspect of life, as researchers have 
been reporting in study after study.
In workplaces, managers scoring high in self-control were 
rated more favorably by their subordinates as well as by their 
peers. People with good self-control seemed exceptionally good 
at forming and maintaining secure, satisfying attachments to 
other people. They were shown to be better at empathizing with 
others and considering things from other people’s perspectives. 
They were more stable emotionally and less prone to anxiety, de-
pression, paranoia, psychoticism, obsessive-compulsive behavior, 
eating disorders, drinking problems, and other maladies. They 
got angry less often, and when they did get angry, they were less 
likely to get aggressive, either verbally or physically. Meanwhile, 
people with poor self-control were likelier to hit their partners 
and to commit a variety of other crimes—again and again, as 
demonstrated by June Tangney, who worked with Baumeister 
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to develop the self-control scale on personality tests. When she 
tested prisoners and then tracked them for years after their release, 
she found that the ones with low self-control were most likely to 
commit more crimes and return to prison.46
The strongest evidence yet was published in 2011. In a pains-
taking long-term study, much larger and more thorough than 
anything done previously, an international team of researchers 
tracked one thousand children in New Zealand from birth until 
the age of thirty-two.47 Each child’s self-control was rated in a 
variety of ways (through observations by researchers as well as 
in reports of problems from parents, teachers, and the children 
themselves). This produced an especially reliable measure of chil-
dren’s self-control, and the researchers were able to check it against 
an extraordinarily wide array of outcomes through adolescence 
and into adulthood. The children with high self-control grew 
up into adults who had better physical health, including lower 
rates of obesity, fewer sexually transmitted diseases, and even 
healthier teeth. (Apparently, good self-control includes brushing 
and flossing.) Self-control was irrelevant to adult depression, but 
its lack made people more prone to alcohol and drug problems.
The children with poor self-control tended to wind up poorer 
financially. They worked in relatively low-paying jobs, had little 
money in the bank, and were less likely to own a home or have 
money set aside for retirement. They also grew up to have more 
children being raised in single-parent households, presumably 
because they had a harder time adapting to the discipline required 
for a long-term relationship. The children with good self-control 
were much more likely to wind up in a stable marriage and raise 
children in a two-parent home. Last, but certainly not least, the 
children with poor self-control were more likely to end up in 
prison. Among those with the lowest levels of self-control, more 
than 40 percent had a criminal conviction by the age of thirty-
two, compared with just 12 percent of the people who had been 
toward the high end of the self-control distribution in their youth.
Not surprisingly, some of those differences were correlated with 
intelligence and social class and race, but all those results remained 
significant even when those factors were taken into account. In 
a follow-up study, the same researchers looked at brothers and 
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sisters from the same families so that they could compare children 
who grew up in similar homes. Again, over and over, the sibling 
with the lower self-control during childhood ended up worse 
off during adulthood: sicker, poorer, more likely to spend time 
in prison. The results couldn’t have been clearer: self-control is 
a vital strength and key to success in life.
The rediscovery of self-control has rehabilitated some Victorian 
notions and caused researchers to reexamine their own “progres-
sive” assumptions. The original Progressives, in the early twentieth 
century, envisioned an America guided by experts using scientific 
principles to mold a new kind of society. They believed the future 
belonged to countries that emphasized collective rather than in-
dividual responsibility. Many social scientists eagerly went along 
with that project—after all, they were the certified experts at shap-
ing human behavior. They provided the rationale for Prohibition, 
and after that progressive reform failed, they kept on looking for 
new ways to regulate the rest of the country. The growing nanny 
state dictated which vices were legal, which temptations could 
be advertised, which medicines could be sold, which foods were 
permissible, which sugary beverages were taboo (anything over 
16 ounces in New York City).
Critics of those progressive policies were dismissed as unscien-
tific dinosaurs—or worse. Social scientists pathologized rejection 
of progressive goals and adherence to traditions, which they 
categorized as conservatism. People who believed in traditional 
notions of individual responsibility were at best naïfs and at worst 
oppressors. Psychologists reported that those they identified as 
conservatives were authoritarian, unscientific, dogmatic, and 
hostile to new ideas.48 Their emphasis on the individual over the 
collective was considered a strategy for preserving their status in 
the hierarchy. In 2004, when researchers noticed that conservative 
students got higher grades in economics classes than liberals did, 
the explanation seemed obvious: conservatives were preserving 
their privileged social positions.49 “Academic disciplines which 
are more likely to provide students with future access to social 
and economic power tend to favor individuals who hold attitudes 
that strengthen the existing societal order,” the researchers wrote. 
They couldn’t explain exactly how the conservative students were 
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getting higher grades, but it was clear that economics depart-
ments were perpetuating the oppressive class system in America 
by “creating a differential advantage for individuals who can be 
expected to maintain a system of group-based social hierarchy.”
A decade later, some other social scientists took another look at 
the differences between conservative and liberal students.50 This 
time, instead of theorizing about the racist patriarchy, they tested 
the students’ ability to concentrate on mental tasks. It turned out 
that the conservative students had better self-control than did 
the liberals, a finding that offers a much more direct explanation 
for their higher grades. It also helps explain their conservative 
political beliefs. Those with faith in individual self-control don’t 
automatically look to the state for protection, either for them-
selves or for their neighbors. Instead, they concentrate on their 
own self-discipline by using the same basic strategies employed 
by Thomas Jefferson and Ben Franklin.
The first step in improving self-control is to set a goal, which 
sounds simple enough. But just about all of us suffer from what 
psychologists call the “planning fallacy”: we routinely underesti-
mate how long a job will take. A project typically takes twice as 
long as predicted, and often longer. That’s why people will often 
set more goals for the week than they could possibly accomplish 
all month. You’re better off choosing a few important goals—per-
haps only one for the week—and then carefully keeping track of 
your progress. Monitoring your progress toward a goal is just as 
important as setting the goal. It’s essential to any kind of self-
control. If you want to cut your spending, keep track of it every 
week. If you want to lose weight, get on a scale every day—that’s 
one of the few clinically proven ways for taking off pounds.51
Another essential strategy, what Baumeister calls “playing 
offense,” emerged from a study tracking self-disciplined people 
throughout the day.52 The researchers expected to see them 
frequently using their strong willpower to conquer temptations. 
But it turned out these disciplined people actually used willpower 
less often than average. The researchers were puzzled until they 
figured out these people’s secret: they structured their lives to 
minimize temptations. They stayed away from all-you-can-eat 
buffets. They didn’t keep bowls of candy on their desks or gallons 
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of ice cream in their freezers. If they wanted to focus on a project, 
they turned off their email notifications. They conserved their 
limited supply of willpower so that it was available for emergen-
cies and important decisions. They played offense, not defense, 
and they flourished as a result.
Willpower is vital to any kind of personal success, but ultimately 
self-control is about much more than self-help. Of all the benefits 
that have been demonstrated in Baumeister’s experiments, one 
of the most heartening is this: people with stronger willpower 
are more altruistic.53 They’re more likely to donate to charity, to 
do volunteer work, and to offer their own homes as shelter to 
someone with no place to go. Willpower evolved because it was 
essential for our ancestors to get along with the rest of the clan, 
and it’s still serving that purpose today. Inner discipline still leads 
to outer kindness.
The Founding Fathers’ conception of individual liberty may 
seem quaint to those clamoring for the state to protect the weak-
willed populace from new menaces and temptations. But the 
rediscovery of willpower offers an alternative vision: a society in 
which individuals have the brains and the strength to deal with 
new problems. Our willpower has made us the most adaptable 
creatures on the planet, and we’re rediscovering how to use it for 
our mutual benefit. We’re learning, once again, that willpower is 
the virtue that sets our species apart, and that sets each of us free.
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Life in the Nanny State: How Welfare 
Impacts Those Who Receive It
By Lisa Conyers
What is life like when responsibility for one’s own well being has 
been taken over by the state? How much liberty does one enjoy when 
subjected to drug testing, controls on alcohol consumption, or com-
pulsory maternity tests? What happens to the pursuit of happiness 
when that pursuit is largely dictated by bureaucratic imperatives? 
Lisa Conyers is director of policy studies for the DKT Liberty Project 
and co-author with Phil Harvey of The Human Cost of Welfare: 
How the System Hurts the People It’s Supposed to Help (Santa 
Barbara: Praeger, 2016), for which she interviewed welfare profes-
sionals and men and women on welfare across the United States 
on the streets, in laundromats, shelters, bus stations, homeless tent 
cities, and on Indian reservations.
In the late 1980s and the early 1990s, and again from 2012 through 
2014, I traveled the United States interviewing a wide sampling 
of people who were dependent on means-tested public assistance 
programs, also known as “welfare.” I wanted to know whether 
depending on welfare had an impact on recipients’ freedom to 
pursue happiness, and whether removing responsibility for earn-
ing one’s keep changed people’s perceptions of their lives. Was it 
possible, I wondered, to be happy without contributing to one’s 
own sustenance?
And what about that crucial relationship between freedom and 
responsibility—what happens when people give up their freedom 
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in exchange for a life controlled by faceless bureaucracies? Does 
their sense of personal responsibility fall by the wayside? Do they 
lose sight of what freedom feels like, and what it means?
Of course, life on welfare is not free of responsibilities, in-
cluding those required to qualify and re-qualify for the various 
federal, state, and local programs that provide public assistance. 
But this is not meaningful work that adds to recipients’ wealth, 
skills, or self-respect.
As I was learning about the links between welfare and work, 
and freedom and happiness, what surprised me most were the 
many things I discovered about how the welfare system backfires—
actually harming the people it is supposed to help. It turns out 
that the most enervating aspects of welfare dependency include 
the fact that the system tends to keep people poor (and some-
times makes them poorer), and that it often makes work a losing 
proposition instead of a reward. But the most moving tragedy, to 
me, is the toll dependency takes on one’s feelings of self-worth 
and dignity, and the consequent sense of having lost control of 
one’s own life and destiny.
What follows is some of what I learned on the road about the 
many ways usurping people’s responsibility for their own welfare 
and making them dependent on government affects those who 
become dependent. First, though, here’s a brief look at how 
Americans came to have such an expansive welfare state, and how 
it works for those trapped in it.
A Brief History of the Welfare State
In the early 1960s, before President Lyndon Johnson launched 
his “War on Poverty,” Americans spent 6.1 percent of their GDP 
on means-tested social welfare;54 today, Americans spend close to 
14.5 percent.55 In 1965, when the poverty war was launched, 20 
percent of the population—roughly 39 million Americans—lived 
in poverty.56 Today a smaller proportion of Americans, 14 percent, 
are classified as poor; a significant improvement, but that still 
leaves 44 million Americans in poverty.57 Further, about $700 
billion of our $3.5 trillion federal budget is spent on programs 
for the poor.58 Means-tested welfare payments cost the average 
taxpayer $10,000 a year.59 One in five Americans now relies on 
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at least one form of public assistance, with 46 million Americans, 
almost one in six, on food stamps alone.60
Johnson’s War on Poverty required a definition of poverty to 
determine who would qualify for benefits. Since 1965, poverty has 
been defined as living at or below a federally defined “poverty line.” 
The calculation of that number is provided by the Department of 
Health and Human Services and represents three times the an-
nual cost of an adequate American diet. In other words, you live 
in poverty if your income is three times or less than the annual 
cost of an average adequate American diet.61 That formula has 
not changed in fifty years. In 1965, that poverty line was $2,000 
($11,600 today in inflation-adjusted dollars per annum).62 And the 
poverty line for a single person in 2015 is about the same: $11,770.63 
Until 2008, as long as your income was at or below this poverty 
line, you were considered poor, and could qualify for benefits.
But in 2008, with the passage of the American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act (ARRA, the federal response to the 2008 
recession) billions of federal dollars were injected into the US 
economy on the theory that it was necessary to stave off a full-
blown depression. Part of that act extended social welfare benefits 
to people earning—in some cases—as much as 400 percent of the 
poverty baseline.64 The result was an enormous uptick in social 
welfare spending. America’s welfare programs now serve not only 
the poor, but the middle class as well.
In a recent National Affairs magazine article, Daniel Armor 
and Sonia Sousa write:
Today, more than half of the benefits allocated through 
programs we think of as “anti-poverty” efforts actually 
go to people above the poverty line as defined by the US 
Census Bureau. As a result, our poverty programs—once 
justified and defended as a safety net for Americans truly in 
need—exist, increasingly, to make life more comfortable for 
the middle class.65
Meanwhile, those in deep poverty, defined as living on an 
income of 50 percent or less of the poverty line, have seen the 
value of their benefits decrease in the last five years. So while the 
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middle class is now benefitting from programs designed to help 
the poor, those most in need of help are getting less of it.66
One thing that has changed positively for those below the 
poverty line is that their lives have become less materially de-
prived. A majority of poor households now have microwaves, 
a car, cable television, and many have air-conditioning and/or 
personal computers; a far cry from the destitution portrayed in the 
famous 1964 Time magazine article about poverty in Appalachia67 
that was credited with inspiring Johnson to launch the War on 
Poverty. Those in poverty are certainly less destitute than were the 
poor of the past; people are clearly materially better off, whether 
from income transfers or simply the fact of rising prosperity. But 
poverty rates remain stubbornly high. As Michael Tanner at the 
Cato Institute remarked recently:
The poverty rate has been effectively flat for almost fifty years, 
suggesting that the welfare system has done little to increase 
self-sufficiency among the poor. In essence, our welfare pro-
grams are not fighting poverty by helping people escape to 
the middle class through work and education; the programs 
are merely making the terrible situation of living in poverty 
more endurable. We are throwing these people a life preserver 
to keep them afloat, but not pulling them into the boat. We 
are effectively creating and perpetuating a dependent class.68
In other words, we have made poverty less uncomfortable for the 
poor—a worthy achievement—but we’re not solving the problem.
How Welfare Works
One of the first things our welfare system does is make people 
poorer so that they may qualify for benefits. Qualifying for ben-
efits means spending down assets and savings, and that includes 
vehicles, which is especially problematic. The ability to move 
around, make appointments and keep them—much of our daily 
lives revolves around transportation, predominantly the personal 
automobile, and yet we make car ownership difficult for those 
who seek welfare.
“When I went in to apply for food stamps, I had to give them 
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all my bank statements, pay stubs, information on my savings, my 
bills, my car—every asset I had, every penny had to be disclosed,” 
said Ken. He’s a thirty-year-old cook in a suburban strip mall 
outside Los Angeles who is serving me lunch on Saturday morn-
ing. Business is slow, so he settles in for a chat, leaning across the 
counter, wiping stray crumbs onto the floor.
“I had a car; it wasn’t anything fancy, but it was worth about 
$4,000, and they told me I couldn’t have the car and qualify 
for food stamps. The total value of the assets I could own was 
$2,000. I had to sell the car, live on the proceeds, and once those 
were gone then I would qualify. They want you coming in there 
completely destitute—you can’t build up savings, you have to live 
hand to mouth. That’s the deal.”
Ken’s experience is not unusual. In order to qualify for welfare 
benefits, applicants must disclose all their assets. Social workers 
then apply a means test to determine whether applicants are poor 
enough to meet the criteria to qualify for assistance. Fair enough. 
We don’t want to give money to people who have money; we 
want to help the poor. But the consequence of that is the system 
makes people poorer than they already are. They cannot hold on 
to savings or physical assets worth more than a certain amount; 
they must dispose of assets that they could otherwise use as col-
lateral for loans or emergency safety nets. This means that they 
lose control of their own personal backup plan; the government 
is now the default safety net.
One hot September evening in the Bronx I interviewed Shauna, 
a young mother of two. We were sitting at a bus stop across the 
street from a children’s playground. We watched adolescent boys 
chase each other around the jungle gym in the dusk, showing 
surprising agility given that the burned-out street lights had 
left the park with only ambient light from passing cars and the 
buildings across the street. Their shouts got quieter as darkness 
fell, and eventually they left for home.
Shauna sat waiting for her bus, and she told me of her experi-
ence when her grandfather died and left her his car. “It was a 
Cadillac, and worth about $8,000. Unfortunately, he left it to just 
me, with the understanding that I’d share it with my sisters—but 
that doesn’t work. In the eyes of the welfare office, I had an asset 
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worth $8,000 and that was going to disqualify me from benefits—
I was going to lose my housing voucher, Medicaid, food stamps, 
cash assistance . . . all of it.”
Instead, she and her sisters sold the car and split the proceeds. 
A car, which could have provided them all with transportation 
to schools and jobs and trainings, and could have been used to 
get other relatives to doctor’s appointments and other errands, 
was instead sold, the profits distributed and spent, all so that 
the welfare office would continue their benefits. “I don’t know, 
maybe that’s right, but what it felt like was I was about to get a 
little freedom, a little step up, and they didn’t like that idea, they 
wanted to keep me right where they had me. So here I am, at the 
bus stop, waiting for the bus that’ll take me an hour to get home. 
That car would have taken me ten minutes.”
The system took away what could have been a tool to gain 
some self-control and maybe even get out of poverty—a tool to 
look for a new job in a wider geographic area, or expand the job 
search to include jobs that require cars. The system made Ken 
and Shauna poorer.
It is worth noting that some US welfare programs have recently 
begun to allow an exemption for a personal vehicle or in some 
cases have raised the allowable value, but not all have done so. As 
a result, while owning a car might be permissible while receiving 
benefits from one program, car ownership may disqualify recipi-
ents for other programs, and navigating those rules is complicated 
at best. Once having qualified for assistance, welfare recipients 
are required to regularly re-qualify. This is a good thing if we 
are trying to make judicious use of our welfare dollars and make 
sure only the needy get help. But this one-size-fits-all approach 
can have burdensome consequences.
One mother in Seattle, whose five children are all on assistance, 
remarked recently, “Every time I go in to the office there’s another 
form I gotta do, and another, and another. Then I gotta go ’cross 
town to another office, then they gotta have my baby’s birth cer-
tificate for something. You know, they got all these computers 
in there, and I know it wouldn’t be that hard to just put me in 
there once and call it good, but instead I’m just running around 
in circles trying to make sure I do everything I’m supposed to do.” 
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Asked about work prospects, she rolls her eyes and says, “How 
you gonna look for a job when at least two to three times a month 
you gotta be over there, spending hours in line, waiting for your 
turn to find out what you gotta do next? What boss is gonna let 
you off work for that?”
If the stakes weren’t so high, the regulations wouldn’t seem so 
onerous, but failing to comply with any rule can lead to a loss of 
benefits, which in turn means going to the back of the line and 
re-applying, often with a lag in benefits in between. For those on 
the bottom end of the economic ladder, a month or two without 
benefits can be catastrophic.
Those who participate most heavily in welfare have the most 
to lose. If a beneficiary crosses the asset or income line, he or she 
may lose all benefits at once. That’s commonly known as the 
“welfare cliff,” and it’s what keeps many mothers from pursuing 
work. Imagine a young single mother with two children. She is 
unemployed. She lives in housing paid for by Section 8 housing 
vouchers; her utilities are paid for with utility subsidies; her 
medical needs are covered by Medicaid; she gets formula and 
health supplements for herself through the Women, Infants, and 
Children program known as WIC; she gets food stamps. If that 
woman were to suddenly fall off the welfare rolls, she would have 
to earn close to $40,000 a year in order to replace the value of 
the benefits she would lose. That becomes an incentive not to 
work; the risk of losing the benefits is too great. Employment 
thus becomes, instead of a path out of poverty, a risk to her and 
her family’s wellbeing.
Janie, a mother of three in Chicago, described it this way: “I 
went in to tell my social worker I was going to take a part-time 
job and she told me, ‘Oh, no, no, no, you can’t take that job. If 
you do you’ll lose everything—your housing, your benefits. It’s 
best you stay home.’ People say they don’t want us on welfare, 
but they make it so if you get a job and start trying to work your 
way out they pull the rug out from under you. You can’t win.”
And this welfare cliff affects the low-income employed as well. 
One nurse I met, working in a migrant and community health 
center in rural Washington, explained her situation this way: “I 
just got offered a nursing supervisor position. It would be great 
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for my career for me to take it. But I can’t, because right now, I 
qualify for public housing because of my low income and number 
of kids. And I’ll lose that if I earn any more money. And I’ll lose 
our subsidized health care and our food stamps. I did the math, 
and the raise isn’t going to cover the value of those benefits.” In 
her case, improving her career was too risky and was going to 
cost her money.
Keith, a young man I met in New Orleans who was working 
two part-time jobs, describes his experience when he accidentally 
broke a food stamp rule. “My aunts asked me what I wanted for 
Christmas one year, and I told them I’d just lost a roommate, who 
had stuck me with the utility bills. I asked if instead of buying 
me stuff they’d just pay the bills, so in that month they paid my 
utilities and got me caught up. Well, the next month I had to 
go re-qualify for food stamps, and I told the social worker what 
had happened.”
He paused, took a deep breath, and went on: “I know. I get 
it. They are just doing their jobs. But what happened is they 
took away my food stamps; they said the gift was income, that 
I needed to declare it, and the amount of the gift took me over 
the income limit. And, on top of that, I had to give back my food 
stamp money from the previous month, and it took me three 
months to get back on. I guess it makes sense, but it sure made 
a mess of my finances.” In Keith’s case, he was doing the best he 
could; holding down two part-time jobs, always on the lookout 
for another, and the food stamps were just enough to make sure 
he could eat decently most of the time. For those without other 
income, bumps in the road like that can become sinkholes that 
trap them in deeper poverty, and make it even harder to escape.
Dora, a young mother in Georgia I met while I was observing 
a job-training program at a local welfare office, had just been 
told she couldn’t participate anymore because she had been 
diagnosed with a rare and usually fatal illness, “I wish I could 
just walk in there and say, ‘Here, take your welfare, I don’t need 
it no more.’ I want my babies to see me as a proud black mama, 
working, bringing in the money. I hate them seeing me getting 
that welfare check every month. My doctor says I can’t work, and 
now they say I can’t be in this program, but I’m planning to cut 
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hair in my house, until I’m too sick to keep doing it. Hopefully, 
by then, I’ll have earned enough to get off welfare. It will have 
to be under the table, because they say I can’t work, and I know 
that is breaking the rules, but I just want the day to come when I 
can walk in and say to my social worker, ‘No thanks; I don’t need 
you anymore. I’m good. I got this.’ That will be the day I get my 
self-esteem back, and can hold my head up again and be proud. 
I just hope I don’t die first.”
Health Costs of Social Welfare Programs
Having no work to do means boredom, and often depression, 
alcohol, and drugs. While many of those on welfare keep busy, 
many do not. Several mothers I met at a local park in Harlem 
described what they do all day. “We hang out with our friends. 
We eat. We drink,” one said. “Then we hang out some more.”
Added another, “I’d rather be working, I know that. I get 
so bored sometimes I start making work for myself, washing 
clothes that don’t need washing, doing my babies’ hair up into 
silly hairdos.” Work at a job means, at the very least, doing things 
that need doing.
Of those I interviewed, a strong majority smoked cigarettes; 
alcohol use and abuse were common, and many admitted to us-
ing drugs. “I smoke cigarettes, and drink, and smoke pot, sure,” 
said Julie. “Why not? This living on the welfare check business 
is a dead-end road; this way I don’t have to think about it too 
much. Get high, and the day goes by faster and with less stress. 
I’ve been selling my food stamps for awhile now, since I can get 
plenty of food at the shelter. It’s crappy tobacco, crappy liquor, 
crappy pot, but it’s better than nothing.”
“I go to work high every day,” reported Sam, a young man on 
food stamps who works two part-time jobs and still can’t quite 
make ends meet. “That way I don’t stress about it.”
It’s possible to have some sympathy with such attitudes. Life on 
welfare can be very hard. For all of those reasons—low self-esteem, 
constant fear of losing benefits, resentment of a patronizing system 
that controls their lives—welfare recipients are often desperately 
unhappy. That they seek a few moments of pleasure or escape, 
perhaps even joy, seems not only natural but perhaps necessary.
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But stories of illicit drug use, expectedly, create backlash. At 
least thirty-six state legislatures had begun considering laws for 
mandatory drug testing for welfare recipients by 2011.69 Florida 
has gone so far as to require applicants to pay for their own drug 
tests; those who pass are reimbursed the $40 fee.70
Those laws, and many others making their way through state 
legislatures, are billed as attempts to more effectively target lim-
ited resources where they are needed most. Proponents argue 
that such laws are needed to insure that money from the public 
coffers is used for true necessities for those in need, not luxuries. 
Opponents say the laws are yet another unfair intrusion into 
recipients’ lives, holding the poor to a different standard than 
other Americans.
In addition to practices such as smoking, drug use, and 
alcohol abuse, all of which are commonplace, there are health 
consequences that researchers have discovered stem directly from 
living in poverty.
Recent studies have found that the poor suffer from higher 
rates of obesity,71 die at younger ages,72 and suffer from levels 
of stress that can lower their IQs.73 Being out of work has even 
more drastic consequences, including an increase in suicide rates. 
A recent study found that during the last recession the loss of 
self-esteem, self-reliance, and personal dignity that comes with 
losing a job led thousands of people to kill themselves.74
The Welfare–Work Conflict
Rebecca lives with her disabled father in a run-down hotel outside 
of Macon, Georgia. She and I sat on the curb outside her hotel 
room one August day in 2013, after having spent the day visit-
ing food kitchens and churches to see where people go for food 
donations, as part of my research for a book on welfare.
Speaking in a measured voice, her hands clenched in her lap, 
Rebecca said, “I hate being on welfare. Hate it. I hate not having 
control. I grew up believing in the American Dream. If I worked 
hard, I’d have the house with the white picket fence, the car, the 
kids, money in the bank. Those dreams—gone. My dad got dis-
abled, my mom took off, and we lost everything. He can’t work 
much. I need to be here for him. He gets some Social Security 
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disability. I get odd jobs on Craigslist, but we are just surviving. 
Not living, just surviving.”
“The American Dream” and “just surviving” were phrases I 
heard over and over again, all over the country. Americans still 
believe that if they work hard enough they will achieve the dream. 
For many that dream is a home and car ownership, a job to pay 
the bills, and a family. But on welfare the dream fades away. The 
system creates a form of welfare inertia with beneficiaries focused 
relentlessly on maintaining their benefits and as a part of that 
focus, living in fear of earning too much money in a regular job.
As Tiffany, a young single mother in Everett, Washington, told 
me as we sat on a bench outside a Safeway Supermarket: “Dreams? 
I don’t have any dreams. I used to. Used to have that picture in 
my head, the white picket fence, the suits, the office job, the 
kids . . . No, not now. I’m still around because I have a son. I have 
no hope. Sure, I’ve got housing, medical, food stamps, and it’s 
just enough to squeak by, get through the month without being 
homeless and destitute. Just barely. ‘Here, survive on this. Now 
go away, don’t bother us,’ that’s the message I get from welfare 
programs. It’s not about getting me out of poverty; it’s about 
keeping me in poverty.”
Those on welfare resign themselves to dealing with cumbersome, 
redundant bureaucracy as the cost of getting assistance. I didn’t 
meet anyone on the road who didn’t have stories to tell about 
how dysfunctional welfare offices can be, and how difficult to 
deal with. For some, though, the treatment received is downright 
humiliating, and there is nothing quite like regular humiliation 
to make you feel as if you’ve lost control of your life.
Tanya, a single mother of four children living in a low-income 
neighborhood on the outskirts of Atlanta, shared this story: 
“The other day, I went in to my social worker’s office to sign up 
my newborn for services. This lady, she’s been my social worker 
since I started living on assistance. She has known me that long, 
and she sees me every few months for paperwork.”
We sit eating lunch with her newborn infant, Jerome, lying 
on the couch between us. We are in the welfare office while she 
takes a break from her job skills training class. Tanya reaches 
down to rub Jerome’s tummy. “This lady, Mrs. Johnson, she tells 
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me she can’t sign Jerome up until I get a DNA test to prove he’s 
mine. ‘What?’ I say. ‘You’ve seen me in here through the whole 
pregnancy, I was in here a week before I delivered, remember? 
How could this not be my baby?’ ‘Doesn’t matter,’ she says. ‘You 
want welfare for him, you gotta prove he’s yours.’ So we both had 
to go across town to the lab to get blood drawn; Jerome cried for 
hours; and I felt like a criminal.”
The caseworker was enforcing a rule that says that all babies 
must get a DNA test to prove maternity, and possibly paternity if 
paternity is contested. There may occasionally be fraudulent use 
of borrowed babies to cheat the welfare system, but a one-size-
fits-all approach, which any federal program must maintain, can 
be hugely humiliating when dealing with people you personally 
know.
Work and Happiness
Taking responsibility for ourselves brings meaning to our lives. 
Moreover, productive work is essential to human happiness. 
Work gives our lives meaning, not just because we bring home 
a paycheck, but because we take responsibility for ourselves and 
get to experience the joys that work—even hard work—brings.
Studies at Santa Clara University’s Center for Applied Ethics 
(2012)75 and Arizona State University’s School of Public Affairs 
(2011)76 came to similar and strong conclusions concerning welfare 
dependence, work, and happiness based on their findings about 
what happened to the Subjective Well Being (SWB) of single 
mothers after the 1996 welfare reforms.
Those sweeping reforms, as you may remember, were agreed 
upon by President Clinton and Congress and were supposed to 
“end welfare as we know it.” Back then, the Aid to Families with 
Dependent Children (AFDC) program had enabled increasing 
numbers of young single mothers (and others) to slide easily into 
a life of welfare without working, and the reforms addressed that 
problem. The new Temporary Assistance for Needy Families 
(TANF) program that replaced AFDC required everybody re-
ceiving cash assistance to work or train for work; its benefits had 
a lifetime limit of five years and it resulted in millions of women 
moving into work and out of poverty.
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Comparing data from the years before and after such “workfare” 
reforms, both studies found that single mothers reported higher 
levels of subjective well-being after they entered the workforce. 
Chris Herbst’s study at Arizona State concluded that the reforms 
had mostly positive effects: “These women experienced an increase 
in life satisfaction, greater optimism about the future, and more 
financial satisfaction.”77 Herbst also provides indirect evidence 
that “the mothers’ employment after welfare reform can plausibly 
explain the gains in subjective well-being.”78 Similarly, John Ifcher’s 
report on the Santa Clara University study concluded that results 
“appear to indicate that the package of welfare and tax policy 
changes [requiring work] increased happiness.”79 Even relatively 
menial work, it seems, made these single mothers happier.
These two studies were rigorously executed and they addressed 
the most notably dependent members of our society—single 
mothers on Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF). 
By definition, those women need financial help to meet life’s 
basic necessities for themselves and their children. If they are 
happier adding the demands of working to their lives, it seems 
likely that other economically dependent Americans will be hap-
pier working as well.
“I don’t know if it’s happiness,” said Cora, a teacher and tribal 
member I met on the Pine Ridge Indian Reservation in South 
Dakota. “I just know that something happens to people when they 
get a job. They sit up straighter. Their chin comes up. They carry 
themselves with pride. They say hello to me in the supermarket. I 
know everyone on this reservation, and I can tell when someone 
is working, because they’ll greet me at the store, and brag on what 
they are doing with their lives.”
When governments take responsibility for our welfare, they 
constrict our freedom of action and generate a cascade of negative 
consequences. Letting the government control our lives is a recipe 
for a host of problems, including loss of self-esteem, loss of pride 
and dignity, loss of aim and focus, and loss of hope. When our 
lives are dominated by an outside entity rather than by our own 
wills, the results can be dire. And clearly those most dependent 
on the state for their sustenance suffer most of all.
Many have forgotten that long before the War on Poverty 
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of the 1960s, way back in the 1930s, in response to the Great 
Depression, President Roosevelt launched a massive jobs and 
welfare program, putting those unemployed and destitute onto 
federal jobs and make-work programs, and doling out food aid 
and assistance. In his second inaugural address he spoke to the 
unintended consequences of those programs. Today, with our 
vastly expanded welfare state affecting more and more Americans 
every year, his words should give us pause:
A large proportion of these unemployed and their dependents 
have been forced on the relief rolls. . . . We have here a human 
as well as an economic problem. . . . The lessons of history . . . 
show conclusively that continued dependence upon relief 
induces a spiritual and moral disintegration fundamentally 
destructive to the national fiber. To dole out relief in this way 
is to administer a narcotic, a subtle destroyer of the human 
spirit. . . . The Federal Government must and shall quit this 
business of relief. . . . We must preserve not only the bodies 
of the unemployed from destitution but also their self-respect, 
their self-reliance, and courage and determination.80
So what does work? Work works. One Southern Ute tribal 
member remembers losing his job. “We went on the assistance 
for a few months, but I told my wife we either find jobs here on 
the reservation or we leave. And we left, moved away, got jobs, 
and later started our own business. I could feel my pride go, and 
I didn’t want to become that person. I’m a worker, I have to be 
able to look back on my life and be proud of the life I built for 
my wife and my family.”
Being needed gives us stature and importance. Parents of young 
children are needed, for sure, and we may be faced with impera-
tive demands to fulfill needs of other family members or friends. 
But work also means we are needed. That paycheck is proof of 
it. One Decatur mother put it this way. “I remember that first 
paycheck when I went back to work like it was yesterday. One 
hundred seventy seven dollars. Not much, right? But it was mine, 
and I took it home and showed it to the kids and it made me 
feel good inside. My kids, they need so many things—diapers, 
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toys, shoes, clothes. And they need me to provide for them, and 
it gives me a lot of pride to do that instead of them seeing mama 
cashing welfare checks.”
“I’d rather be able to find enough work to pay my own way 
all the way. What man wouldn’t?” said Ken in Atlanta. “Pay the 
rent, pay the bills, and buy food. But I can’t find a full-time 
job so I’m stuck with the food stamps. Every time I go into that 
welfare office I get treated like dirt by those old ladies in there, 
and I can’t say nothing back to them. I can’t wait till I can pay 
all my bills all on my own.”
When I met Rosie in New York City, she told me: “I have 
to work or I’d go crazy.” Homeless and living on the streets of 
Brooklyn, she continues to string jobs together, under the table. 
“As long as I can keep busy, then I’m happy,” she said.
And Terry, who currently lives in a homeless tent city in Seattle, 
offered these observations: “When I worked I definitely looked 
down on all those people on welfare with their food stamps 
and their hand-me-downs. Then I became that person in the 
checkout line with the food stamps. I’m the one who is home-
less. I’m the one who is taking socks from the church ladies that 
stop by. Self-esteem? Gone. I would much rather be working, at 
any job, than living the way I live right now. I know I’ll never be 
a medical tech again, but I’d be happy working at McDonalds. 
Happy to be working.”
As Warren Buffet began in a recent editorial in the Wall Street 
Journal, “The American Dream promises that a combination of 
education, hard work, and good behavior can move any citizen 
from humble beginnings to at least reasonable success. And for 
many, that promise has been fulfilled.” But, he goes on to say, “In 
recent decades, our country’s rising tide has not lifted the boats 
of the poor.” Noting that some of this can be blamed on our shift 
to a knowledge economy he nonetheless argues, and I agree, that 
the Earned Income Tax Credit (a tax credit for the poor which 
essentially tops off workers’ wages at a certain income level by 
giving them rebates on their taxes if their income falls below a 
certain level) should be expanded so that, as he puts it, “America 
will deliver a decent life for anyone willing to work.”81 I agree; work 
should never be a risk, it should always be a reward, and anyone 
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contemplating the choice between going on welfare or working 
(or working part-time) should have an incentive to choose work.
Welfare doesn’t end poverty. Work does. And with work comes 
identity, pride, self-esteem, self-control, and yes, happiness. As 
I learned from the many Americans I interviewed, the fleeting 
feelings of security and safety to be had by turning over our lives 
and destiny to the government pale in comparison to the feel-
ings of freedom and control we experience when we take full 
responsibility for our lives. As those Americans taught me, the 
alternative—the lost autonomy and loss of responsibility that 
comes with government oversight and control—is ultimately 
destructive to the human spirit.
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Does Consumer Irrationality 
Justify the War on Drugs?
By Jeffrey Miron
If people are sometimes irrational, or some people are habitually 
irrational, does it follow that freedom of choice should be over-
ridden by state control? What are the consequences of prohibiting 
mind-altering substances such as alcohol, narcotics, or nicotine? Is 
crime caused by drug use, or by prohibition? What are the health 
consequences for both rational and irrational people of prohibition? 
Jeffrey Miron is senior lecturer and director of undergraduate studies 
in the department of economics at Harvard University and director 
of economic studies at the Cato Institute.
When—if ever—is state control of individual decisions better 
than self-control?
In the rational consumer model, the answer is never. That 
paradigm assumes that consumers know their own preferences, 
possess all relevant information, process that information cor-
rectly, and make consistent decisions over time. Government 
interference with individual choices—the substitution of state 
control for self-control—can therefore only harm individuals, 
who would make optimal decisions on their own.
The rational model has a long history. Many economists still 
view that model as one useful approach to positive and norma-
tive questions. Other economists and non-economists, however, 
believe many consumers are not fully rational. Their alternative 
assessment arises both from casual observation of human be-
havior and from experimental research in behavioral economics 
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and psychology that appears to challenge the rational consumer 
model.82
If consumers are not fully rational, the case for self-control 
rather than state control might seem less compelling. Government 
interference would not automatically reduce the well-being of 
non-rational consumers, since those non-rational consumers 
might be making sub-optimal decisions on their own behalf.
I argue, however, that consumer irrationality strengthens, rather 
than weakens, the case for self-control. I make that argument 
in the context of the “War on Drugs”—the US government’s 
century-long attempt to eliminate marijuana, cocaine, heroin, 
and other intoxicating or mind-altering substances. If consumers 
are rational about drug use, prohibition makes them worse off. If 
consumers are not necessarily rational, prohibition might prevent 
some “bad” decisions to use drugs unnecessarily, so prohibition 
may seem worth considering.
As I will explain, however, the War on Drugs is still bad 
policy—indeed, it’s an even worse policy if some consumers are 
non-rational. Prohibition might deter some ill-advised drug use, 
but its overall consequences harm irrational consumers more 
than rational consumers. Self-control as the approach to drugs 
might not be perfect, but state control is almost certainly worse.
A Framework for Debating the War on Drugs
Before discussing how consumer rationality affects the merits of 
prohibition versus legalization, I present what economists call 
a “positive” analysis of prohibition, meaning one that describes 
prohibition’s effects without addressing whether prohibition is 
desirable overall.
Prohibition does not eliminate the market for drugs. Evidence 
from the study of drugs, alcohol, gambling, prostitution, and 
other services and commodities demonstrates that markets persist 
even under strongly enforced prohibitions. Instead of eliminating 
drug markets, prohibition drives drug markets underground.83
Prohibition may, however, reduce drug use relative to legal-
ization. On the demand side, prohibition imposes penalties for 
possession, and some consumers might abstain out of “respect 
for the law.” Others might abstain because of the fear of being 
caught and punished. On the supply side, prohibition raises 
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production and distribution costs since suppliers must invest 
resources to avoid detection by law enforcement; that implies 
higher prices and less use.84 The net impact of those demand- and 
supply-side impacts, however, need not be large. Prohibition might 
spur demand by adding a “forbidden fruit” quality to drugs; if 
they’re forbidden, they must be really good, some seem to think. 
Because they operate in secret, black market suppliers face lower 
costs of evading tax and regulatory burdens, which offsets some 
prohibition-induced secrecy costs. And differences in drug sellers’ 
ability to advertise, the payoffs from advertising, and the extent 
of market power under prohibition versus legalization might also 
limit prohibition’s impact on use.85
Existing evidence indeed suggests that prohibition’s impact on 
use is modest.86 That holds across different drugs and alcohol and 
across countries and time periods. The evidence on this question 
is incomplete, since few societies have moved from prohibition 
to full legalization, but many have moderated their prohibitions 
substantially. Those “de-escalations” are associated with small or 
almost undetectable increases in use. Regardless of the impact 
on use, moreover, prohibition has numerous unintended effects.
Prohibition increases violent crime. Legal market participants 
resolve disputes using courts and related non-violent mechanisms. 
Black market participants use violence instead, since complaining 
to authorities would reveal their identities and activities and since 
courts do not enforce contracts involving illegal goods. Relatedly, 
legal suppliers compete for market share via advertising, but black 
market suppliers rely on violent turf battles.
Substantial evidence confirms that prohibition generates vio-
lence.87 The use of violence to resolve disputes is common in drug 
and prostitution markets, as it was in gambling markets before 
the advent of state-run lotteries and the expansion of legalized 
gambling during past decades. Over the past century, violence 
has increased and decreased with the enforcement of drug and 
alcohol prohibition, as illustrated in Figure 1.88 Across countries, 
violence is elevated especially in countries that grow and ship 
illegal drugs such as cocaine and heroin.89 
Prohibition also encourages income-generating crime such as 
theft or prostitution, since prohibition-induced increases in drug 
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prices mean users need additional income to purchase drugs.90 
Prohibition diverts criminal justice resources from deterrence of 
all kinds of crime.91
That conclusion—that prohibition causes crime—contrasts 
with the claim advanced by prohibitionists that drug use causes 
crime. Little evidence, however, confirms the claim that drug use 
per se promotes violence or other criminal behavior.92
Prohibition also lowers product quality and reliability. In legal 
markets, consumers who purchase faulty goods can punish sup-
pliers via liability claims, bad publicity, avoiding repeat purchases, 
or complaining to private or government watchdog groups. In 
black markets, those mechanisms are unavailable or ineffective, 
so prohibition causes accidental overdoses and poisonings.93 US 
alcohol prohibition provides a classic example, since deaths from 
adulterated alcohol soared; see Figure 2.94 Similarly, marijuana 
users were sickened in the 1970s after the US government sprayed 
the herbicide paraquat on Mexican marijuana fields but the 
marijuana was still harvested and shipped to US consumers.95
Prohibition generates corruption. In legal markets, participants 
have little incentive to bribe law enforcement, and they have 
legal mechanisms such as lobbying or campaign contributions 
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for influencing politicians. In black markets, participants must 
either evade law enforcement or pay them to look the other way. 
Similarly, standard lobbying techniques are more difficult.96
Figure 2. Estimated Gallons of Pure Alcohol Consumed Per Capita
The graph displays data on measured alcohol consumption per capita for the non-
Prohibition years along with estimated alcohol consumption per capita for all years. 
The estimates come from regressions of each proxy series (e.g., the cirrhosis death rate) 
on a constant, a linear trend, and actual alcohol consumption per capita. The data 
graphed are then the implied values of alcohol consumption per capita for all years 
implied by inverting the estimated regression to estimate alcohol consumption for the 
Prohibition years based on the proxy and the estimated relation between the proxy and 
alcohol consumption. The estimation and inversion procedure converts the units of 
each proxy into units of gallons of alcohol consumption per capita.
Prohibition enriches those most willing to violate society’s laws. 
In a legal market, the income from drug production and sale is 
taxed, and the revenue affects everyone via lower other taxes or 
higher government spending. In a black market, suppliers capture 
that revenue as profit. Existing estimates suggest that federal, state, 
and local governments could collect roughly $50 billion per year 
from legalized drugs.97
Prohibition has additional adverse consequences. Because 
drug crimes involve mutually beneficial exchange, participants 
do not report them to police, who therefore rely on undercover 
buys-and-busts, asset seizures, no-knock warrants, stop-and-frisk, 
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and racial profiling, all of which strain accepted notions of civil 
liberty.98 More broadly, the drug war has fueled a broad range 
of privacy-invading law enforcement tactics, such as domestic 
wiretaps.99 (See Figure 3) Because of prohibition, many state 
governments ban over-the-counter sale of clean syringes, which 
increases needle-sharing and thus promotes the spread of HIV 
and other blood-borne diseases.100 Because of prohibition, mari-
juana is more tightly controlled than morphine or cocaine and 
cannot be used for medical purposes.101 Similarly, doctors face 
loss of their medical licenses or even jail time for “excess” opiate 
prescribing, which encourages under-treatment of chronic pain.102 
Prohibition means that foreign policy and free trade negotiations 
are intertwined with decisions about drug policy.103 Widespread 
non-compliance with prohibition, despite draconian enforcement, 
signals users and non-users that laws are for suckers, undermining 
the spirit of voluntary compliance that is essential to a free soci-
ety. And expenditure on police, judges, prosecutors, and prisons 
to enforce prohibition, summed across all levels of government, 
totals about $50 billion per year in the United States alone.104
To summarize, prohibition may reduce drug use relative to 
2014 Wire Taps (USA Overall)
Larceny, Theft & Robbery 21
Kidnapping 4
Homicide & Assault 135
Gambling 13
Corruption 16
Other 93
Racketeering 72
Narcotics 3,170
Total 3,524
Figure 3. Major Offenses for Which Court-Authorized Intercepts 
(Wiretaps) Were Granted, 2014 (source: uscourts.gov)
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legalization. But whether that reduction is large or small, prohibi-
tion has many other effects compared to legalization, including 
increased crime, reduced health, greater corruption, diminished civil 
liberties, foregone tax revenues, and substantial expenditure costs.
Is Prohibition Desirable Policy?
With that positive analysis as background, I ask whether prohibi-
tion is a good policy. This is what economists call a normative 
analysis: one that asks whether prohibition is preferable to 
legalization, taking as given a particular positive analysis of the 
differences between the two policies.
The positive analysis indicates that most effects of prohibition 
are undesirable. The possible exception is prohibition’s impact, 
if any, in reducing drug use. So, analysis of prohibition versus 
legalization might appear to turn on how policy should regard 
that potential reduction and thus on whether consumers make 
rational decisions about drugs. In fact, the right normative conclu-
sion does not rest on whether consumers are rational.
If all consumers are assumed to be fully rational, then normative 
analysis of drug prohibition is trivial.105 In that case, prohibition’s 
effects are all undesirable, since any reduction in use would be a 
cost, not a benefit, of prohibition. In particular, under full ratio-
nality it would not matter whether people consume drugs for the 
psychopharmacological effects, or the medicinal properties, or to 
look cool; all that matters would be that consumers voluntarily 
choose to use drugs. Similarly, under that view, it does not matter 
whether drugs are addictive or if use negatively affects health or 
productivity; if rational people choose to accept such risks, they 
must think the benefits exceed the costs.
The rational model of consumption was long believed to be 
inconsistent with many observed behaviors related to drug con-
sumption, such as addiction, withdrawal, relapse, and the like. 
Theoretical work by Gary Becker and Kevin Murphy shows the 
rational model is potentially consistent with those phenomena, 
and empirical work has had some success in fitting the model to 
data.106 That work does not prove that the rational model de-
scribes all drug consumption, but it undermines the presumption 
that drug use is irrational. Stated differently, it is hard to deny that 
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at least some drug use fits the rational model. Many people claim 
to enjoy the pleasure associated with marijuana consumption; 
others value the pain relief or mental calm produced by opiates; 
still others appreciate the stimulation of cocaine, much as others 
appreciate the stimulation of caffeine. Thus, at least some drug 
use is plausibly rational, implying prohibition-induced reductions 
are a cost of prohibition.
If some consumers make irrational decisions about drug use, 
prohibition might generate one benefit: preventing such consum-
ers from using drugs. While the harms from drug consumption 
are often exaggerated, some decisions to use drugs may indeed 
be ill-advised.107 That’s possible for any good, but the risks may 
be greater for potentially addictive goods that carry non-trivial 
health risks. For example, short-sighted consumers might ignore 
the possibility of addiction and underestimate any associated 
health risks. A policy that prevents such consumers from trying 
drugs could, in principle, make them better off.108
This argument for prohibition might seem plausible, but further 
inspection exposes deep flaws. Even if irrationality is rampant and 
even if policy can prevent irrational drug use, the question for 
any proposed policy is not just whether it generates benefits but 
whether these outweigh the policy’s costs. So any benefit from 
policy-induced reductions in irrational drug use must be weighed 
against the costs of the policy used to achieve that reduction. One 
potentially large cost is any policy-induced reduction in rational 
drug use, but there are many others, as well.
The evidence is robust that prohibition has numerous adverse 
side effects, such as increased crime and corruption, greater HIV 
infection, diminished civil liberties, forgone tax revenues, and 
significant direct costs for police, judges, prosecutors, and prisons. 
Plus, prohibition does not appear to have substantial impacts in 
reducing drug use. And while hard data are not available, it is 
plausible that rational users are the ones most likely deterred by 
prohibition, while irrational consumers ignore prohibition. So it 
is almost inconceivable that the one possible benefit of prohibi-
tion could plausibly exceed its costs. Even if irrationality warrants 
policies to reduce drug use, prohibition is almost certainly the 
worst choice among such policies.
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Beyond those concerns, the harms from drug use are not only 
routinely exaggerated but are also not obviously different from 
those of legal goods such as alcohol, tobacco, saturated fat, and 
more; indeed, the currently legal substances are the ones whose 
long-term side effects cause serious illness or death (e.g., cirrhosis, 
lung cancer, emphysema, heart disease). Yet outlawing marijuana, 
heroin, cocaine, and other illegal drugs suggests those goods are 
unacceptably “bad” while legal goods such as alcohol and tobacco 
are at least “tolerable.” Further, policy-induced reductions in 
irrational drug consumption might induce substitution toward 
the legal goods that have similar or even more harmful effects.
Perhaps most importantly, prohibition almost certainly harms 
irrational users more than rational users, given that many irrational 
users consume anyway. Prohibition means that users must purchase 
from criminals who are likely to victimize them, often in danger-
ous neighborhoods. Prohibition means users face not just health 
risks but also arrest, loss of professional licenses and eligibility for 
student loans, and more. Prohibition means users face heightened 
difficulty in assessing the quality of the drugs they purchase, since 
in underground markets, consumers cannot sue sellers of manufac-
turers for faulty products, or complain to government watchdog 
groups, or consistently patronize sellers with reputations for quality, 
or generate bad publicity for purveyors of adulterated or misla-
beled products; thus, prohibition generates increased accidental 
overdoses and poisonings. Prohibition raises production and sell-
ing costs, and therefore also drug prices,109 so users face elevated 
incentives to consume via unsafe ingestion methods, such as needle-
sharing, and therefore face a greater risk of HIV and hepatitis.
All those negative effects of prohibition harm both rational 
and irrational consumers, but rational users are more likely to 
recognize the risks and adjust their behavior to minimize the 
adverse impacts. To minimize risk of arrest, rational consumers 
will grow their own marijuana or buy other drugs from known, 
repeat suppliers. To avoid the risks of impurities, rational consum-
ers will again purchase from reliable suppliers, or try small doses 
initially, or avoid illegal drugs and substitute legally available 
and thus reliable alcohol instead. Rational consumers will avoid 
sharing needles, either ingesting via other methods or substituting 
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other drugs, or they will be more successful in obtaining clean 
syringes from legal and illegal connections.
Prohibition may also harm irrational consumers by glamorizing 
drug use in the eyes of those too young, naive, foolish, or myopic to 
consider the long-term consequences; rational users discount such 
imagery. Under prohibition, the monetary rewards for working 
in the drug trade are high, but this is merely compensation for an 
elevated risk of injury, death, and imprisonment. Rational persons 
understand that and accept such risks only if the total compen-
sation equals that available in other sectors. Myopic teenagers, 
on the other hand, focus on the up-front cash and thus expose 
themselves to excess risk of death or prison. Prohibition suggests 
to less rational parents that policy can prevent youth drug use; 
rational parents realize that prohibition has minor impacts on 
availability, so they must still intervene to protect their children 
from foolish choices and dangerous influences.
Thus while prohibition may prevent some users from consum-
ing drugs in the first place, prohibition makes use more dangerous 
and costly for those who consume despite prohibition, and those 
negative effects are far worse for irrational consumers. And since 
prohibition’s overall impact on use appears modest, it’s unlikely that 
the benefit from reduced irrational use could plausibly outweigh 
the increased negatives for those who use despite prohibition.
Conclusion 
In comparing self-control to state control the conclusion applies 
broadly. In many contexts, some consumers make poor decisions, 
but state control is a blunt instrument for improving those 
decisions. Rational consumers understand the implications of 
government policies and can therefore adjust their behavior to 
moderate the impact. Irrational consumers, however, may respond 
in ways that make their irrationality more costly. Self-control is 
not always perfect; nothing guarantees that all individuals make 
good decisions about their own well being all of the time. But 
substituting state control for self-control generally yields far worse 
outcomes; that approach imposes sub-optimal choices on rational 
individuals and creates perverse incentives that harm precisely the 
irrational individuals the state control is attempting to protect.
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Responsibility and  
the Environment
By Lynne Kiesling 
Is responsibility just a faculty of individual self-control, or are there 
social institutions that assist people in acting responsibly? What in-
stitutions and social and legal rules induce people to act responsibly, 
to consider the long-term consequences of their behavior, and to 
take into account the impact of their acts on others? Examination 
of the means used to protect endangered birds of prey helps us 
understand how the institution of property enables humans to act 
responsibly. Lynn Kiesling is associate professor of instruction in 
economics at Northwestern University; her most recent book (co-
edited) is Institutions, Innovation, and Industrialization: Essays 
in Economic History and Development (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2015).
Introduction
Our actions often have impacts not only on ourselves, but also 
on other people. Indeed, they can have impacts not only on 
other people, but on other species and on the environment itself. 
Humans have evolved a variety of means of encouraging people to 
take into account the effects of their behavior on others, known 
as “externalities” in economics. They include fear of retribution, 
benefits in repeat games, and norms of care, shame, and sanctity. 
They also include social institutions that lead people to “internal-
ize” those “externalities,” that is, to take into account the effect 
of their actions on others.
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Let’s consider a case of behavior regarding an “environmen-
tal amenity.” Rosalie Edge took action when she saw Richard 
Pough’s photos (taken in 1932) of row upon row of dead birds 
of prey, killed for sport and money at Hawk Mountain in eastern 
Pennsylvania. A wildlife conservation activist, Edge saw the threat 
of extinction facing birds of prey that most humans thought of as 
expendable vermin because they killed and ate chickens. Thinking 
of raptors as vermin led to a wildlife policy in many states of pay-
ing sportsmen bounties for them; in the 1930s, for example, the 
Pennsylvania Game Commission paid a $5 per-bird bounty on 
birds of prey, including the goshawk and the great horned owl. 
In the Great Depression such a bounty was a welcome income 
supplement, while also reducing the threat to domesticated 
animals. Hawk Mountain was a fertile waypoint in the seasonal 
migration path of many species, thus the name.
In 1934 Edge leased 1,400 acres of land on Hawk Mountain and 
hired a warden to prevent hunters from shooting birds of prey on 
that land.110 Shooting on the land stopped. Edge raised the money 
to purchase the land, and in 1938 gave the land to the newly cre-
ated Hawk Mountain Sanctuary Association.111 The premise was 
simple: buy the land to ensure control of its use and dedicate its 
natural resources to wildlife habitat. Over the ensuing decades 
understanding of the interconnections in complex ecosystems 
and attitudes toward birds of prey evolved, and initiatives like 
Hawk Mountain Sanctuary contributed to the revival of many 
raptor species. Today Hawk Mountain is the world’s oldest wildlife 
sanctuary dedicated to the preservation and observation of birds 
of prey. It remains privately owned, funded, and operated as a 
membership-supported conservation organization.
Hawk Mountain provides a vivid example of how property 
rights affect behavior; in this case, behavior regarding the envi-
ronment. Imagine how property owners control the use of their 
land, with barbed-wire fences and signs saying “No Hunting. No 
Fishing. No Trespassing.” If they were to find someone on their 
land hunting, fishing, or trespassing, they could file a civil lawsuit 
against them under the common law, and if found guilty, the 
violators would have to pay monetary damages to the property 
owner to compensate them for the lost value of the wildlife, fish, 
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or game. If a neighbor were to dump trash or pour toxic sludge 
onto the owner’s land or into the owner’s river, stream, or lake, 
the one causing the harm could be held responsible for the harm. 
Property rights allow us to be held accountable—responsible—for 
our behavior. Property rights that are defined and enforced well 
enough create incentives to maintain environmental quality in the 
present and for the future, aligning economic and environmental 
interests across time, space, and uses. Property rights help humans 
balance the inevitable tradeoff between use and stewardship. 
They help humans to incorporate into their decision making the 
wider effects of their actions. They make people attentive and 
responsible to the interests of others.
What Are Property Rights?
Property rights are the rights to determine the use and disposal 
of a resource. If you own a pair of shoes, you decide how to use 
them—wear them, let them lay idle in your closet, loan them to 
a sibling, rent them out, or sell them. You also decide on main-
tenance and upkeep, and when they are worn out and need to 
be replaced.
According to David Hume, property rights as an institution 
encompass three elements: stability of possession, transference by 
mutual consent, and performance of promises.112 Hume argued 
that property rights as an institution emerge in societies to enable 
individuals to coordinate their actions to mutual benefit, and 
the modern literature on property rights follows Hume’s argu-
ment. Enforcement of property rights can be formal (common 
law, contract, legislation that leads to regulation) or informal 
(conventions, custom, social norms), or both; custom historically 
has led to law, which is codified in the common law framework 
in countries such as the United Kingdom and the United States.
Ownership means decision-making authority over how a re-
source is used, and in many cases those uses can be distinguished as 
separable and those rights can be transferred separately. Consider 
owning a piece of land with a cabin on it (e.g., use for house and/or 
plants, loan, rent, idle). Legal institutions matter too; suppose this 
land and cabin are in Montana, where state law allows property 
owners to sell or lease the subsurface rights separately from the 
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surface rights. Being able to separate that right out and transfer it 
enables the owner to profit from leasing drilling rights to another 
party that wants to explore for oil or natural gas.
Environmental problems are generally conflicting claims over 
resources and how they are used. Property rights help to resolve 
those conflicts by providing a legal institution that prioritizes 
particular uses—the uses that the owner prioritizes, in the time 
frame that the owner chooses. For some environmental problems, 
such as chemical pollution in a self-contained lake, individual 
ownership of the land that includes the lake is likely to give the 
owner incentives to maintain the lake’s quality, either for his/her 
own consumption value or because pollution would reduce the 
market value of the property. Not all environmental problems 
are that straightforward, though, because defining and enforc-
ing property rights can be costly or even not feasible. That’s 
when the tragedy of the commons becomes an all-too-common 
phenomenon.
Garrett Hardin famously characterized overgrazing of common 
pastures in medieval villages as a “tragedy of the commons.”113 In 
a village with a fixed amount of pasture, if the residents treat the 
pasture as an open-access resource and allow anyone to graze as 
many animals as they choose, each person has an incentive to 
graze another animal as long as the additional individual benefit 
is above zero. But a pasture has a carrying capacity, or maximum 
herd size it can nourish, so every additional animal beyond that 
carrying capacity reduces the food consumed by the other animals 
below what they need to thrive, even though the benefit to the 
individual is positive (but less than optimal). Open access amounts 
to an absence of property rights and leads to overgrazing, erosion, 
and undernourished livestock. Hardin proposed an alternative: 
privatize the commons, or define private property rights by divid-
ing up the pasture and having each villager own a plot of land. In 
this context, though, privatizing the commons is not desirable, 
because it would have destroyed the economies of scale and risk-
spreading that the villagers could exploit through scattered-strip 
and three-field rotation agriculture. Hardin generalized from 
this example to modern situations of air and water pollution, in 
which air and water are open-access resources that are degraded 
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or destroyed because of an inability to define property rights. He 
concluded that the only feasible alternative was public ownership, 
nationalizing the commons since it can’t be privatized.
Building on Hardin and the economist Ronald Coase,114 Elinor 
Ostrom constructed a way of analyzing institutional frameworks 
in common-pool resources (CPRs) that is valuable for understand-
ing how property rights benefit the environment, even when they 
cannot be fully defined.115 Ostrom took Hardin’s binary open ac-
cess/pure private model and expanded it by observing that pure 
private property is extremely rare; in fact, most of the conditions 
in which we own property are not really pure private property 
at all. Instead of thinking of property rights as a dichotomy be-
tween open access and pure private, think of property rights as a 
continuum, and along that continuum are degrees of commons.
Pure private property might be something like your contact 
lenses, which you and only you own and use and dispose of. But 
what about that pair of shoes discussed above? If you lend them 
to a sibling, you create a use right for your sibling, probably 
complete with (more or less specified) rules about returning them 
to you in the same condition. Imagine also the possibility that 
you and your sibling chip in and buy the pair of shoes together 
to share—the shoes are not pure private property for either one 
of you, and rules you establish for who gets to wear them when 
and how to treat them are an example of what Ostrom calls 
“governing the commons.”
Imagine another type of CPR along the continuum: a park 
with a beach. If it’s a municipal park, those in city government can 
decide whether to charge a user fee for the beach and limit access 
to those who have purchased access, or treat it as an open-access 
CPR for all to use. The park is a CPR that is more “commons-
like” than the shared pair of shoes. Finally, consider the example 
of air quality. Defining who owns air and privatizing air is so 
prohibitively costly that it is not feasible, so air is closer to the 
open access end of the continuum.
Ostrom’s insights were profound. First, it is possible to define 
and enforce use rights even where property rights cannot be 
defined well. Second, sometimes the characteristics of a resource 
make it harder to define property rights, but the decision of 
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whether or not to define use rights is more often a political choice. 
In cases like CPRs, where people either cannot define property 
rights or choose not to, they can devise institutions for governing 
their shared use of the CPR. Those institutions involve specifying 
use rights, indicating who has use rights, and committing some 
resources to monitoring and enforcement. Through bottom-up in-
stitutional design within communities, Ostrom found investment 
and sustainable use of resources in communities that defined and 
enforced use rights within the community, enabling community 
members to earn increased profits and to thrive over time. Her 
work shows the role that property rights and use rights can play 
in sustainable resource use.
Why Do Property Rights Align Economic and 
Environmental Incentives?
The coordination that property rights facilitate is economically 
and socially beneficial. With Hume’s three conditions a property 
owner can be confident that even if s/he is not currently using 
or inhabiting the property, it will not be taken or used without 
consent, and if it is, the violator will be required to pay the owner 
compensation for harm. Those conditions and that degree of 
relative certainty create a context in which people will produce, 
invest, innovate, and conserve because the connections between 
their actions and those benefits and costs over time are clearer.
Better definition of property rights changes time horizons and 
incentives to think about future outcomes, aligning economic 
and environmental incentives over time and space, and inducing 
short-run conservation to enable sustainable longer-run economic 
gain. Institutional choice affects those incentives and shapes how 
well property rights are defined and how much into the future 
people are willing to look in making tradeoffs.
Take the example of the park and beach and whether or not 
to limit access and charge a user fee. One municipality limits 
access, the other does not, and that choice affects the quality of 
the beach, the resources available to maintain it, and the degree 
of congestion or overuse of the beach. That comparison is not 
hypothetical—in my own backyard, the city of Chicago does not 
restrict beach access, while the adjoining suburb of Evanston does, 
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and the two beaches do differ in quality and congestion. Whether 
the resource is beaches or irrigation systems or air, institutional 
choice matters.
Note that property rights may not work perfectly to align eco-
nomic and environmental incentives across time and space, or to 
mitigate the problems of diffuse private knowledge. Realistically, 
though, other alternative institutions that we design and use for 
environmental regulation do not work perfectly either—com-
mand-and-control regulation or community self-governance will 
not achieve perfection. Thus when evaluating the performance 
of the three different institutional approaches (property rights, 
community self governance of a CPR, or command-and-control 
government regulation), it is imperative to compare the likely, re-
alistic effects of the enforcement institutions to each other, not the 
theoretical or “blackboard” conception of them. It is unrealistic 
to compare an ideal system of bureaucratic control with a realistic 
system of regulation by property rights, just as it would be an 
unjust comparison to compare a realistic bureaucratic regulatory 
scheme with an idealized property rights alternative and then find 
the bureaucratic regime inferior. For that reason environmental 
policy analysis does, and should, require substantial field work 
that involves social science as much as environmental science.
Property-Based Environmental Policy in Action 
Some of the most effective environmental policies of the past 
two decades have used those insights to align economic and 
environmental incentives more closely while avoiding the pitfalls 
of command-and-control regulation. One notable example in the 
United States is the Environmental Protection Agency’s Acid 
Rain Program, which created a program of tradable emission 
permits for the right to emit sulfur dioxide (most from burning 
bituminous coal to generate electricity).
The effect of this program was unequivocal. In the first year, 
emissions declined by 25 percent below 1990 levels and by 
more than 35 percent below 1980 levels. By 2000, emis-
sions were nearly 40 percent below those of 1980. Under 
the command-and-control approach used before the 1990 
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amendments, abatement costs would have been more than 
three times as high—$2.6 billion annually as compared to 
$747 million under cap-and-trade.116
Fisheries provide another example where a property rights ap-
proach yields sustainable outcomes unattainable with traditional 
command-and-control regulation. Ill-defined property rights in 
fishing created a tragedy of the commons, with overfishing for 
many species by the 1980s. Traditional regulation led to shrinking 
of fishing seasons for many species, going from several months to 
two or three days in a year.117 A different method of regulation, 
individual fishing quotas (IFQs, or catch shares), defines a fisher’s 
right to a share of the total allowable catch (TAC), and that right 
is itself transferable, which makes the IFQ an asset.
IFQs are attractive for two main reasons. First, each quota 
holder faces greater certainty that his or her share of the TAC 
will not be caught by someone else . . . Second, transferability 
allows quotas to be reallocated through sales so that they 
are eventually owned by the most efficient fishermen, that 
is, those with the lowest costs or highest quality and hence 
highest-valued catch.118
Fisheries using IFQs in places ranging from Iceland to New 
Zealand have seen fish populations stabilize and even grow along 
with fishing incomes.
A controversial application of property rights has been imple-
mented in places such as Botswana that use community ownership 
and hunting rights for wildlife preservation. A policy that defines 
rights over wildlife as belonging to villagers makes the wildlife 
an asset—they profit from preserving the wildlife for safaris and 
ecotourism (and for hunting tourism, where they determine the 
hunting licenses). That profit induces them to discourage and 
prosecute poachers. One example of the success of this policy 
is the rebound in the white rhinoceros population in Botswana 
compared to the decline in wildlife populations in countries 
such as Kenya that use traditional anti-poaching regulation to 
little effect.119
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Conclusion
Property rights are consistent with beneficial economic and 
environmental outcomes because private property promotes 
good stewardship. But defining and enforcing property rights 
are costly activities, so even if pure private property rights were 
feasible, we would not have them in most cases. Property rights 
need not be perfect in order to be useful at coordinating the ac-
tions of individuals and creating incentives that are compatible 
with sustainability.
In some cases defining property rights is not feasible, and most 
cases of environmental pollution or degradation are a consequence 
of either an inability or a political unwillingness to define and/
or enforce property rights. Through collective action ranging 
from community self-governance to statutory legislation, legal 
institutions emerge and are designed that help us define and 
enforce use rights in the CPR, leading to valuable economic and 
environmental outcomes.
Property rights provide an imperfect, yet powerful, means of 
connecting behavior with responsibility and of inducing humans 
to take into account the impact of their actions on others when 
they make decisions. Property rights both protect the freedom 
to pursue interests and the responsibility to compensate others 
when their rights are harmed. They also allow people to pursue 
interests beyond the narrowly “selfish,” such as protecting endan-
gered birds of prey.
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First Person Singular: Literature 
and Individual Resistance
By Sarah Skwire
Art reveals truths otherwise hidden from sight. Freedom and respon-
sibility are sometimes best seen in action, and action is often best 
illustrated in poetry and stories. The struggle for recognition of one’s 
unique identity and enforcement of one’s just claims against power is 
a struggle for freedom and for justice. From the most ancient stories 
of antiquity to Shakespeare, Mark Twain, and the Hunger Games, 
art reveals freedom and responsibility to be inextricably entwined. 
To be a free person is to grasp one’s unique identity and to accept 
responsibility for one’s own acts. Sarah Skwire is a fellow at the 
Liberty Fund and co-author of the popular college writing textbook 
Writing with a Thesis (12th edition, Boston: Wadsorth Publishing, 
2014). She earned her PhD in English at the University of Chicago.
The poet Tom Wayman wrote that good poems mean that “a 
person is speaking / in a world full of people talking.” The 
measured, individual voice of the poet—of the writer of any 
literature, really—and the voices of the characters who speak in 
their works are, as I argued in Peace, Love, and Liberty,120 often 
some of the most effective ways of reminding ourselves that hu-
mans are not an anonymous mass built of indistinguishable and 
interchangeable parts.
The earliest author whose name we know is Enheduanna, a high 
priestess of the goddess Inanna who lived between 2285 and 2250 
BCE. Among her surviving poems is “The Exaltation of Inanna” 
72
a song of praise and supplication. In it, Enheduanna details her 
long history of devotion to Inanna, and her current state of despair 
over the destruction of her rituals and her temple. But what is 
most striking about this poem is what the scholar Roberta Binkley 
has called “a strong authorial presence that may be unmatched in 
ancient literary creation until the time of Sappho.” Enheduanna’s 
poetry insists on her own importance. Her suffering is not just 
cultic, or ritual, or on behalf of her people. It is personal.
 
I no longer dwell in the goodly place You established.
Came the day, the sun scorched me
Came the shade (of night), the South Wind overwhelmed me,
My honey-sweet voice has become strident,
Whatever gave me pleasure has turned into dust.
. . . I, what am I among the living creatures!
Enheduanna’s voice is the cry of an individual protesting suffer-
ing and injustice.
We hear that same cry in the Book of Job as Job protests God’s 
treatment of him and in the book of Genesis when Abraham 
argues that God is behaving unjustly by destroying Sodom. But 
it is not only divine injustice against which our earliest stories 
protest. In “The Poor Man of Nippur” an Akkadian story from 
about 1500 BCE, the impoverished Gimil-Ninurta tries to share 
his only possession—a goat—with the mayor. When the mayor 
takes the goat and gives Gimil-Ninurta only some scraps of food 
and third-rate beer, Gimil-Ninurta seeks his revenge through 
trickery and violence, eventually disgracing the mayor and severely 
beating him three different times, nearly killing him. Wise or 
foolish, brave or brutal, Gimil-Ninurta is clearly an individual, 
and an individual objecting to his unjust treatment by the state.
This kind of protest, the protest of the individual against 
authority, should be of the greatest possible interest to lovers of 
liberty. Over a thousand years after “The Poor Man of Nippur,” 
and within a hundred or so years of Job, Sophocles’ play Antigone 
presents us with a heroine who refuses to allow a new law to 
override her religious responsibility to bury her dead brother. 
Instead, she slips from the city gates, performs rites for him, 
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repeats them when the body is desecrated again, and remains 
staunchly unapologetic about her resistance to authority. As the 
arresting sentry observes, “She was not afraid, / Not even when 
we charged her with what she had done. / She denied nothing.” 
Indeed, she directly confesses her crime to the ruler, tells him his 
strength is nothing before the gods’ laws, and when condemned 
to death for her actions, announced that “This death of mine / 
Is of no importance; but if I had left my brother / Lying in death 
unburied, I should have suffered. / Now I do not.” Antigone’s 
defiance is on behalf of her brother’s spirit, of course, but it is 
at least as much on behalf of her own right to practice religious 
rituals, and the gods’ rights to have their laws observed rather 
than overturned by the state.
The growth of the state and its increasing reach into the private 
corners of the lives of citizens and subjects spurred an ever-increas-
ing number of such stories of individual protests. Shakespeare’s 
histories and tragedies are filled with small moments where often 
apparently insignificant individuals speak out for their rights and 
responsibilities against tyrannical rulers. The gardener’s servant 
in Richard II, for example, argues that Richard’s deposition from 
the throne is merely a sign that the king’s country has followed 
the king’s example of disorder and tyranny:
Why should we in the compass of a pale
Keep law and form and due proportion,
Showing, as in a model, our firm estate,
When our sea-walled garden, the whole land,
Is full of weeds, her fairest flowers choked up,
Her fruit-trees all upturned, her hedges ruin’d,
Her knots disorder’d and her wholesome herbs
Swarming with caterpillars?
The gardener responds Richard should have followed the 
gardener’s example instead. “O, what pity is it / That he had not 
so trimm’d and dress’d his land / As we this garden!”
The servant who gives his life while fighting against the blind-
ing of Gloucester in King Lear; the rebellion of Macduff against 
Macbeth; Paulina’s confrontation of the “most unworthy and 
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unnatural Lord,” Leontes, the King of Sicily, for his domestic 
tyranny—all of these are moments of resistance and of bravery, 
of the individual spirit against the power of the state.
The modern state spurs similar protests. Dystopian novels of 
the mid-twentieth century written in response to the rise of vari-
ous forms of collectivism frequently present precisely this sort of 
personalized, individual rebellion against command and control. 
Think of Orwell’s Winston Smith hiding from the telescreen, 
writing in his journal, and finding tiny ways to resist Big Brother 
throughout 1984. Consider Zamyatin’s novel We, set in a society 
that teaches that, “. . . the only things that are aware of themselves 
and conscious of their individuality are irritated eyes, cut fingers, 
sore teeth. A healthy eye, finger, tooth might as well not even 
be there. Isn’t it clear that individual consciousness is just sick-
ness?” Amid constant attempts to eradicate individual identity, 
the citizens of We, devoid of even names, still find small ways to 
rebel and to insist on their autonomy—by smoking, drinking, 
or just loving one another. By the end of the novel, those small 
rebellions have added up to produce a resistance movement and 
to begin to crumble that wall that divides the collectivist One 
State from the wild lands outside of it.
For many readers, the dystopian novel that most expresses the 
power of individual resistance against a collectivizing, totalitarian 
state is Ayn Rand’s Anthem. The society described in Anthem has 
succeeded in the project set out in Zamyatin’s We. Individuality 
has been eliminated to the point that singular pronouns no lon-
ger exist. It is hard to deny the power of the moment when the 
female character struggles to express affection for the narrator, 
but lacks the words to do so.
“We love you.”
But then they frowned and shook their head and looked 
at us helplessly.
“No,” they whispered, “that is not what we wished to say.”
They were silent, then they spoke slowly, and their words 
were halting, like the words of a child learning to speak for 
the first time:
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“We are one .  .  . alone .  .  . and only .  .  . and we love you 
who are one . . . alone . . . and only.”
We looked into each other’s eyes and we knew that the 
breath of a miracle had touched us, and fled, and left us 
groping vainly.
And we felt torn, torn for some word we could not find.
Two chapters later, the rediscovery of the first person singular 
pronoun with the sentences, “I am. I think. I will.” shatters the sti-
fling hold of the state over the mind of the individual, and Rand’s 
narrator knows it. “These are the words. This is the answer.”
The current surge in popularity of dystopian novels and films—
particularly for young adults—suggests that there is still a thirst 
for this kind of story of rebellious individuals standing up to 
an oppressive state. Today the message comes through Katniss 
Everdeen from Hunger Games instead of Winston Smith; Jonas 
from The Giver instead of Zamyatin’s D-503; Lena Haloway 
from Delirium instead of the narrator of Anthem. It even comes 
from the television series Daredevil in this exchange between the 
vigilante hero Daredevil and his arch-enemy Kingpin.
Matt Murdock / Daredevil: No, no, I’m not trying to be a 
hero. I’m just a guy that got fed up with men like you and 
I decided to do something about it.
Wilson Fisk / Kingpin: That’s what makes you dangerous. 
It’s not the mask. It’s not the skills. It’s your ideology. The 
lone man who thinks he can make a difference.
The names of the heroes may change, as may the vehicles that 
bring us their stories. But the message that the individual has 
the ability to resist the state—and the responsibility to use that 
power—remains.
Even allowing for the power of these many representations, 
there is one literary example of the power of individual resistance 
that is, for me, the most moving. Towards the end of Mark Twain’s 
The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn, Jim—the escaped slave who 
has been Huck’s travelling companion, friend, and father figure 
through most of the novel—is captured. Huck knows, because 
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he has been taught to know it, that Jim is someone else’s property. 
Huck also knows that stealing is a sin that will send him to hell. 
His struggles as he tries to decide whether he should be good 
and sinless and tell Jim’s owner where to find him, or whether 
he should be wicked and damnable and help Jim escape, are the 
most finely wrought explorations I can find of what it means to 
resist the power of a corrupt state and a corrupt culture.
Initially Huck resolves to write to Jim’s owner. He does so, 
and then pauses.
I felt good and all washed clean of sin for the first time I had 
ever felt so in my life, and I knowed I could pray now. But 
I didn’t do it straight off, but laid the paper down and set 
there thinking—thinking how good it was all this happened 
so, and how near I come to being lost and going to hell. And 
went on thinking. And got to thinking over our trip down 
the river; and I see Jim before me all the time: in the day and 
in the night-time, sometimes moonlight, sometimes storms, 
and we a-floating along, talking and singing and laughing. . . . 
and then I happened to look around and see that paper.
It was a close place. I took it up, and held it in my hand. I 
was a-trembling, because I’d got to decide, forever, betwixt 
two things, and I knowed it.
We hang with Huck, in the balance. He is no hero. He is no 
great man. He’s an unschooled boy, brought up in violence, rac-
ism, and poverty. He has just done what he feels is the only good 
thing he has ever done. He has returned valuable property to its 
owner. He has done everything that everyone around him—his 
government, his teachers, his friends—would tell him is the right 
and the honest and the honorable thing to do.
And he cannot do it. He cannot make himself see the world 
the way that they do.
And so he tears up the note and cries out, “All right, then, I’ll 
go to hell.”
Huck’s choice to defy everything that he has been taught to 
believe is good and right in order to rescue a man he has been 
taught to believe is merely a piece of property is surely one of the 
77
greatest triumphs of the individual over the powerful compulsion 
of instantiated cultural and political wrongs.
Margaret Atwood’s poem “Spelling” reminds us that “a word 
after a word / after a word is power.” And she tells us—thinking 
perhaps of the authors before and after Enheduanna whose names 
we will never know, and perhaps of the nameless narrators of so 
much dystopian fiction—that we must learn to spell:
your own name first,
your first naming, your first name,
your first word.
To use one’s name, to use the first person singular, to claim it as 
one’s right and one’s responsibility, is to begin to fight for liberty.
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Rules and Order  
without the State
By Philip Booth and Stephen Davies
Is state control the only means of regulating human interaction? Or 
are there are other mechanisms whereby the behavior of individu-
als and groups can be regulated to reduce conflict and to generate 
greater social coordination and harmony? Who provides the rules 
that regulate exchanges, and how are they enforced? History provides 
instructive examples of regulatory institutions without the state. It is 
frequently asserted as a matter of faith that some economic interac-
tions can only be controlled by the state, but historical examination 
of two of the “hardest cases”—land use and financial risk—shows 
that non-state regulatory institutions provide regulation without 
either the coercion or the perverse incentives and rent-seeking of 
state control. Philip Booth is professor of finance, public policy, and 
ethics at St. Mary’s University, Twickenham and research director 
at the Institute of Economic Affairs in London. Steve Davies is a 
historian and head of education at the Institute of Economic Affairs.
That economic activity of all kinds needs to be regulated is one 
of those truisms that almost no one denies. Why then is there 
so much debate around that topic and, even more noticeably, 
so much confusion, with many people talking past each other? 
One reason, as will become clear, is a lack of attention to the 
evidence of economic history and lack of awareness of real-life 
examples. The more important reason, however, is that the very 
concept or basic idea of regulation is usually poorly understood 
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and defined. To put it slightly differently, many people assume a 
definition of regulation that presupposes that such regulation can 
only be provided by one institution. That, in turn, leads much of 
the discussion to being framed by a false dichotomy between two 
alternatives: state regulation or no regulation at all.
Etymologically, if something is regulated, it takes place in a 
regular manner (as opposed to a random or erratic one) and is 
guided or constrained by rules. In other words, when applied to 
human interactions, it means a state of affairs where people cannot 
simply do whatever they want; their actions are guided by rules 
and the collective outcomes are the results of the interactions 
of the choices of individual actors constrained by those rules. 
That obviously raises a number of questions. In particular, what 
kinds of rules are needed and who or what is the originator and 
enforcer of the rules? Confusion over those two questions leads 
to avoidable misunderstandings. Human cooperation depends on 
rules. The content, source, and enforcement of rules are thus most 
important topics that deserve careful study; merely assuming that 
they can only be provided in one way, without further thought 
or study, is a serious mistake. State control of behavior is not the 
only option, as the following case studies show.
As far as the content and nature of the rules is concerned, it is 
commonly believed that they should have certain characteristics. 
First, the rules must be known and understood by all or most 
of the participants in the activities they govern (otherwise they 
would serve no purpose). Second, there must be institutions, 
mechanisms, or practices that enforce the rules. Third, there 
must be sanctions for breaches of the rules as well as positive 
payoffs for compliance. It is commonly believed that rules should 
be explicit and spelled out precisely in words that capture and 
cover all conceivable eventualities. In other words, regulations 
are codified rules that are written down, comprehensive, explicit, 
and detailed. Anything less than that, we are told, is a failure of 
regulation or its complete absence.
It is widely assumed that, if there are to be rules, there must 
be a ruler: that is, a person or institution (group of persons, in 
other words) that is the source of the rules. In the absence of a 
ruler, it is widely assumed, there would be no rules at all. The 
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source of rules is assumed to be the government or one of its 
agents. If such an entity does not exist or chooses not to issue 
rules then, so the argument goes, there will be an absence of any 
rules—essentially chaos.
However, that dichotomy—of state regulation or no regula-
tion—is a false dichotomy. There are other alternatives. Historical 
research shows that regulation does not always require codified, 
uniform, and exhaustive written rules. (Such exhaustiveness is 
theoretically impossible, in any case.) Nor are we limited to a 
choice between rules created by Hobbes’s Leviathan and the 
lawless war-of-all-against-all of Hobbes’s state of nature. The 
reality is that regulation in the sense described, namely, activity 
constrained by rules, is possible without the rules and associated 
enforcement institutions being directly created by the state. It is 
not only possible, but can be found all around us. Rules can and 
do arise spontaneously from the efforts of people to achieve their 
aims in cooperation with others. It is often (though not always) 
the case that government enables the emergence of such rules, 
but in such cases government does not actually create the rules 
or enforce them.
Once one begins to look for rule-governed interactions, one 
finds that most of human life is regulated in that way. Most rules 
that govern human interactions were not created by government, 
although government may create a general framework of the 
rule of law that facilitates such cooperative creation of rules and 
enforcement institutions.121 Obvious examples include language, 
sports, and codes of social etiquette, but there are many others, 
as well. The process can be observed today in the emergence of 
rules governing Internet transactions through eBay, Etsy, and other 
online trading sites. There is an enormous wealth of empirical 
examples of non-governmental regulatory regimes in natural 
resource management (much of the study of those comes from 
the work of the late Elinor Ostrom and her students122).
In such cases the systems of rules typically have features that 
distinguish them from regulations that are created through 
political processes. Those that evolve are bottom-up systems in 
which the systems of rules arise at local levels by spontaneous 
and unplanned processes, even though the actions that lead to 
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their emergence are themselves purposeful. Others are designed 
and are agreed to by those whom they govern. The degree of 
explicitness varies considerably; some incorporate very explicit 
rules, while others rely more on non-articulated norms. Evolved 
regulatory systems may vary from industry to industry or locale 
to locale and may lack the uniformity or standardization that is 
a feature of designed regimes. They often have the high degree 
of flexibility and variability that is associated with evolutionary 
processes; the system as a whole changes over time in response to 
changed circumstances, but does so in a piecemeal and dispersed 
or local way as opposed to a general and uniform one. Innovations 
in one place or system may be tried, found useful, and copied 
elsewhere, or tried, found unhelpful, and abandoned. They are 
often connected with wider patterns or orders of social life and 
their institutions. Their great strength is that they make use of 
dispersed and tacit or unarticulated (and often inarticulable) 
knowledge. It is that which accounts for their final feature: they 
are more effective than their designed government counterparts. 
(Designed non-governmental regulatory systems that are adopted 
by those they govern have the advantage of being voluntary and 
thus can be modified or discarded if they do not succeed in 
creating or enforcing useful rules. Examples include the rules of 
condominium associations, clubs, corporate bylaws, and other 
systems, although even those invariably incorporate many rules 
that were the results of evolution, rather than design.)
How can we compare the effectiveness of governmental and 
non-governmental systems of regulation? We can turn to economic 
history and the many concrete examples it gives of regulatory 
orders. Historical examples have the advantage in many cases of 
having been studied and their practices recorded and captured. 
Also many such regulatory orders appear at certain points in time 
and then are eradicated or collapse at a later time. Studying the 
origins and demise of such institutions helps us to understand how 
and under what conditions they thrive or otherwise. Such stud-
ies also correct frequent misunderstandings. Sometimes orderly 
states of affairs (which are highly regulated by non-governmental 
institutions) are presented as instances of chaos, randomness, and 
disorder, because they are not subject to state control.
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State Rules or Market Institutions?
All markets are regulated, meaning that there are rules that govern 
them. It is frequently, but erroneously, assumed that only the 
state can provide the rules or the enforcement mechanisms. The 
interesting public policy question is not whether there should be 
regulation, but “who should regulate?” That question is rarely 
asked. In what follows we will look at two cases that are very 
commonly assumed to require state regulation. Our evidence 
will be drawn primarily from the United Kingdom (where we 
live), but it shows that state regulation is neither inevitable nor 
always necessary. The two cases on which we will focus are land 
use and finances.
Of course, those two “hard cases” are not unique. In many 
regulated spheres of life, it is not the state that provides the regu-
lation. Consider fast food restaurants: many McDonalds outlets 
are owned and operated by independent investors and managers 
under a franchise system. To protect its brand name and assure 
uniform quality, McDonalds regulates in rather minute detail how 
they operate, what goes onto the menu, the precise ingredients, 
the precise prices they charge, sanitary precautions, the training 
of employees, and so on.
It is often assumed that the Catholic Church, because of its so-
cial teaching, is committed to high levels of state intervention and 
regulation. However, in its most authoritative document on such 
matters, it states: “Another task of the state is that of overseeing 
and directing the exercise of human rights in the economic sector. 
However, primary responsibility in this area belongs not to the 
state but to individuals and to the various groups and associations 
which make up society.”123 Over time, though, the development 
of state regulation in many sectors has crowded out institutions 
of civil society, including private regulatory institutions.
The reaction to the financial crash of 2007–2008 provides an 
indication of how state regulatory institutions are created and 
operate. In the wake of the crash, tens of thousands of pages of 
regulations were written and promulgated. It was estimated that 
the Dodd–Frank Act in the United States, with its associated 
regulations, would come to thirty thousand pages.124 In 2011, 
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some 14,200 new financial regulations were created worldwide. 
That trend was underway well before the financial crash. It is 
often asserted that there was a period of deregulation before the 
financial crash and that the crash was a consequence of deregula-
tion. That is not so, certainly not in the United Kingdom. As 
Bank of England Chief Economist Andrew Haldane has noted: 
“In 1980, there was one UK regulator for roughly every 11,000 
people employed in the UK financial sector. By 2011, there was 
one regulator for every 300 people employed in finance.”125 Indeed, 
if the number of people working in finance and the number of 
financial regulators in the United Kingdom is projected forward 
on the same trend from 2011 to 2060, by that date there will be 
more financial regulators than people working in finance—and 
that excludes compliance officers and others working on regulatory 
issues within financial firms themselves. Until very recently within 
the United Kingdom, responsibility for financial regulation lay 
with a single body, the Financial Services Authority (FSA). Now 
that body has had its responsibilities split. It has been calculated 
that four million words of financial regulation have been generated 
from just one of the bodies that succeeded the FSA.126
The evidence is quite strong that systems of state regulation have 
not been successful. Not only did the comprehensive systems of 
financial regulation that developed in the United Kingdom from 
1986 and in the United States from the 1930s not prevent the 
financial crash, but in many ways they were contributory causes 
that exacerbated and spread the crisis globally.127 Many forms of 
mistaken and reckless behavior that led to the failures of banks 
and other financial institutions in 2007–2008 were encouraged 
by regulation. Certainly, there is little evidence that regulators had 
some special insights that would have allowed them to control 
the behavior of participants in financial markets in beneficial 
ways. Governments and their regulators encouraged lending to 
poorly qualified borrowers; they encouraged securitization; they 
underwrote risky lending; and they distorted the ways in which 
ratings agencies rated the riskiness of the instruments that ac-
counted for huge financial losses.128 Paul Tucker, later appointed 
Deputy Governor of the Bank of England, referred to the process 
of securitization in a speech as late as April 2007: “So it would 
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seem that there is a good deal to welcome in the greater disper-
sion of risk made possible by modern instruments, markets and 
institutions.”129 That statement was made just a few months before 
the spectacular failure of Northern Rock, an institution that was 
financing its lending activity through securitizations. Tucker was 
not necessarily wrong; indeed, he was probably right. However, 
we should not be confident that state regulators can predict and 
prevent problems arising within markets. State regulators certainly 
failed to anticipate the financial crisis.
It is not just that we have too much confidence in state regula-
tors to resolve problems and perfect the world. We also neglect 
the role—indeed, often deny altogether the role—that private 
regulatory institutions can play, especially in financial markets.
In other markets, we still see many private regulatory institu-
tions and they are making a comeback as a result of the sharing 
economy and the use of the Internet for the exchange of goods 
and services and, of great importance, for the exchange of evalua-
tions of goods and services. They systematically outperform state 
regulators. For example, Visit England is a body funded by the 
government to promote tourism. For most of its life it has been a 
government body, although now it is maintained at arm’s length. 
Whilst a government body it developed a rating system for hotels 
and other accommodation. If you use Visit England to look for 
accommodation in the popular English town of Stamford, for 
example, you can find just two hotels within three miles that 
have a specific rating, and they both have the same rating, which 
is not very helpful. TripAdvisor, a private rating service, on the 
other hand, shows about twenty properties with specific ratings, 
and between them they have hundreds of visitor opinions. It is 
difficult to imagine any justification for the maintenance of a 
government-connected ratings service.
In some sectors, government regulation very clearly crowds 
out private regulation. One could ask why there are few ser-
vices such as TripAdvisor in finance. One answer to that is that 
financial activity is now so highly regulated, that the risks and 
liability of setting up such services would be enormous. In the 
United Kingdom, providing financial advice without authoriza-
tion from a government bureau carries a prison sentence of up to 
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two years.130 Furthermore, the lines between providing opinion, 
advice, and information are so thinly drawn that nobody would 
dare to tread them.
It is clear that regulation can exist in many sectors without the 
state and that the state has forced out many non-state regulatory 
institutions and practices. What is perhaps more interesting is 
that until recently the United Kingdom had a large and thriving 
financial sector with very little government regulation at all. That 
will be the subject of one of the case studies below. But first, we 
take a look at a field that is commonly believed to require state 
regulation in all circumstances: land use and development.
Planning without Government Planners: Housing and 
Development
The systems that developed spontaneously, without the state, to 
govern urban development in the United Kingdom from the 
eighteenth century are particularly illuminating. Today land de-
velopment is heavily regulated by government through statutory 
law (the Town and Country Planning Act in the British case) and 
by a huge array of local government regulations (such as zoning 
laws in the United States and building and planning regulations 
in the United Kingdom). The dominant historical narrative sug-
gests that, before the twentieth century, urban development was 
chaotic and that each property owner and developer could do 
what they wished without regard to the impact of their actions 
on anyone else.131 The result, supposedly, was terrible slums, and 
ugly unplanned development. (A visit to such places as Bath and 
Bloomsbury might raise doubts about that narrative, of course.) 
Interestingly, the same people who advance that account also often 
complain about “suburban sprawl” in the United States without 
stopping to reflect that such “sprawl” is associated with and largely 
caused by governmental regulatory regimes.132 Complaints about 
the ugliness and poor quality of public and private buildings 
produced under the pre-1948 regime in Britain are also puzzling 
when one considers the poor quality of so many buildings that 
have been produced since that time.
In fact the entire process of urban development in the eigh-
teenth and nineteenth centuries in the United Kingdom was 
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highly regulated, but by a non-political regulatory system. That 
regime of rules and institutions neither depended on nor derived 
from statute or government agency rule-making. The state enabled 
it through the existence of the court system and its enforcement 
of contracts, but that was as far as it went. Instead of government 
planning there were often detailed regulations that made use of 
private contracts and various common law practices. The system 
was flexible and responsive because it made use of price signals 
as they were generated by markets for land and improvements.
During that period, although there was much piecemeal 
and small-scale development, most of the large scale growth 
of towns and cities after the 1730s was done in large chunks of 
land. Sometimes, as in Southport or Eastbourne or Cardiff, that 
involved the building of an entire town. Elsewhere, as in London, 
Newcastle, and Edinburgh, it was the development of large areas 
that were parts of growing cities or towns. Sometimes a single 
estate owned by one landlord was developed in that way, as with 
the Cadogan estate in Chelsea for example. On other occasions a 
developer would put together a large parcel of smaller pieces of 
land, as in some of the developments of Thomas Cubitt.
Those developments were not randomly carried out. Even 
when, as was normally the case, each individual plot within the 
larger parcel was developed and built on by a single builder (so 
that one street would have each house built at a different time 
by a different builder) the process was governed by explicit and 
detailed rules. Those were effected through the use of covenants 
which formed perpetual and binding conditions that were a part 
of the original lease or sale contract for the land. They bound 
all subsequent owners or lessors and could be enforced either by 
the residuary authority of the original developer and his or her 
heirs or by neighbors. Some were negative and simply prohibited 
certain things, such as carrying on particular trades and occupa-
tions. That meant that there was quite detailed regulation of the 
economic use made of new buildings and of the impact of the 
activities of the inhabitants of any one building on their neighbors. 
(Thus, what we would now call externalities were controlled.) 
Such matters could also be dealt with through the common law 
of nuisance, but incorporating them into covenants attached to 
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the act of development made the whole process much cheaper 
and quicker in the event of a breach of the rules, because it was 
simply a matter of enforcing an existing contract and there was 
no need to demonstrate harm or nuisance in a court of law.
Many other kinds of covenant were positive and required 
things such as standard heights for buildings erected on a plot, 
size and numbers of rooms, details of decoration and appearance, 
standards of construction, and the use of certain materials. Those 
could be, and often were, astonishingly detailed and specific; 
they set out requirements not just for the use of, say, stone rather 
than brick, but for a specific type of stone and the exact details 
of ornamentation, window size and shape, and the like.133 The 
result was the harmonious and uniform pattern of development 
found in places such as Bath. The crucial point, though, was that 
that was not done through a political process but by interplay 
and contract between individual developers and customers. That 
meant that the actual regulations would depend on the individual 
developer and their situation. There was not a uniform—and 
hence impossibly complex or prescriptive—set of regulations for 
an entire district, much less the whole country.
Those private regulatory mechanisms also interacted through 
the market to adjust and adapt to the preferences and needs ex-
pressed through purchasing decisions by consumers. Thus, where 
the main demand was for luxury housing, the covenants would 
be extensive and detailed, whereas in places where the demand 
was for mass cheap housing they would be much more limited 
and would stipulate requirements of size and provision. The 
process led developers to provide and lay out the infrastructure 
of streets, roads, lighting and (often) water supply when they 
began to develop a site.134
In other words you had a predominantly non-state and spon-
taneously generated system of regulation that covered layout, 
building standards and materials, design, appearance, quality, 
usage, and safety and did so in a flexible and responsive way. 
Moreover, it usually led to coherent communities being created, 
not least because the typical pattern was for mixed use so that com-
mercial, residential, and leisure provision would all be provided 
in the same area. There was a comprehensive regulatory system 
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that was decentralized, varied, flexible, and responsive and was 
independent of the state. It was arguably much more effective 
than the state system that later replaced it.
What about the terrible slums of the Victorian era about which 
we read so much? Those certainly existed and they were indeed 
terrible, but the bleak Dickensian picture needs to be heavily 
qualified. The great majority of the working class did not live in 
slums; instead they lived in modest but, by the standards of the 
day, adequate housing which was within their financial means. 
The very lowest income groups, especially those on irregular 
income due to casualized labor, experienced the most serious 
problems. Movement of people into the older, pre-industrial 
areas in the centers of the cities created serious problems. Those 
problems were also well on the way to being resolved by the later 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries with the appearance of 
charitable housing associations such as the Peabody Trust. Such 
organizations created robust and decent quality but low-cost 
housing where it was needed most—in the centers of large urban 
areas and in particular in the “recipient” or “catchment” areas.135 
They also made use of covenants to regulate the behavior of the 
tenants but that is another story.
What happened and why did that system not survive? It appears 
at first sight that the system of private regulation described broke 
down after 1918, most strongly during the 1930s. That decade saw 
the form and pattern of urban growth and development change 
dramatically with the appearance of what was called “ribbon 
development.” Instead of the large, integrated developments 
that had featured earlier, Britain saw the building of residential 
property along major trunk roads leading out of the main cities. 
The system of mixed use—commercial, residential, and leisure—
seemed to have been abandoned. The development was also of 
much lower density. The result was a pattern of development that 
was unattractive and a serious threat to the rural and semi-rural 
environment and its amenities. That led to the passage of the 
Town and Country Planning Act in 1947.
What had happened? It clearly was not due to a shortage of 
large parcels of land becoming available for development; the 
Great War (World War I) meant that such land parcels were 
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coming on to the market at an unprecedented rate because of the 
number of deaths among the landowning class during the war and 
its immediate aftermath and the need to pay death duties. The 
previous system had been changed via statute in 1910, and it is 
tempting to blame those changes for what happened. However, 
the changes were too limited to account for the sudden and 
dramatic shift that took place. The real reason for the change 
was a combination of a new technology and an associated change 
in consumer demand, and a change in government policies that 
enabled the shift in development patterns.
The new technology was, of course, the motor car. That brought 
about a radical shift in demand because it enabled people to live 
a considerable distance away from their places of work. What 
most people wanted, it emerged, was to have urban housing and 
amenities in a semi-rural environment, a distance away from the 
workplace. That created a prisoner’s dilemma and a correspond-
ing “market failure”: each individual house buyer rationally chose 
to buy a house built on a major trunk road, but the collective 
unintended outcome, which ultimately defeated their desires, 
was the ribbon development described earlier.
That by itself, however, was not enough to undermine the 
effectiveness of the private regulatory system; ribbon develop-
ment would have been much more limited had it not been for 
another factor. Earlier, the advent of the commuter railway had 
led to the appearance of suburbia, but that was still built in large 
integrated chunks using the regulatory system described above. 
(The development of the Edgerton Estate in South Manchester 
is an example.) The critical new factor was a sudden expansion 
of the role of government. Before 1850, the road system in the 
United Kingdom had been run and maintained in large part by 
turnpike trusts, which were private bodies authorized by a Private 
Act of Parliament to maintain a stretch of road and levy tolls on 
it. Much of the paving of urban areas was created by developers 
while elsewhere it was done and maintained by Paving Trusts 
and Town Improvement Trusts. From the 1850s onwards both 
of those functions passed to the control of local authorities 
(borough councils and counties). Still, there was no involvement 
on the part of national government. Moreover, the roads of late 
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Victorian Britain were as quiet as they had ever been because of the 
domination of medium- and long-distance travel by the railways.
All that changed abruptly in the immediate aftermath of the 
Great War. In 1919, the Ministry of Transport was created and 
took over responsibility for all major roads from local authorities. 
Given the rapid shift to motorized transport (and the inadequacy 
of the road system as revealed during the war) there was a deci-
sion to invest heavily in roads. What that meant, given that those 
roads were supplied free at the point of use for anybody building 
houses along them, was that a huge part of the cost to individu-
als and developers of suburban living and development was now 
socialized and loaded on to the general taxpayer. That removed 
the check that had made the kind of private regulation described 
above function efficiently. In particular, the change created strong 
incentives to build housing along the “free” roads that had been 
provided by the state for the purpose of communication and that 
dictated the pattern of development. The alternative of building 
estates and nicely planned developments which were linked by 
roads paid for by the developer with the associated private plan-
ning and restrictive covenants was now relatively more expensive 
than relying on state provision.
The evidence of sub-urbanization linked to the development 
of the railways is that, if developers and, ultimately, consumers 
had to pay the full costs of their first choice, the pattern of ribbon 
development that emerged would have been much less common, 
and there would still have been a pattern of integrated develop-
ment regulated by private contract.
What that shows is that what to the modern eye looks like 
chaos was actually orderly and regulated by mechanisms other 
than those of the state, and that such systems are vulnerable to 
government intervention and disruption.
Regulation without Government Regulators: Banking and 
Finance
 Self-regulation of finance in the United Kingdom
Until the 1980s, beyond provision of a legal system and protec-
tion of property rights, there was very little direct government 
regulation of either the insurance or the banking136 industries in 
91
the United Kingdom. Today, we have international, European 
Union, and national regulation of bank capital. Banks are required 
to hold a level of capital137 determined through a very complex 
regulatory process. The capital level is set so as to reduce their 
likelihood of failure and, thereby, reduce the likelihood of a bank 
failure undermining the rest of the financial system and possibly 
the real economy.
In many areas of economic activity, people regulate their own 
behavior because they face the adverse consequences of reckless 
actions. Even if people or businesses do silly things, we generally 
allow them to do so and require them to bear the costs. In a 
world in which the finance system is so highly regulated, it may 
be difficult to imagine that that was ever the case when it came to 
financial institutions. But, in fact, it was. Banks did regulate and 
restrain their own behavior. Their behavior was also restrained 
by choices made by counterparties who had capital or deposits 
invested with the bank and who wanted to deal with responsible 
financial institutions.
As Capie and Wood conclude in the summary of their 2013 
report, Do We Need Regulation of Bank Capital? Some Evidence 
from the UK, dealing with bank capital regulation: “An analysis of 
bank capital shows that they [banks] adjusted their capital ratios 
according to the risks that they were taking and that they were 
well capitalised in comparison with the standards set by regulators 
under the Basel I and Basel II approaches [the current interna-
tional regime for statutory regulation of bank capital]. Indeed, 
when bank capital levels became very thin after the Second World 
War, banks were prevented by the Bank of England from raising 
more capital, despite their appeals to the Bank.” Crucially, they 
also note: “During this long period of prudent management of 
the banking sector, there was no clear expectation that the state 
would have stepped in to save an insolvent bank in Britain.”138
In other words, banks behaved responsibly when they were 
financially accountable for their own decisions. Of course, banks 
occasionally did fail. The Bank of England, as regulator, regarded 
it as its role to protect the banking system as a whole when an 
individual bank failed, but it would not have saved the bank itself. 
Certainly that approach was much more successful than the far 
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more governmentally regulated US banking system, in which 
banks were fragile because they were prevented from diversifying. 
Between 1870 and 1979 there were no major banking crises in the 
United Kingdom and only two minor crises. Non-state regulatory 
mechanisms worked well. That system of regulation appeared 
to break down after the state injected systematic moral hazard 
into the system through state guarantees; when banks, creditors, 
and depositors knew that risky decisions would, at least to some 
extent, be underwritten by the state, increasingly risky behavior 
was the predictable result. That was even more evident in the 
United States. Central bank (ab)use of lender of the last resort 
facility;139 the bailing out of bond holders; deposit insurance; the 
underwriting of mortgage securitization by the US government; 
weak bankruptcy law; and the way in which monetary policy 
was managed; all of that changed the risk climate within banks 
and changed their incentives and thus their behavior.140 That 
happened to a lesser extent in the United Kingdom, although 
a limited degree of deposit insurance was introduced in 1979.
Other aspects of financial services were also largely free from 
state intervention or regulation during the period from 1870 
to 1986. Again, that contrasted with the United States. In the 
United Kingdom, life insurance was regulated in a manner broadly 
consistent with freedom of contract.141 The 1870 Life Assurance 
Companies Act required the publication of accounting informa-
tion. That information was, in effect, released to the market via 
the Board of Trade (a government department). Over time, the 
government became slightly more involved with the analysis of 
that information but, for much of the period, it simply published 
the information and any correspondence it wished to exchange 
with the company. Crucially, there was also a special set of pro-
cedures for winding up life insurance companies so that, if they 
failed, they could be wound up safely with all creditors obtaining 
what was due to them.
That whole legal framework was very successful and remained 
more or less intact for a hundred years. The regulatory regime 
surrounding pension funds was also liberal and designed in the 
best traditions of British common law until the 1980s.
In the case of banks, pension funds, and life insurance compa-
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nies, institutions evolved within the market to deal with consumer 
concerns. Pension funds were largely free of state control or regu-
lation, but the assets were always held within trusts, the trustees 
of which had a fiduciary duty to act in the best interests of the 
members of the trust and to invest as a prudent person would 
invest. That meant that an employee was not at risk of losing his 
or her whole pension if his or her employer became bankrupt. 
Unit trusts (the UK equivalent of mutual funds) also operate 
using trusts for the same purpose. Within insurance markets, 
professions developed which would only admit members with 
high levels of technical expertise and who had to put their pro-
fessional duties ahead of any obligations they might have had to 
their employers when it came to management of solvency and 
the general behavior of the company.142
It is important to note that, in the insurance and pensions 
industry, those professions were entirely self-regulating bodies 
that had no state protection and no state involvement with the 
setting of qualifications. Different forms of corporate owner-
ship also evolved. Mutuals, for example, were common in both 
insurance and banking. They are often technically less efficient 
than proprietary companies.143 However, they manage conflicts 
of interest between owners and customers better.144 In both 
banking and insurance markets, mutuals thrived in that period 
of limited state regulation. In the case of the banking industry, 
mutual building societies developed their own system of capital 
regulation. As well as mutuals, 100 percent reserve deposit banks 
also existed. Institutions operating according to different conven-
tions provided wider consumer choice and obviated the need for 
state regulation.
Moreover, accounts by contemporaries suggest that the health of 
insurance professions was much stronger in the United Kingdom 
than in the United States, where state regulation of the insurance 
industry was much more prominent.145 In that environment, 
insolvencies of life insurance companies were very rare. There 
were two significant events between 1870 and 1970, and neither 
of those adversely affected policy holders.146
It is worth noting the kinds of institutions and forces at work 
here: responsibility exercised by owners, creditors, and customers; 
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the development of private regulatory organizations such as 
professions; and the development of special forms of corporate 
ownership. All were important in ensuring that markets promoted 
responsible behavior. Not all of those were market regulatory 
devices (though the professions were), but they led market par-
ticipants to regulate and take responsibility for their own behavior. 
Market participants do not wish to lose their investments or be 
subject to fraud, so it is hardly surprising that markets should 
have developed such regulatory processes.
Rule-making institutions in financial markets
What surprises many today is that formal regulatory institutions 
developed within financial markets to perform roles that, these 
days, are widely believed to be exclusively the responsibility and 
function of the state.
Orderly markets develop when individuals and corporations 
have to take financial responsibility for their own decisions. 
However, there are some situations where more formal rule-
making institutions are needed. That is especially important if 
there are “externalities” from particular forms of market behavior. 
For example, if the behavior of one individual or institution 
undermines market confidence in other institutions or, if there 
are benefits from standardized terms and conditions of trading, 
there is a need for institutions to provide the rules for all those 
market participants who wish to join (and who meet the condi-
tions that the rule-makers set).
Perhaps surprising to some, there are a number of non-state 
institutions within financial markets that govern the behavior of 
participants. The International Swaps and Derivatives Association 
(ISDA), for example, was established in 1985 to “make the global de-
rivatives markets safer and more efficient.” As ISDA put it: “ISDA’s 
pioneering work in developing the ISDA Master Agreement and a 
wide range of related documentation materials, and in ensuring the 
enforceability of their netting and collateral provisions, has helped 
to significantly reduce credit and legal risk.”147 Stock exchanges, 
even given the high levels of state regulation that now exist, still 
provide rules and regulations in order to create orderly conditions 
for markets on which companies can have their shares quoted.
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However, it is perhaps more interesting to examine historical 
examples of where private sector organizations were the only 
regulators of securities and derivatives markets, as was the case 
in the United Kingdom until as recently as 1986. It is clear that 
ISDA does an important job, but it might be thought that it can 
only do that in the context of tight government regulation. That 
is simply not true, as history indicates.
The world’s first modern stock markets developed in Amsterdam 
and London in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.148 Those 
markets provided a secure environment for trading in securities. 
Trading on account was possible and forward markets developed. 
Sometimes those markets facilitated the trading in and enforce-
ment of contracts that were not even enforceable in national 
courts. In the United Kingdom, the London exchange developed 
rules for the trading of securities, for members of the exchange 
and for the companies the securities of which were traded on the 
exchange. By 1923, the reputation for propriety was such that the 
motto of the exchange became “my word is my bond.” In the early 
stages, of course, rules were informal, though they were effective. 
For example, when trading on account was introduced, those who 
had not settled had their names chalked up on a board under the 
heading “lame duck.” In time, rules became more formal, as did 
enforcement mechanisms.
In the United Kingdom, unlike in the United States, the trad-
ing of securities was more or less entirely regulated by the stock 
exchange—a private institution—with almost no involvement 
from the state until 1986. In 1986, the government effectively 
prohibited many of the regulations that that private body had 
developed and enforced and, from 1998, began to develop a 
highly bureaucratic system of state regulation.149
The first codified rule book covering topics such as default 
and settlement was developed by the London exchange in 1812. 
That rule book included provisions for settlement, arbitration, 
and dealing with bad debts. There were also rules about general 
behavior that were designed to increase transparency. At the 
beginning of the twentieth century, more onerous conditions 
were developed for companies that wanted their securities listed 
and traded on the exchange. Until 1986, apart from a few pieces 
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of primary legislation, nearly all regulation of securities markets 
was undertaken by private institutions such as the stock exchange. 
Some of the rules imposed on members were onerous (and not 
without controversy). For example, from 1909, members were 
prohibited from both broking (buying shares on behalf of clients) 
and trading on their own book (that is taking risks and positions 
themselves). That reduced the likelihood of conflicts of inter-
est but would also have reduced opportunities for members to 
develop their businesses.
A Royal Commission enquiry in 1877–78 illustrates the impor-
tance of those mechanisms in London’s financial markets. The 
Royal Commission noted that the exchange’s rules “had been 
salutary to the interests of the public” and that the exchange 
had acted “uprightly, honestly, and with a desire to do justice.”150 
It further commented that the exchange’s rules were “capable 
of affording relief and exercising restraint far more prompt and 
often satisfactory than any within the read of the courts of law.” 
That is to say, the exchange was better able to solve problems than 
were the courts of law.
There was no legal requirement to deal through members 
of the exchange or to have shares quoted on the exchange. The 
London Stock Exchange did not have a monopoly. However, 
the exchange was perceived to use its powers in a cartelistic way. 
That arose from its ability to decide who was a member and how 
members should operate, which is vital if it is going to be effective 
as a regulatory body.
The exchange’s most important self-regulatory powers were, 
in effect, removed when the government decided that they were 
a form of unfair restriction on trade; that happened in 1986. 
Ironically, the change occurred at the very time technology would 
probably have led to international competition between differ-
ent non-state regulatory bodies which would have removed any 
perceived problem of restrictive practices disadvantaging other 
participants in financial markets. The state regulator now has 
the absolute power to decide who operates in financial markets 
and under what conditions; that is to say, the state regulator now 
has a total monopoly.
It is now impossible to operate in securities markets in the 
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United Kingdom without permission from the state regulator 
(even if one holds very high level academic or professional qualifi-
cations). There are, however, despite all the constraints, important 
areas where non-state governance still prevails. The London Stock 
Exchange no longer is the main determinant of rules for trading, 
deciding how quoted companies should behave and so on, but it 
does provide various mechanisms such as clearing facilities that 
are important for orderly and liquid markets. Furthermore, there 
are other bodies and markets, such as ISDA and the Alternative 
Investment Market (AIM), which have their own rules systems 
as determined by the kind of business they do. AIM, for example, 
is a more lightly regulated market that tends to host trading of 
smaller companies. Indeed, variety in regulation and adaptability 
to differing circumstances are two of the advantages of private 
regulatory institutions.
The United States evolved similar institutions, but the state ac-
tively involved itself much earlier than in the United Kingdom. In 
1817, a group of people created the New York Stock and Exchange 
Board, which developed formal rules for trading, the paying of 
commissions and so on, and demanded financial guarantees from 
members. Indeed, arguably, its formal rule-making capacity de-
veloped earlier than that of the London exchange. The New York 
exchange evolved over time until after the crises of 1929–1933. 
In 1934, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) was 
founded. Under that new arrangement, for quite some time, the 
New York exchange was allowed to regulate itself without a great 
deal of interference. Gradually, that changed—especially from 
1975. Effectively, the exchange is now accountable to the state 
regulator, the SEC.151
State regulation is hardly necessary in investment markets, as 
the UK experience has demonstrated. Companies want a well-
regulated exchange because regulation ensures investor confidence 
and more liquidity and thus leads to a lower cost of capital. The 
members of the exchange demand that the companies that have 
their shares traded are subject to certain forms of regulation be-
cause that reduces risks to members and their clients. That makes 
trading more attractive, thus reducing the cost to a company of 
raising capital, and so on. There is a symbiotic relationship.
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Conclusion
Throughout history, banks, other financial institutions and securi-
ties and derivatives markets developed their own highly effective 
regulatory structures. And since the regulation of securities mar-
kets in the United Kingdom was taken over by the state in 1986, 
it is very difficult to argue that the number of scandals has fallen. 
Formal exchanges are just one of many types of institutions that 
emerged to regulate behavior in complex financial markets. It 
is worth noting that regulation does not just come from formal 
institutions. As long as participants in financial markets bear the 
cost of their decision-making, they have incentives to regulate 
their own behavior and develop special forms of cooperation to 
handle conflicts of interest, financial risk, and other problems 
more effectively.
The same is true in land-use planning where the state’s role 
is so ubiquitous that most people are hardly aware that it is not 
necessary. Some of the most highly regarded developments in 
the United Kingdom arose through voluntary non-state plan-
ning systems.
Voluntary non-state regulatory institutions can provide the 
benefits promised, but rarely delivered, by state regulatory bodies. 
Indeed, we are again witnessing the reemergence of such systems. 
New non-financial markets (such as Uber and eBay) already have a 
wide range of non-state regulatory mechanisms attached to them. 
That openness could be extended to other kinds of markets, as 
well. As new forms of finance develop (such as crowd-funding 
and peer-to-peer lending) the state could choose to step back and 
allow markets to coordinate borrowers and lenders, investors and 
entrepreneurs, in an environment where market participants and 
institutions provide the regulation. Those new innovations could 
even be clearly labeled “unregulated by the state.” Nobody 
would be excluded from financial services as existing products, 
channels, and services would still exist. Unfortunately, in the 
United Kingdom, the financial regulator has chosen to regulate 
those new innovations just like it regulates traditional finance.
Regulation is a desirable quality of market exchanges. The 
central question is, regulated by what and by whom? Markets 
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regulated by the rule of law, rather than by detailed and minute 
commands and prohibitions, have existed and do exist now and 
thus are possible. It is time to jettison the thoughtless assumption 
that only the state, in the form of politicians and bureaucrats, can 
provide the rules, the regularity, and the oversight that can be such 
valuable features of cooperative ventures. Given the framework of 
the rule of law, it may be far wiser to let people exercise their own 
self-control, rather than surrendering that control to the state.
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The Welfare State and the 
Erosion of Responsibility
By Nima Sanandaji
Do welfare states generate high degrees of trust, social cohesion, and 
norms of responsibility, or do they require high degrees of pre-existing 
trust, social cohesion, and norms of responsibility to avoid systematic 
social conflict and dysfunction? A study of the welfare states of the 
Nordic countries shows the irreplaceable role of norms of responsibil-
ity in avoiding dysfunction. The responsibility precedes the welfare 
state, and not the other way around. Moreover, evidence gathered 
over decades shows that welfare states systematically undermine 
the norms of responsibility and with that social trust and cohe-
sion. Dr. Nima Sanandaji is a Swedish-based fellow of the Center 
for the Study of Market Reform of Education. He is the author 
of Scandinavian Unexceptionalism: Culture, Markets, and the 
Failure of Third-Way Socialism (London: Institute of Economic 
Affairs, 2015) and other works. He received his PhD from the Royal 
Institute of Technology in Stockholm.
The “New Deal” that President Franklin D. Roosevelt presided 
over can be considered the birth of the American welfare state. 
It was those laws and executive orders that created the central 
institutions and programs that have formed the modern welfare 
state as we know it today. The architect of the American welfare 
state, Roosevelt, was, however, concerned about the long-term 
viability of the programs he had created, because he believed that 
welfare payments might impact societal norms.
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Two years into his presidency, Roosevelt addressed the United 
States Congress and praised the expansion of welfare programs. 
During the same speech, however, he noted that many of the 
individuals who had lost their jobs during the Great Depression 
still remained unemployed. Roosevelt commented that “the 
burden on the federal government has grown with great rapid-
ity.” His greatest concern was not, however, the sustainability of 
public finances, but rather that public dependency also created 
a profound spiritual and moral problem. With foresight the 
president reached the conclusion:
When humane considerations are concerned, Americans 
give them precedence. The lessons of history, confirmed 
by the evidence immediately before me, show conclusively 
that continued dependence upon relief induces a spiritual 
and moral disintegration fundamentally destructive to the 
national fiber. To dole out relief in this way is to administer 
a narcotic, a subtle destroyer of the human spirit. It is inimi-
cal to the dictates of sound policy. It is in violation of the 
traditions of America.152 
In today’s political climate, Roosevelt’s view on public benefits 
might be denounced as quite radical. History, however, has borne 
out his warnings. Not only advocates of small public sectors 
but—perhaps even more so—proponents of large welfare states 
should carefully consider how policies change people’s norms 
and behavior over the long term.
Roosevelt’s Concern
President Roosevelt’s views were at the time more common than 
one might suppose today. In the beginning of the twentieth cen-
tury even the proponents of the welfare state were worried that 
the build-up of welfare programs might strain the social fabric. 
To understand why, one must bear in mind that for the welfare 
state to function properly, it is not enough that most individuals 
follow the norm of paying taxes. Nor does it suffice that most 
individuals follow the norm of not overusing welfare services. 
Rather, for the system to be viable over the long term, the vast 
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majority of individuals must obey both norms and must believe 
that others are doing the same. In other words, they must obey 
the social contract.
However, as transfer schemes become more generous and taxes 
are raised, it becomes increasingly lucrative to shift from working 
and paying taxes to not working (or working less) and receiving 
benefits. If everyone in society were to follow the norms of work-
ing and paying taxes, only relying on welfare programs when in 
true need, even a large system of transfers could be sustained. 
However, if some individuals start to defect from the norms, 
others are likely to follow suit. If a critical mass of people change 
their behavior, either by dodging taxes or overusing benefits, the 
erosion of welfare norms can accelerate as the social contract 
falls apart.153
This is not merely speculation based on abstract game-the-
oretical reasoning. Researchers Erns Fehr and Urs Fischbacher 
have found that legal rules and legal enforcement mechanisms 
typically lack effectiveness if not backed by social norms. Social 
norms can in this sense be seen as rules of “conditional coopera-
tion.” Critically, “defection of others is a legitimate excuse for 
individual defection.”154 In other words, if an individual perceives 
that her neighbors stick to the norm, she will be likely to follow 
it as well. If the neighbors begin abandoning the norms, she is 
likely to change her behavior as well. An erosion of the conditional 
cooperative foundation of a sustainable welfare state can have 
grave societal effects. The result can be deteriorating work ethics, 
increased public dependency and bitter social strife.
To further complicate the matter, it’s not enough merely to 
implement stricter enforcement of rules to restore a sustainable 
system of norms. Administrative measures to control use of public 
programs might signal to law-abiding citizens that violations have 
become common. Friedrich Heinemann has studied how generous 
welfare systems can—over time—undermine the very norms that 
make those welfare systems possible. He explains that the imposi-
tion of sanctions for improper receipt or use of benefits can “be 
perceived as limiting citizens’ self-determination and will then 
further crowd out the intrinsic motivation to respect the law.”155
If society reaches a point where over usage of welfare programs 
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becomes common practice, the deterioration of norms may prove 
difficult to stop. Imposing restrictive regulations or administrative 
measures may be inadequate to stop the erosion of norms and 
may in fact accelerate the process. In that light, one can better 
understand why President Roosevelt himself viewed doling out 
relief as “a narcotic, a subtle destroyer of the human spirit.”
Unintended Consequences
With time, welfare state proponents forgot Roosevelt’s warning. 
The advocates of welfare policy grew more confident that generous 
government services and handouts could, in fact, be introduced, 
and funded by high tax rates, without the social norms that 
made such transfers possible being undermined in the process. 
However, the actual societal development showed that there was 
indeed reason to keep the long-term effects of welfare policy in 
mind. The same welfare policies that were intended to, and to 
some degree succeeded in, alleviating material poverty also un-
intentionally created persistent “social poverty.” Concerns about 
the welfare dependency that arose in marginalized communities 
lead to a shift in political thinking.156 President Ronald Reagan 
articulated this concern in 1986, during his radio address to the 
nation on welfare reform:
From the 1950s on, poverty in America was declining. 
American society, an opportunity society, was doing its 
wonders. Economic growth was providing a ladder for mil-
lions to climb up out of poverty and into prosperity. In 1964 
the famous War on Poverty was declared and a funny thing 
happened. Poverty, as measured by dependency, stopped 
shrinking and then actually began to grow worse. I guess you 
could say, poverty won the war. Poverty won in part because 
instead of helping the poor, government programs ruptured 
the bonds holding poor families together.157
President Reagan provided a textbook example of how the social 
capital of families can be eroded by welfare programs ostensibly 
intended to help them:
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Perhaps the most insidious effect of welfare is its usurpation 
of the role of provider. In states where payments are highest, 
for instance, public assistance for a single mother can amount 
to much more than the usable income of a minimum wage 
job. In other words, it can pay for her to quit work. Many 
families are eligible for substantially higher benefits when 
the father is not present. What must it do to a man to know 
that his own children will be better off if he is never legally 
recognized as their father? Under existing welfare rules, a 
teenage girl who becomes pregnant can make herself eligible 
for welfare benefits that will set her up in an apartment of 
her own, provide medical care, and feed and clothe her. She 
only has to fulfill one condition—not marry or identify the 
father.158
Ronald Reagan’s critique resonated with the public. Americans 
supported policies to limit the scope of welfare programs, with 
the motivation of curbing the unintended consequences of welfare 
dependency. Not only Republicans, but also some Democrats, sup-
ported those policies. Crucially, in 2006, President Bill Clinton 
signed the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Rec-
onciliation Act. He promised “to make welfare a second chance, 
not a way of life.” In an opinion article published ten years later 
in the New York Times, Bill Clinton argued that the bipartisan 
legislation had indeed been successful:
The last 10 years have shown that we did in fact end welfare 
as we knew it, creating a new beginning for millions of 
Americans. In the past decade, welfare rolls have dropped 
substantially, from 12.2 million in 1996 to 4.5 million today. 
At the same time, caseloads declined by 54 percent. Sixty 
percent of mothers who left welfare found work, far surpass-
ing predictions of experts.159
The United States is not the only nation where eroding social 
norms have led people to re-examine welfare programs. The same 
issue has been raised in many other parts of the world. Yet there has 
been a persistent conviction amongst the modern proponents of 
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welfare states that it is somehow possible to create stable systems 
that combine high benefits and high taxes. Proponents typically 
point to the Nordic countries—Sweden, Norway, Denmark, 
and Finland—as evidence. The welfare states in this part of the 
world seem, at least at first glance, to have succeeded in provid-
ing extensive services and cash benefits without eroding personal 
responsibility. If generous welfare works in the Nordics, why not 
also in the rest of the world? 
This issue is quite interesting for me. One reason is that I have 
written some twenty books and over one hundred policy reports, 
mainly dealing with various societal issues in Sweden and other 
northern European countries. Another reason is that I myself grew 
up in an immigrant family in Sweden, supported mainly with 
welfare. Thus, I have had firsthand experience of the short-term 
benefits that such programs provide to less-fortunate families. I 
have also seen the long-term disadvantages of a system that traps 
entire families and communities in dependency.
The Lutheran North
The four Nordic nations—Sweden, Denmark, Finland and 
Norway—are often regarded by proponents of the welfare state 
as prime role-models whose policies should serve as models for 
others. New York Times columnist and Nobel Prize-winning trade 
economist Paul Krugman, for example, has written, “Every time 
I read someone talking about the ‘collapsing welfare states of 
Europe,’ I have this urge to take that person on a forced walking 
tour of Stockholm.”160 The Nordic countries are perceived by many 
as having successfully implemented large-scale welfare states, with 
generous and broad-ranging public programs, while avoiding the 
moral hazards associated with welfare policy.161 
The reality is that not only policy but also culture sets this part 
of the world apart. The Nordic countries—and to some extent 
other similar northern European countries such as Germany and 
the Netherlands—are characterized by social norms that place 
unusually strong emphasis on individual responsibility and not 
“free riding” on the efforts of others. Religion, climate, and history 
all seem to have played a role in forming these unique cultures.
Over a hundred years ago, the sociologist Max Weber observed 
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that Protestant countries in northern Europe tended to have 
a higher living standard, more highquality academic institu-
tions, and overall stronger social cohesion than Catholic and 
Orthodox countries. Weber believed that the cause of the success 
of Protestant nations was to be found in a stronger “Protestant 
work ethic.”162 Swedish economist and welfare state researcher 
Assar Lindbeck later built upon that theory by considering factors 
other than religion. Lindbeck explains that it has historically been 
difficult to survive as an agriculturalist without working excep-
tionally hard in the hostile Nordic environment. The population 
therefore out of necessity generated a culture that placed great 
emphasis on individual responsibility and hard work.163 
What is unique about Nordic nations is not only that they 
are cold, but also that throughout most of their recent history 
they have been dominated by independent farmers. Hard work 
has historically been a necessity in the cold north. The rewards 
of hard work also accrued to individuals and their families due 
to widespread private ownership of land. In addition, the ho-
mogenous Nordic societies have adopted cultures characterized 
by strong social cohesion and the highest levels of trust in the 
world.164 A study of sixty countries by Jan Delhey and Kenneth 
Newton shows that the Nordic countries165 combine all the 
features traditionally associated with high levels of trust. The 
authors write: “High trust countries are characterized by ethnic 
homogeneity, Protestant religious traditions, good government, 
wealth (gross domestic product per capita), and income equal-
ity.” Delhey and Newton go on to explain, “This combination 
is most marked in the high-trust Nordic countries, but the same 
general pattern is found in the remaining 55 countries, albeit in 
a weaker form.”166
Welfare States Rely on Norms
High levels of trust, a strong work ethic, and social cohesion are 
the perfect starting points for a successful economy. They are 
also the cornerstones of sustainable social democratic welfare 
policies; a pre-existing high level of social cohesion allows welfare 
programs and high taxes to be implemented without the same 
impact on work habits as such policies might have in a different 
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environment. Thus the Nordic countries and other parts of 
northern Europe have had optimal conditions for introduction 
of welfare state policies.167
The measured level of reluctance to claim government ben-
efits without legal entitlement is referred to as “benefit morale.” 
Benefit morale is measured through the World Value Survey, a 
global attitude study where respondents are asked, among other 
things, whether they believe that it can sometimes be justified 
to claim government benefits to which they are not entitled. By 
examining thirty-one different developed economies between 
the period of 1981 and 2010, Daniel Arnold demonstrated that 
high benefit morale reduces the incidence of absence and sick-
pay entitlements.168
Once we realize that benefit morale affects welfare states, our 
understanding of modern welfare policies can be expanded. A 
common notion is that politicians in the United States have 
opted to introduce less-generous public programs, perhaps since 
they care little for the needs of the poor, whilst politicians in the 
Nordic countries have chosen a more generous route. Ideological 
differences are, however, not the entire truth. We must account 
for the fact that welfare state policies have been more suited for 
Nordic societies than for America. The historical evolution of cur-
rent policies supports that notion. Nordic countries did introduce 
early welfare state projects. But Nordic Social Democrats at the 
time had a pragmatic approach, and were careful not to disrupt 
the successful small-government systems that existed at the time. 
Therefore the size of government remained small for a long time.
As late as 1955, the tax burden in Sweden was at the same level 
as in the United States (taxes amounted to 24 percent of GDP 
in both countries) while those in Denmark were slightly lower 
(23 percent of GDP).169 When the Great Depression hit the 
world, politicians such as Franklin D. Roosevelt responded by 
introducing massive public programs, viewing state involvement 
as the best stimulus. Somewhat surprisingly, Nordic countries 
reacted differently. These trade-dependent nations were initially 
hit hard during the Great Depression. However, they recovered 
rapidly by relying on a market-oriented approach. During the crisis 
years, Nohab Flight engines (today known as Volvo Aero), was 
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born. Shortly after the crisis, Securitas and SAAB were founded. 
A new method for creating paper pulp was invented, leading to 
the creation of Sunds Defibrator (today Metso Paper, a leading 
developer of paper industry equipment).170
A common myth holds that early on the United States chose 
a free-market path while the Nordic countries rapidly moved 
toward large welfare regimes. In reality, the American welfare sys-
tem developed parallel to that of the Nordic countries. But there 
was a major difference: the American welfare system met with 
early criticism, precisely because the unintended consequences 
of deteriorating norms and family break up was so evident. In 
homogenous Nordics, that early criticism did not materialize—at 
least not on anywhere close to the same scale.
The uniquely strong norms associated with personal responsi-
bility and work in the Nordics made those societies particularly 
well suited for avoiding the moral hazard of large public sectors. 
The Nordic cultural affinity for collectivist policies was certainly 
quite different from that of the American melting pot. The same 
reasoning can explain why northern European countries have been 
more successful in introducing welfare states than their southern 
European neighbors, which are not as exceptional when it comes 
to trust and ethics related to personal responsibility.
The Chicken or the Egg?
Well before scholars had shown the link, Franklin D. Roosevelt and 
Ronald Reagan had the foresight to understand that norms and 
the viability of welfare regimes go hand in hand. The important 
question that arises is which way the causation points. Which did 
come first, the chicken or the egg? From a theoretical perspective, 
one could certainly argue that a generous welfare state might even 
strengthen norms such as trust and benefit morale. If the general 
public desires welfare policy, and knows that welfare state pro-
grams rely on norms such as widespread trust, people might act 
to reinforce those norms. Similarly, the state could launch various 
programs aimed at promoting system compliance. As is often 
the case with the chicken and the egg problem, it is not so easy 
to distinguish which factor strengthens the other. The Swedish 
researcher Andreas Bergh and his Danish colleague Christian 
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Bjørnskov apply sophisticated research methods to examine the 
issue, by looking at levels of trust.
As Bergh and Bjørnskov note, a long tradition in psychology 
indicates that a basic level of trust in strangers is instilled in in-
dividuals in early childhood. That basic sense remains relatively 
stable for the rest of the individual’s life, if it is not disturbed by 
major events. Indeed, high levels of trust seem to span over gen-
erations, as they are passed from parent to child. An important 
observation is that the trust levels of American citizens closely 
follow the trust levels of the countries from which their ancestors 
came. And as it turns out, no group in the United States has trust 
levels as high as those with Nordic origins.171 Americans of Nordic 
descent even have slightly higher levels of trust than their cousins 
who currently inhabit the Nordic countries themselves.172 That 
suggests that the origin of the Nordic culture of trust pre-dates 
modern welfare states. After all, large-scale migration of Nordic 
populations to the United States occurred during the late nine-
teenth and early twentieth centuries, well before the shift toward 
large public sectors in the countries of origin.
Bergh and Bjørnskov use a number of different statistical tech-
niques to examine historic trust levels. They reach the conclusion 
that historic trust levels are not caused by the welfare state itself, 
since such welfare states are relatively recent phenomena and the 
historic trust levels predate the establishment of the welfare states. 
The authors reach a clear conclusion: “trust is high in universal 
welfare states, not because welfare state universality creates trust, 
but because trusting populations are more likely to create and 
sustain large, universal welfare states.”173
So we can, in fact, separate the egg from the chicken. High 
levels of trust among Nordic populations existed before the 
introduction of the contemporary welfare states. Additionally, 
the same strong norms that led to high living standards and low 
poverty in the Nordics thrive—even more so—in the United 
States. Other indicators of work ethics are not measured in the 
same way as trust. However, few would argue against the claim 
that Americans of Nordic origin also have very strong norms 
concerning work and individual responsibility. As a consequence, 
American descendants of Nordic origin in the United States today 
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have half the poverty rate of the American national average, a 
pattern that has held constant for decades. Nordic Americans 
even have lower poverty rates than their cousins in the Nordics. 
It seems that Nordic norms coupled with American capitalism 
leads to even lower poverty than Nordic norms coupled with 
Nordic-style democratic socialism.174 Lastly, the US Census 
shows that the individuals who identify themselves as having 
Nordic origins have a median yearly household income higher 
than the American average and also considerably higher than in 
the Nordic countries.175
This simple comparison hopefully shows the fallacy of trying 
to replicate a Nordic welfare state in the United States, and the 
mistaken belief that those policies alone will bring about the same 
low poverty level as in Nordic countries. If Nordic Americans 
already have reached the same (or in fact, higher) social success 
than in the Nordics, perhaps culture should also be factored in. 
Similarly, as Philipp Doerrenberg and his co-authors show, when 
it comes to taxes, the nice guy does finish last. The authors find 
that governments exploit groups with high relative levels of tax 
morale by taxing them more.176 It is no coincidence that taxes are 
higher in countries with stronger tax morale. To sum up, simply 
copying Nordic tax policy or welfare policy will not lead to the 
same outcomes as in the Nordics if the cultural support for such 
policies is lacking.
The Theory of the Self-Destructive Welfare State
So far, we have established that the welfare state critically relies 
on pre-existing norms, and that large welfare states have been 
implemented in countries which over the course of history have 
developed strong norms. But how does welfare policy in itself 
affect norms? What of Franklin D. Roosevelt’s warning that 
welfare dependency is “a subtle destroyer of the human spirit”?
Previously mentioned scholar Friedrich Heinemann has studied 
whether Roosevelt’s warning “of the moral disintegration effect of 
welfare dependency” is supported by evidence. The study is based 
on the same World Value Survey that Daniel Arnold used in his 
work. Heinemann examines whether benefit morale is affected in 
the long run by welfare policy. He reached the conclusion that a 
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self-destructive mechanism exists in welfare states: generous wel-
fare payments over time undermine the reluctance to over-utilize 
public support. That is to say, they undermine the same norms 
on which the welfare state rests. High rates of unemployment, 
which can result from policies hindering wellfunctioning labor 
markets, can have the same effect. Heinemann explains: “In the 
long-run an increase of government benefits and unemployment 
is associated with deteriorating welfare state ethics.”177
The World Value Survey gives strong support for the erosion 
of norms in the Nordics. In the 1981–1984 survey, for example, 
82 percent of Swedes and 80 percent of Norwegians agreed with 
the statement “claiming government benefits to which you are 
not entitled is never justifiable.” The citizens in the two countries 
still had a strong ethical approach to government benefits until 
the 1980s. However, as the populations adjusted their cultures 
to new economic policies, benefit morale dropped steadily. In 
the 2005–2008 survey, only 56 percent of Norwegians and 
61 percent of Swedes believed that it was never right to claim 
benefits to which they were not entitled. The 2010–2014 survey 
only includes Sweden out of the Nordic countries. It shows that 
benefit morale has continued to fall in Sweden: only 55 percent 
answered that it was never right to overuse benefits.178
Norms Change Slowly, Over Generations
The architects of the welfare state believed that the risks of moral 
hazard posed by high transfer payments and high taxes could 
be avoided, at least in the social democratic utopias that Nordic 
countries were intended to be. Why was Roosevelt’s warning not 
taken more seriously? The simple answer is that norms change 
slowly, even over the course of generations. When the government 
raises taxes or makes living on benefits more advantageous, most 
people continue to act as they did previously. Therefore, at least 
initially, it seemed that policies did not change people’s behav-
ior. But norms are not set in stone. Over time even the Nordic 
populations have adapted their norms to the incentives created 
by contemporary welfare states.
Jean-Baptiste Michau studied the link between government 
benefits and cultural transmissions of work ethics. He notes that 
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parents make rational choices regarding “how much effort to exert 
to raise their children to work hard,” based on their “expectations 
on the policy that will be implemented by the next generation.” 
Therefore a significant lag should exist between the introduction 
of certain policies, or even a public debate regarding future policies, 
and changes in ethical views. Building a model with a lag between 
those two factors, Michau argues that generous unemployment 
insurance benefits can explain a substantial fraction of the history 
of unemployment in Europe after the Second World War.179
In another study, Martin Halla, Mario Lackner, and Friedrich 
G. Schneider conduct an empirical analysis of the dynamics of 
the welfare state. The authors hypothesize that individuals do 
not respond to changes in economic incentives right away. The 
reason is that individuals are constrained by social norms for 
some time. “Therefore, the disincentive effects may materialize 
only with considerable time lags.” Interestingly, the authors find 
that a high level of public social expenditure can even have a small 
positive immediate impact on benefit moral. This would fit with 
the theory that individuals initially adjust their norms to follow 
the intent of public benefit programs. However, in the medium- 
and long-term, high levels of expenditure lead to reduced benefit 
morale. That is in line with the theory that individuals over time 
adjust their behavior to economic incentives. Halla, Lackner, and 
Schneider warn: “our results suggest that the welfare state is at 
risk to destroy its own (economic) foundation and support the 
hypothesis of the selfdestructive welfare state.”180
Even Nordic Welfare Norms Follow Roosevelt’s Prediction
The Nordic countries still today retain much of their uniquely 
strong norms. Yet, it is quite evident that norms have indeed 
deteriorated as the populations have gradually adjusted their 
behavior to reflect high taxes and generous welfare regimes. The 
theory of the self-destructive dynamics of welfare states has, to 
a significant degree, been developed by previously mentioned 
Assar Lindbeck, one of Sweden’s leading modern economists. 
Lindbeck has stated that changes in work ethics are related to a 
rising dependence on welfare state institutions.181 Additionally, 
he believes that the evidence of explicit benefit fraud in Sweden, 
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where, for example—some individuals receive unemployment 
benefits or sick-pay whilst working in the shadow economy—
leads to a weakening of norms against overusing various benefit 
systems. Reforms to limit fraud are therefore necessary in order 
to maintain the welfare system.182
A number of attitude studies in Sweden show that a significant 
portion of the population has come to consider it acceptable to live 
on sickness benefits without being sick. A survey from 2001, for 
example, showed that 41 percent of Swedish employees believed 
that it was acceptable for those who were not sick but who felt 
stress at work to claim sickness benefit. Additionally, 44 and 48 
percent respectively responded that it was acceptable to claim 
sickness benefits even by individuals who were not sick, if those 
who did so were dissatisfied with their working environment or 
had problems within their families.183
Other studies have pointed to increases in sickness absence 
due to sporting events. For instance, absence due to sickness 
increased by almost 7 percent among men at the time of the 
Winter Olympics in 1988, and by 16 percent in connection with 
TV broadcasts of the World Championship in cross-country skiing 
in 1987.184 During the 2002 soccer World Cup, the increase in 
sickness absence among men was an astonishing 41 percent. The 
stark difference between the events during the end of the 1980s 
and the beginning of the 2000s might be seen as an indication 
of the deterioration of work ethics over time—though all three 
figures are remarkably high.185
During recent years, governments on both the right and the 
left in Sweden have reduced the generosity of the welfare system. 
Additionally, gate-keeping functions have been introduced, mainly 
in the sick-leave system to limit overutilization. Interestingly, 
a recent paper suggests that the reforms may need to be quite 
farreaching to reverse the long-term effect that the welfare state 
has had. Economist Martin Ljunge suggests that politicians who 
wish to increase the generosity of the welfare state must take into 
account the long-term costs of such policies. The abstract reads: 
Younger generations use sickness insurance more often than 
older generations. Amongst the younger generation twenty 
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percentage points more take a sick leave day compared with 
those born twenty years before, after other circumstances 
have been adjusted for. The higher demand for sick leave pay 
amongst the younger generations can be seen as a measure 
of how rapidly the welfare state affects attitudes towards 
the use of public benefits. The results have implications for 
economic policy. The demand for social insurance increases, 
even if the rules do not become more generous. Policy evalu-
ations based on behavioural changes shortly before and after 
a reform can strongly under-estimate the long-term changes 
that are relevant for the financial integrity of a welfare state.186
Similarly, the Danish researcher Casper Hunnerup Dahl has 
reached the conclusion that: “The high degree of distribution 
in the Danish welfare state does not merely reduce the concrete 
incentives that some Danes have for taking a job or to work extra 
in the job that one already holds. Much evidence suggests that 
the welfare state also has a very costly and long-lasting effect on 
the working ethic of Danes.”187 There can be little doubt then 
that the erosion of norms due to longterm adaptation to welfare 
policy is an observable phenomenon rather than just theory.
Nordic Policies Aim to Reverse Erosion of Norms
For the outside world, the Nordic countries still seem today to 
be shining examples of how large public sectors can be created 
without the moral hazard of welfare states predicted famously by 
Roosevelt. Those who have greater insight into Nordic policies 
can, however, observe that much of the recent development has 
centered on the issue of deteriorating norms and overutilization. 
As stated above, reductions of the generosity of the welfare state—
as well as significant tax cuts—have already been introduced in 
Sweden. Particular focus has been given to curbing overutiliza-
tion of sick leave. The current trend in the country, where sick 
leave rates are again rising rapidly to high levels (although the 
population is amongst the healthiest in the world), suggests that 
more needs doing.
Sweden no longer holds the title of the nation with the high-
est tax rate in the world. Today Denmark holds that distinction. 
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Although Denmark has yet to introduce reforms as broad-ranging 
as those in Sweden, the realization that change is needed is 
strong. Somewhat surprisingly, the debate about how welfare 
policies have created overuse of and entrapment in the benefit 
systems has not been limited to the conservatives or libertar-
ians in Denmark. The Social Democrats have joined in. Bjarne 
Corydon, at the time the country’s Social Democrat finance 
minister, made international headlines in 2013 by discussing the 
need to reduce the generosity of transfer systems in the country. 
Corydon explained that it was no mere coincidence that the 
government was reforming taxes, welfare aid, and the system for 
early retirement: “The truth is that we are in full swing with a 
dramatically positive agenda, which is about strengthening and 
modernising the welfare state, and the result of the change will be 
a much better society than the one we have today.” The leading 
Social Democrat went as far as formulating a new vision for the 
future of the welfare state: “I believe in the competition-state 
as the modern welfare state. If we are to ensure support for the 
welfare state, we must focus on the quality of public services rather 
than transfer payments.”188
Toward a New Welfare Contract?
Americans who still believe that the moral hazard risk is avoided 
in the Nordic countries would do themselves a service by reading 
(with the help of Google Translate perhaps) a report published by 
the Danish Social Democratic government in 2013. The report 
reached the conclusion that 400,000 Danish citizens at the time 
had few economic incentives to participate in the labor market. 
Those individuals lost 80 percent or more of their incomes when 
entering the labor market, since they lost benefits and had to pay 
taxes. Through extensive reforms of taxes and benefits the previ-
ous Social Democratic government hoped to reduce the group 
to 250,000 individuals. Even that would be a large share of the 
working age population, which is below 3 million.189
In June 2015, the Danish left-of-center government lost the elec-
tion to a new right-of-center coalition, which has an even greater 
emphasis on welfare reform. Interestingly, the Social Democrats 
themselves increased their support in the election, regaining the 
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position as the country’s largest party. Power shifted since the 
coalition partners of the Social Democrats, who had criticized 
the vision of the competition state, lost considerably during the 
election. It would thus seem that the Danish electorate supports 
the vision of a system with more self-reliance and less welfare-
reliance. That shift in political attitudes has occurred as welfare 
dependency has grown, particularly amongst the population with 
foreign background.
Other northern European welfare states have followed a 
path similar to Denmark’s and Sweden’s. For a long time the 
Netherlands had one of the most generous welfare systems in 
the world. During the beginning of the 1980s, the Netherlands 
ranked as a top spender in terms of welfare policy, on par with 
the (at the time) famously generous Swedish public system. With 
time, however, the Netherlands scaled back its welfare system, 
reducing the scope of public spending, privatizing social security, 
and introducing elaborate market mechanisms in the provision of 
health care and social protection.190 Although not geographically 
a part of the Nordics, the Netherlands has cultural, economic, 
and political features very similar to its northern neighbors. A 
difference is that the Netherlands was earlier in shifting away 
from a very generous welfare system to a more limited model. 
The ambition to provide social safety nets, health care, and 
schooling to its underprivileged citizens has remained. Through 
scaling down the generosity of the system and creating insurance 
markets which combine universal coverage with competition and 
individual responsibility, the Netherlands has found a new social 
contract. Arguably, this new social contract has more long-term 
stability since it encourages individual responsibility more than 
the previous system.
Germany and Finland have never introduced welfare regimes 
quite as ambitious as Denmark’s and Sweden’s, but they have also 
moved in a similar direction as the long-term effects of norms 
on public behavior have become apparent. Even the United 
Kingdom, with its more moderate welfare model, is experienc-
ing an extensive debate about the need to re-strengthen norms. 
In the beginning of 2014, for example, the documentary Benefit 
Street was aired and ran for five episodes. The show filmed the 
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lives of residents of James Turner Street in Birmingham, where 
reportedly 90 percent of residents claim benefits. Benefit Street 
sparked a massive debate about the British welfare system, benefit 
claims, and lack of motivation to seek employment. Recent politi-
cal trends indicate that the route to welfare reform is favored by 
many amongst the general public.191
Collapsing Norms in an Oil-rich Welfare State
There is a possible exception to the new welfare contract being 
formulated in northern European welfare states: Norway. Thanks 
to its massive Atlantic oil wealth, this mountainous country has 
long retained the social democratic ideal of very generous public 
programs. However, as Roosevelt so elegantly put it, welfare 
dependency is not only an economic but also a human issue. 
Certainly the oil funds have made it possible for Norway to afford 
to pay for substantial public benefits. It is an entirely different 
question whether the nation can afford the human cost associ-
ated with the same policies. One consequence of the generous 
welfare policies in Norway is deterioration in work ethic. The TV 
series Lilyhammer, starring Sopranos actor Steven Van Zandt as 
an American expat to Norway, regularly makes fun of the lack 
of work discipline in the country.
That phenomenon is also apparent outside popular culture. 
In 2014, the Financial Times reported: “Norway’s statistics office 
says many people have started to call Friday ‘fridag’—‘free day’ 
in Norwegian. The state railway company says commuter trains 
serving the capital are less full on Fridays, and the main toll 
road operator says traffic is noticeably quieter on Fridays and on 
Mondays.”192 It’s not only the adults who have stopped focusing on 
work. The youth—born and raised in a system with little reward 
for work—have gone even further. In a recent survey, three out of 
four Norwegian employers answered that Swedish youth work-
ing in the country have a better work capacity than Norwegian 
youth. Out of those questioned, merely 2 percent believed that 
young Norwegians between the ages of sixteen and twenty-four 
years old have a high work capacity. Stein André Haugerund, the 
president for the employment company Proffice, which carried 
out the survey, argued that the Norwegian welfare model has 
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created a situation where incentives for hard work are limited, 
which in turn affects the behavior of youth.193
Those who doubt that generous welfare systems can affect 
working norms should think hard about the case of Norway. 
It is difficult to disregard the fact that Norwegians, just a few 
generations ago, had some of the strongest working ethics in the 
world. Without high trust, social cohesion, and a culture focused 
on individual responsibility Norway would never have grown so 
successful. The country’s oil wealth boosted the economy further. 
However, it proved a double-edged sword since the massive oil 
revenues to the state made it difficult to limit the generosity of 
public programs and cash transfers. From a progressive viewpoint, 
one could of course argue that the Norwegian situation—that is, 
being able to afford a very generous welfare state thanks to natural 
resources wealth—is admirable. However, much like in oil-rich 
Arab countries, welfare handouts have not simply created social 
good; as an unintended consequence, the same systems have 
fostered a class of the socially poor.
A Class of the Socially Poor
On the surface of it, it seems that Norway has low unemploy-
ment. In reality, however, much of the unemployment is hidden 
in early retirement statistics. This is true amongst native-born 
Norwegians in general and amongst immigrants in particular. 
One study looks at the individuals aged 30–55 who were granted 
a disability pension at some point between 1992 and 2003. That 
group includes 11 percent of men and 16 percent of women with 
Norwegian background. For those born in the Middle East and 
North Africa the figures were even higher: 25 percent amongst 
the men and 24 percent amongst the women.194
Disability pensions are of course aimed at people who are truly 
disabled. It might therefore seem puzzling why such a high share 
of the population in one of the healthiest countries in the world 
is granted this benefit. One explanation is that this benefit is used 
to hide the true unemployment level—if an unemployed person 
is given disability benefits, he or she is no longer counted as being 
part of the labor force and thus vanishes from the unemployment 
statistics. Another explanation is that many individuals misuse 
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the system. Being granted disability pension benefits is often 
more lucrative than being supported by unemployment. Thus, 
many who are unemployed, but not too sick to work, strive for 
being granted a disability pension. Some even combine this with 
black market work, which of course proves that they are indeed 
not too sick to work.
Nordic countries are notoriously bad at integrating foreign-
born individuals into their labor markets. The combination of 
high taxes, generous public benefits, and rigid labor markets 
makes it difficult even for highly educated groups of refugees to 
enter the workforce. Welfare dependency and norm-deterioration 
in particular thus affect immigrants and their children. It is, 
however, important to point out that welfare dependency is not 
only an issue for minorities. Ethnic Nordics are also affected. A 
good example is given in the “The Confessions of a ‘Welfare 
Freeloader,’ ” published in the Norwegian daily paper Dagbladet. 
There a young man wrote about how he had been supported by 
welfare for the last three years, although he was healthy and in 
his prime years. In this, he was not alone:
I know several people—talented, gifted people—who do 
not take a job. They do not do much else either, seen from 
a societal standpoint. No studies, no clearly defined plan 
for the future and no cunning plans to create wealth of any 
kind. The interest to “participate” or to “help” is minimal 
within this group, and poses no motivation to talk about. 
The feeling of responsibility when it comes to an abstract 
entity as “society” is low.195
The article spurred a national debate about the need to adjust 
the generosity of the welfare state even in oil-rich Norway, as it 
became obvious that the welfare state was undermining its core 
goal of combating poverty—by inadvertently creating a class of 
the socially poor.
Is There Such a Thing as Too Much Welfare?
A central political question is, can there can ever be such a thing 
as too much welfare? Is it possible that individuals might in some 
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circumstances be better off receiving less generous public support? 
That question is tricky to answer, since it is difficult to prove how 
a certain policy affects people on an individual or family level. 
Gordon B. Dahl, Andreas Ravndal Kostøl, and Magne Mogstad 
use an ingenious method to arrive at a conclusive answer. In social 
sciences, it is often difficult to prove that one thing actually causes 
the other. The best way to separate causation from correlation is 
to use so-called “natural experiments.” 
Dahl, Kostøl, and Mogstad write: “Some policy makers and 
researchers have argued that a causal relationship exists, creating 
a culture in which welfare use reinforces itself through the family. 
Others argue the determinants of poverty or poor health are cor-
related across generations in ways that have nothing to do with 
a welfare culture.” Those claims are difficult to test empirically 
because many factors can explain the link between children’s 
behavior and parents’ tendency to rely on welfare. However, the 
authors find a natural experiment that makes it possible to isolate 
the effect of welfare generosity. In the Norwegian welfare system, 
judges are sometimes appointed to look at disability insurance 
claims that have initially been denied. Some appeal judges are 
systematically more lenient when it comes to granting benefits. 
From the perspective of claimants, being appointed a strict or 
lenient judge is a random event. The researchers can therefore 
compare those who are granted disability insurance by a lenient 
judge with those who are denied the benefit by a strict judge. The 
conclusion is clear. The authors find:
[S]trong evidence for a causal link across generations: when 
a parent is allowed [disability insurance] at the appeal stage, 
their adult child’s participation over the next five years in-
creases by 6 percentage points. This effect grows over time, 
rising to 12 percentage points after 10 years. Although these 
findings are specific to our setting, they highlight that welfare 
reforms can have long-lasting effects on program participa-
tion, since any original effect on the current generation could 
be reinforced by changing the participation behavior of their 
children as well.196
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Thus, we can resolve the long-standing political debate about 
welfare dependency by looking at the most generous welfare state 
in the developed world. The conclusion is clear: overly generous 
welfare can indeed create a poverty trap for families, creating a so-
cial marginalization which is transferred from parent to children. 
A Way Out Of or Into Poverty?
As the Nobel laureate Robert Fogel has suggested, many of the 
traditional sources of poverty have been alleviated in modern 
societies. In previous generations, those born in impoverished 
families were often hungry, had poor or no housing, could not 
afford education, and even lacked the means to buy the decent 
clothing they needed for a job interview. Those were all obstacles 
for individuals who were attempting to create good lives and to 
become self-sufficient. Today, in most if not all modern societies, 
underprivileged citizens can rely on various public programs to 
get their basic needs, such as housing and food, covered. Basic 
education is free of charge, and scholarships are available to fund 
higher degrees. Global capitalism has created a system where it 
is difficult to determine from a distance if a shirt is made by an 
expensive Italian tailor or bought cheaply off the racks of H&M 
or Zara. But that does not mean that the obstacles to escaping 
poverty have vanished. Still today, those born in poor circum-
stances often remain there, and in turn pass social marginalization 
on to their children.
Fogel suggests that poverty exists in modern societies to a 
large degree because of an uneven distribution of “spiritual re-
sources” such as self-esteem, a sense of discipline, and a sense of 
community.197 Basic welfare institutions can help in alleviating 
material poverty, in providing schooling for all. Thus, they can 
provide various benefits to disadvantaged families. However, the 
spiritual poverty which Fogel points to can be exacerbated when 
individuals who could otherwise be self-reliant become dependent 
on public support. That is what Ronald Reagan meant when he 
said that the “most insidious effect of welfare is its usurpation 
of the role of provider,” pointing to how “government programs 
ruptured the bonds holding poor families together.”
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Reagan and Roosevelt Were Both Right
To sum up, both Roosevelt and Reagan had good reasons to fear 
how the social fabric and human wellbeing could inadvertently 
be harmed by welfare dependency. Although Nordic welfare 
states in particular seemed to avoid that moral hazard problem 
initially, we know today beyond doubt that that has not been the 
case in the long term. Norm deterioration due to adjustment to 
generous welfare states is an observable phenomenon, not least in 
the Nordics. The only thing that Roosevelt did not foresee was 
that norms change slowly. Even the northern European welfare 
states—founded in societies with exceptionally strong working 
ethics and emphasis on individual responsibility—have with time 
caught up to his dire predictions.
Although the ideals of the welfare state remain strong in 
northern Europe, political leaders from both left and right in 
countries such as the Netherlands, Sweden, and Denmark are 
seeking to formulate a new social contract—with greater empha-
sis on incentives, personal responsibility, and insurance markets. 
The motivation behind that political shift is not only to curb 
public spending or even to strengthen working ethics. The basic 
idea of welfare policy is to help disadvantaged groups to create a 
better future for themselves and their families. Evidently, overly 
generous welfare is not the best route for accomplishing that goal. 
Even proponents of large welfare states should strive to find this 
balance. More generous welfare is not always the same as better 
conditions for the less well-off.
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The Self-Controlling Individual 
in Society and Community
By Tom G. Palmer
How do self-controlling individuals coordinate their actions with oth-
ers to generate social order? Do individual human beings come with 
self-control, freedom, and responsibility built in, or does self-control 
have a history? Is self-control unique to any particular cultures or 
even perhaps incompatible with some cultures or religions? Sociology, 
economics, history, and political science illustrate how individuality, 
self-control, and freedom are connected, while various attempts to 
link freedom uniquely to one or another culture are examined and 
debunked; concepts, practices, and tools all have histories, but it 
does not follow that only the heirs of certain cultures may embrace 
or utilize them. Freedom is a universal human right and carries 
with it the universal human responsibility to respect the freedom 
of others. (Note: In this essay the term liberalism is used to refer to 
“classical” liberalism.)
Some people, when they think about self-controlling individuals, 
conjure up images of rugged, lone figures who leave society to 
“go it alone,” or of selfish and self-obsessed persons who reject 
all shared connections of family, friendship, and community. 
Such people assume, without argument or evidence, that self-
controlling individuals are somehow averse to or unsuited for 
social interaction, when, in fact, the more “social” people become 
and the more complex societies become, the more the individu-
als who constitute them need to exercise and assert self-control. 
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Greater differentiation (or individuation) is itself a product of 
social interaction; the greater the complexity of the social order, 
the greater the ability of the members of society to distinguish 
themselves through their complex, intersecting, and overlapping 
forms of affiliation and identity.198
Individuality is also intimately connected to responsibility 
and accountability. We “own” the choices we make and their 
consequences. John Locke grounded the moral agent, the self, 
on the ability of the self to “own” its actions:
Any substance vitally united to the present thinking Being, is 
a part of that very same self which now is: Any thing united 
to it by a consciousness of former Actions makes also a part 
of the same self, which is the same both then and now.
Person, as I take it, is the name for this self. Where-ever a 
Man finds, what he calls himself, there I think another may 
say is the same Person. It is a Forensick Term appropriating 
Actions and their Merit; and so only belongs to intelligent 
Agents capable of a Law, and Happiness and Misery. This 
personality extends it self  beyond present Existence to what 
is past, only by consciousness, whereby it becomes concerned 
and accountable, owns and imputes to it self past Actions, 
just upon the same ground, and for the same reason, that it 
does the present.199
The self does not exist in a mere instant, existing momentarily 
and winking out of existence, to be replaced by another succeeding 
self. The “self ”—the “person,” the “individual”—exists temporally, 
across its experiences. Ownership is not merely a concept ap-
plicable to physical possessions; you own your actions, through 
which you have become the person you are and through which 
you can become the person you want to be.
The sociologist Georg Simmel distinguishes between two 
meanings of individuality: “individuality in the sense of the free-
dom and responsibility for oneself that comes from a broad and 
fluid social environment. . . . The other meaning of individuality 
is qualitative: it means that the single human being distinguishes 
himself from all others; that his being and conduct—in form, 
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content, or both—suit him alone; and that being different has 
a positive meaning and value for his life.”200 Both senses will be 
deployed, but also further distinguished, in this essay.
Individualism, as a political theory of the proper relationship 
among individuals and between individuals and the state, is virtu-
ally the opposite of “atomism,” the idea that humans exist without 
social connection, like atoms bouncing off each other in a void.201 
Individualism means both an understanding of the uniqueness 
of each individual and a moral theory of human association 
based on recognition of common features that deserve respect, 
namely, the right of every person to make choices governing his 
or her own life.202
Individuation, i.e., the development of a unique self to which 
one can be true, tracks the development of self-control; greater 
coordination and harmony in a complex social order require 
not more powerful and detailed systems of command by those 
with authority or power, but higher degrees of individuation 
and individual self-control.203 Greater self-control is a central 
part of the process of civilization. The more complex and differ-
entiated the social order, the greater the corresponding need for 
self-control; alternatively put, greater social coordination among 
large numbers of people, such as characterizes modern civilization, 
can only come about when people possess and exercise greater 
capabilities of self-control. The history of civilization is one of 
greater and greater attention to the impact of our actions on both 
ourselves and on those with whom we interact, an awareness that 
becomes habitual.
The sociologist Norbert Elias found evidence of greater self-
control through his careful examination of books of etiquette and 
social manners from the thirteenth to the nineteenth centuries; 
the results were surprising, as such books admonished adults to 
avoid behavior that would today be considered quite disgusting 
even among children and that are taught not to adults (who 
are presumed to have already learned them), but to very small 
children. 204 (Memorable examples include not blowing one’s 
nose on one’s hand and then reaching with that hand to get 
bread from a common bowl, not gnawing on a bone and then 
putting it back into the common serving dish, not picking one’s 
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nose while eating, not blowing one’s nose on the tablecloth, not 
spitting across the table, and so on.) Moreover, normal human 
interaction often entailed what we would consider astonishing 
brutality and violence, but which was considered at the time so 
common that it barely merited notice.205
No mind is capable of issuing the commands necessary to di-
rect all the actions needed for large numbers of people engaged 
in complex undertakings to coordinate their behavior harmoni-
ously; generals may command armies, which are organizations, 
but generally no one can command societies, which are far more 
complex than organizations and which are not subordinate to any 
particular purpose or goal, but are the result of the interactions 
of many people pursuing many goals. Complex social orders 
depend primarily on following abstract rules (i.e., rules that are 
independent of particular aims, purposes, interests, or persons) 
and the observance of such abstract rules requires a high degree 
of self-control, by which individuals can control transient (and 
frequently harmful or aggressive) impulses and adjust their 
behavior to act in accordance with the same rules followed by 
others. In Elias’s words,
As the interdependence of people increases with the in-
creasing division of labour, everyone becomes increasingly 
dependent on everyone else, even those of high social rank 
on those people who are socially inferior and weaker. The 
latter become so much the equals of the former that they, 
the socially superior people, can experience shame-feelings 
even in the presence of their social inferiors. It is only in 
this connection that the armour of restraints is fastened to 
the degree which is gradually taken for granted by people in 
democratic industrial societies.206
Peaceful social coordination and prosperity depend not on 
dictatorship, but on the liberty of the self-controlling individual 
to make his or her own choices within the framework of generally 
applicable rules, which John Locke referred to as “a Liberty to 
dispose, and order, as he lists, his Person, Actions, Possessions, and 
his whole Property, within the Allowance of those Laws under 
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which he is; and therein not to be subject to the arbitrary Will 
of another, but freely follow his own.”207
Traffic rules provide a simple and easily grasped example: mil-
lions of drivers have their own myriad destinations and purposes, 
but a fairly simple set of rules allows them under normal circum-
stances to reach their destinations and to achieve their purposes 
without detailed instructions from a central power.
Many thinkers yearn for guarantees that things will always turn 
out for the best and believe that “if only someone were in charge” 
or “if only there were a law,” mistakes, frailty, bad luck, and dead 
ends would be avoided. That is a fatal conceit. Self-control does 
not generate perfect results, of course; not everyone succeeds in 
achieving self-control and happiness, sometimes because of their 
own failures, and sometimes because of factors outside of their 
control.208 Voluntary social coordination does not guarantee 
perfect efficiency or the best imaginable outcomes. That is no 
argument against self-control, however, because no system of state 
control, from the mildest to the harshest dictatorship, achieves its 
ostensible goals of perfect social harmony and universal happiness. 
It is not enough to imagine an ideal outcome and then imagine 
an ideal dictator creating it; life isn’t like that. Bitter experience 
shows that substituting state control and direction for self-control 
rarely generates positive outcomes and more generally is a cover 
for predatory exploitation in the interests of those who actually 
exercise power over others.209
The Myth of the Purely Rational Individual
The lone and self-sufficient individual who makes a rational choice 
to “enter society” for his or her own benefit is a myth.210 For people 
to come together to agree on rules to govern themselves already 
presupposes a set of relationships, not to mention the norm 
that agreement is the proper foundation for social cooperation. 
Without such relationships and norms, they could not negotiate 
or agree on a contract to found “society.”211 The myth of lone indi-
viduals generating morality and norms through agreement is not 
only unhelpful to the advancement of individual self-control and 
of social and political orders that protect individual liberty, but it 
is positively harmful to the cause of liberty, limited government, 
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and self-control. It is a convenient straw man for advocates of 
state control over individuals (which is why they perpetuate it at 
virtually every opportunity), and it misleads us about the nature 
of voluntary cooperation in free societies. It is so obvious that 
individuals are dependent on each other, and not only for survival 
(consider flying in airplanes and being able to watch movies and 
otherwise enjoy the amazing luxuries of the modern age), that 
if the public can be falsely convinced that liberal individualists 
deny something so obvious, liberalism can be made to appear 
foolish. Families, tribes, schools, clubs, temples, villages, cities, 
and so many other inherently social entities are obviously neces-
sary for transmission and cultivation of the values, norms, habits, 
language, and other elements of character that make us human. 
Individualism is itself a product of social interaction; humans 
with widely varied individuating features, interests, needs, and 
capabilities could not survive, much less flourish, without social 
cooperation, as classical liberal/libertarian social scientists have 
taught for centuries.
The social thinker F. A. Hayek emphasized (not that his critics 
bothered to read him) that “individualism” is not wedded to the 
idea of man “as a highly rational and intelligent” being, but saw 
the human being instead “as a very irrational and fallible being, 
whose individual errors are corrected only in the course of a social 
process.  .  .  .”212 Each individual is limited in the knowledge on 
which he or she may draw. There is no mind to whom all of the 
relevant information is available; among limited and fallible hu-
man beings institutions have emerged by which individuals may 
share information without even being aware of the existence of 
those with whom they are interacting. Consider prices; some of 
Hayek’s most important work in economics focuses on the role 
that prices play in providing encapsulated forms of information 
that help millions or billions of people, who share different inter-
ests and are generally unaware of each other, to coordinate their 
actions.213 Hayek focused on the evolved rules by which human 
beings coordinate their actions without relying on an omniscient 
central planning authority; he associated “true individualism” not 
with super-human resolve, strength, intellect, or powers—char-
acteristics that might suggest that coherent social planning by an 
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intelligent, capable, and informed leader or elite would be possible, 
but with humility and a recognition of the limits of individual 
minds.214 As social psychologist Jonathan Haidt puts it, “we must 
be wary of any individual’s ability to reason . .  . We should not 
expect individuals to produce good, open-minded, truth-seeking 
reasoning, particularly when self-interest or reputational concerns 
are in play. But if you put individuals together in the right way, 
such that some individuals can use their reasoning powers to 
disconfirm the claims of others, and all individuals feel some 
common bond or shared fate that allows them to interact civilly, 
you can create a group that ends up producing good reasoning 
as an emergent property of the social system.”215
Hayek considered the key insight of Enlightenment-era classi-
cal liberal thinkers to be the importance of limiting the damage 
individuals could do and deflating their ambitions to impose 
their self-proclaimed genius on society: “It would scarcely be too 
much to claim that the main merit of the individualism which 
he [Adam Smith] and his contemporaries advocated is that it is 
a system under which bad men can do least harm. It is a social 
system which does not depend for its functioning on our finding 
good men for running it, or on all men becoming better than they 
now are, but which makes use of men in all their given variety 
and complexity, sometimes good and sometimes bad, sometimes 
intelligent and more often stupid.”216 (The insight was not lim-
ited to Smith, but was shared by many figures in the history of 
liberalism, e.g., James Madison, Benjamin Constant, Frédéric 
Bastiat, and many others.)
Everyone is a unique individual (a statement so trite as to 
be almost not worth writing) and almost everyone (there are 
pathological exceptions) can exercise self-control. Yet a variety 
of influential ideologues who have sought to vest greater and 
greater powers in the state have argued that “true freedom” can 
only be realized through giving up self-control and enhancing 
state control. Others, less extreme in their ideology, argue that 
experts with superior knowledge, wisdom, and foresight should 
be granted the power to control the decisions of the rest of society 
for their own good; sometimes they suggest that such submission 
realizes a higher freedom, but more commonly they argue that 
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it is justified on utilitarian grounds, because the experts have 
the special knowledge that the common people (i.e., you and I) 
lack.217 Of course, trained specialists generally do know more than 
others about their areas of specialization, but it is a far cry from 
that fact to believing A) that politicians are the people among 
whom such expertise is to be found, B) that politicians have more 
skill in identifying qualified experts than those who will directly 
bear the consequences of good or bad decisions, or C) that one 
decision will be the best decision for everyone and thus should 
be uniformly imposed on all. (There is a vast literature on the 
economics of “public choice” that documents the effects of such 
overestimation of the capabilities of political decision-makers, 
as well as the perverse incentives created by substitution of state 
control for self-control.218)
Are Individual Freedom and Responsibility Culturally 
Specific?
Assumptions about super-rational individuals forming societies 
de novo should be rejected, but what of those who claim that 
individual autonomy and responsibility are products of a par-
ticular culture and thus any claims one might make regarding 
responsibility and freedom are limited to that culture? That 
claim is frequently made as if it were self-evident and not to 
be questioned. It deserves to be questioned, because it is hardly 
self-evident. In fact, it is false and has been very harmful, for it 
has been invoked to justify the imposition of—or indifference 
to—incalculable suffering and injustice. (“They don’t value 
freedom;” “They cannot be held to the same standards regarding 
respect for women, children, or the vulnerable;” “They don’t feel 
pain and loss like we do.”)
Before rebutting the claim that the capacity and the right to 
individual self-control are limited to just one culture (or just 
those that have generated such beliefs), it is worth looking at 
the claim in its most general form, namely, that ideas carry little 
flags that limit their applicability. Antoine Lavoisier, one of the 
great pioneers of chemistry and the identifier of oxygen, was born 
in France and wrote in French. Someone inclined to limit the 
application of ideas to their cultures of origin might conclude 
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that oxygen (or at least the theory of oxygen) cannot be useful 
to people from other countries, or speaking other languages. 
Koreans and Canadians (except, perhaps, for the Québécoises) 
could not invoke the theory of oxygen, because the applicability 
of the concept is limited to the French. And the same would go 
for the use of zero as a placeholder for mathematical calculation 
and the use of yoga as healthful exercise. (Hindus only, please!) 
The fact that an idea has a history, with names, places, and times 
specified, is no reason to limit its applicability or usefulness to 
people with those names, or to people who live in those places, 
or to people who lived at those times.
The idea of individual freedom and self-control, rather than 
control by slave masters, warlords, potentates, or politicians 
achieved its most thorough formulation in Europe and in societies 
that derived their political institutions from Europe. The term 
for the philosophy built around the “presumption of liberty” is 
liberalism.219 (Because of peculiar historical circumstances, the 
term liberalism acquired a different meaning in the United States, 
where the philosophy of liberty is now sometimes referred to 
as “classical liberalism”; the term “libertarianism” is also used, 
although it is sometimes reserved for more radical or consistent 
versions of liberalism.) Freedom is thus the touchstone of liberal-
ism, but is freedom a uniquely “European” idea? Certainly, the idea 
of self-direction and freedom from coercion is hardly unknown 
in other societies. Moreover, the ideas of liberal individualism 
have spread around the world, such that advocates of liberalism 
are now present in every country (including North Korea, Iran, 
Saudi Arabia, and other tyrannical states), even if their voices 
may be muted or suppressed by violently intolerant authoritar-
ians, whether acting through government or organized as mobs, 
vigilante committees, or other kinds of criminal associations. 
Against liberalism, it is frequently asserted that, because the rulers 
of those countries do not embrace the idea of liberty for their subjects, 
it is justified for those rulers to deny freedom of religion, or trade, 
or movement, or speech to their subjects. The conclusion does not 
follow. The claim rests on a hidden premise, namely, that those 
exercising power represent the wishes or thoughts of the people, 
which may not be the case; or, it presumes that merely because 
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tyrannies do in fact exercise power over their subjects, they are 
therefore justified in exercising all the powers they exercise, which 
is not an argument, but a mere assertion. (The statement “Those 
people don’t believe in freedom like we do” and the conclusion 
“therefore it’s ok to arrest, jail, or punish them for disobeying 
their rulers” presupposes that the individuals or groups who are 
punished—and not only the rulers who punish them—don’t 
believe in or value their own freedom; that is generally not the 
case. Moreover, even if that were the case, by itself it would not 
be sufficient reason for oppressing them; not only those who 
explicitly embrace their freedom deserve their freedom.220)
Just as the fact that yoga originated in India does not mean 
that no one else can learn or practice it, the fact that the theory 
of the right of self-control was articulated among certain groups 
of people earlier than among others, or that the latter may have 
adopted some ideas of rights from the earlier, does not limit the 
range of applicability of rights only to the descendants of the 
originators.
Historical Dimensions of Individual Freedom and 
Responsibility
Nonetheless, history matters. Historical understanding offers 
a powerful lens through which to understand scientific theo-
ries, philosophical concepts, legal enactments, and other social 
phenomena. It generally helps to understand an idea if one under-
stands its history. Ideas, concepts, and theories can be understood 
as tools that we use to solve problems and thus an understanding 
of their histories—of the problems to which they were presented 
as solutions—can help us to understand those ideas, concepts, and 
theories. That said, offering a historical account of an idea need 
not imply that the idea is limited in validity to certain people, 
times, or places. Nor need it imply that it could only have been 
developed under those conditions; certainly it is common for 
people widely separated in time and space to develop similar or 
identical tools, including ideas, and it is also common for tools 
and concepts to spread to other groups through persuasion and 
emulation.
The recognition of individuality, of the uniqueness of each 
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individual, is commonplace in all cultures. It’s simply undeniable 
that persons are individually distinct; indeed, specific organs 
and regions of the human brain are functionally necessary to 
distinguish and recognize human faces, without which sustained 
patterns of human cooperation would be impossible.221 Each 
human person is unique, even if rulers may consider us inter-
changeable and expendable. What is less commonly grasped is 
that we all share in common something morally significant and 
that therefore all human beings have legitimate claims to rightful 
treatment by each other, that is, to respect for their human rights. 
Only in modern times has such an idea achieved widespread, 
albeit far from universal, acceptance.
The theoretical appreciation of individuality at both the level of 
individual uniqueness (or “individuation”) and of individualism 
as a foundation for legal and political claims emerges at different 
times in different places. Those streams of individualistic ideas 
that merged to form liberalism mostly emerged from Europe, 
although the core elements of liberal individualism can be found 
in Chinese, Islamic, Indian, and other civilizations. They emerged 
in Europe for a number of historically contingent reasons, includ-
ing: Europe’s post-classical radical decentralization of political 
authority (which resulted in both feudal society and later civil 
society, the former mainly rural and the latter mainly urban and 
commercial, but both were decentralized responses to violence 
and predation that facilitated experimentation and competi-
tion among jurisdictions);222 the separation and rivalry of the 
institutions of organized religion and state;223 the competition 
of political authorities (including city republics, kingdoms and 
principalities, archbishoprics, manors, and other political entities) 
to attract workers, skills, and capital, and the ensuing growth of 
industry and commerce;224 and the rediscovery and frequently 
very selective re-appropriation of the heritage of classical (mainly 
Greek and Roman) philosophy and law.225 (The emergence of 
liberalism is itself a spontaneous order, not the product of one or 
a few brilliant minds; it emerged from the confluence of a number 
of different processes to form a coherent and evolving mutually 
reinforcing body of ideas in law, moral philosophy, economics, 
sociology, psychology, history, and other humane sciences.226)
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Historical Contingency
History is full of contingencies, of things that could have been 
otherwise. Had the Mongol armies continued into Europe after 
the poisoning of the great Khan Ögedei on December 11, 1241, 
European history would likely have taken a radically different 
course. As it was, the Mongol war lords returned to Karakorum to 
elect a new Khan and central and western Europe were spared the 
Mongol conquests that so profoundly influenced the trajectories 
of the societies of Russia, Asia, the Caucasus, Central Asia, India, 
and the Middle East. Historical accident and contingency give us 
reason to be wary of essentialist claims about cultures.
Inferring necessary development from initial starting points is 
risky, but that rarely stops people from doing it. Some years ago 
I participated in a colloquium on the comparison of Confucian 
and Aristotelian thought, at the end of which one participant 
concluded that a culture with Aristotle at its base resulted in 
the US Constitution, the Industrial Revolution, and the aboli-
tion of slavery, whereas one with Confucius at its base resulted 
in Mao Zedong, the tens of millions of deaths of the Great Leap 
Forward, and the Cultural Revolution. It was as if nothing else 
had happened in the time between the lives of Aristotle and 
Confucius and the present; according to that all-too-common 
approach, history is just a linear trajectory from an idea to a set 
of outcomes. What shapes society is exclusively the Idea (with a 
capital “I”) and, because different Ideas have different implica-
tions, it’s just a matter of tracing out those implications to deduce 
the present from the ideas of the past. One reads the Bible or 
Aristotle or the Quran or the Analects or the Mahabharata and, 
without interpretive apparatus or context, deduces its implica-
tions. (Sometimes the associations are especially absurd, as with 
the association sometimes made between “Asian culture” and 
collectivism. When such claims about the inevitability of tyranny 
in Asia are made, Chinese libertarians point out that Karl Marx, 
Friedrich Engels, Vladimir Lenin, and Joseph Stalin, whose posters 
are still hung in the buildings of Chinese state institutions, are 
rather implausibly classified as Chinese or Asian thinkers.227 The 
horrors of collectivist tyranny in Asia had far more to do with 
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ideas articulated by European thinkers than with “Asian culture,” 
which, in any case, is hardly monolithic.)
One can find statements of libertarian ideals in classical times,228 
and expressions of individuality and personal freedom in Arabic 
and Islamic civilization229 (the last itself also an heir to classical 
civilization), in Chinese civilization,230 and in Indian civilization,231 
but the intellectual and institutional sources of what became 
global liberalism converged mainly in Europe.
The historical trajectory could have been otherwise, but it 
wasn’t. While individualistic thinking can be found in other 
cultures—and, had some things gone differently, liberalism might 
have emerged instead, or more strongly, in those other cultures 
(and not in Europe)—that’s not what happened, which is why 
historians focus on the origins of liberal individualism in Europe. 
(A number of the physical sciences were also disproportionately 
pioneered by European thinkers, as well, but few would claim 
that modern biology, chemistry, physics, and mechanics are only 
for Europeans, simply because some of the pioneering inventions 
and discoveries in those fields were made in Europe.)
Individuality and Moral/Political Individualism
Awareness of one’s distinct individual identity and attention to 
the individuality of others is related to political individualism, 
in the sense of a legal and political order based on respect for 
the rights of individuals, but individuality and individualism are 
not, strictly speaking, the same. Both recognize the uniqueness 
of the individual, but the latter combines that recognition of 
individuality with claims about a common feature ascribed to 
all human beings, namely, that they have equal basic rights (e.g., 
“life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness”). When did those ideas 
begin to take clear form and to gain more widespread acceptance? 
The historian Colin Morris identified the twelfth century as 
“a peculiarly creative age” for “the development of self-awareness 
and self-expression . . . the freedom of a man to declare himself 
without paying excessive attention to the demands of convention 
or the dictates of authority.”232 Morris focused on the importance 
of humanist thinking (particularly the rediscovery of the writ-
ings of Cicero and Seneca the Younger, two important Roman 
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philosophers), the theological shift from seeking the salvation of 
mankind to focusing on individual salvation, and the depiction of 
human individuality in art and literature.233 Artistic and cultural 
appreciation for individuality increased through that period and 
beyond. John Benson has focused our attention on such elements 
as the development of biography and portraiture, diversification 
of names, monasticism, the substitution of conceptions of indi-
vidual guilt for social shame, and the focus on the distinction 
between childhood and adulthood as elements in the increasing 
appreciation of individuality.234
The recognition of the equal rights of all is complementary 
to the recognition of the individuation of persons, who are not 
merely interchangeable units. Each human being is a unique in-
dividual, but all bear common features, among them equal rights. 
(In the words of the American Declaration of Independence, “All 
men are created equal . . . they are endowed by their Creator with 
certain unalienable rights . . .”) A key document in the history of 
the legal recognition of universal rights was a Decretal, or legal 
pronouncement, issued by the lawyer Pope Innocent IV, about 
the year 1250. It concerned the rights of non-Christians.
I maintain . . . that lordship, possession and jurisdiction can 
belong to infidels licitly and without sin, for these things 
were made not only for the faithful but for every rational 
creature as has been said. For he makes his sun to rise on the 
just and the wicked and he feeds the birds of the air, Matthew 
c.5, c.6. Accordingly we say that it is not licit for the pope 
or the faithful to take away from infidels their belongings 
or their lordships or jurisdictions because they possess them 
without sin.235
It’s worth pausing to consider the role played by religion in that 
story. Pope Innocent IV quotes the Book of Matthew from the 
Christian New Testament, as well as alluding to the scholastic/
Aristotelian idea of the commonality of rationality. He cites a 
Christian Gospel text, so was it simply Christianity that was 
playing the key role? And if so, which of the many Christian 
theologies, or which elements of the various Christian doctrines, 
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were essential? And what role is played by the insistence that 
“these things were made not only for the faithful but for every 
rational creature as has been said”?
In a thoughtful and provocative book, full of novel ideas, the 
political theorist Larry Siedentop has provided an answer that 
reminds me forcefully of the story I told above of the colloquium 
participant who concluded that the American Constitution was 
a result of Aristotle’s ideas and China’s disastrous “Great Leap 
Forward” was the result of Confucius’s, that each result was an 
implication of texts written thousands of years ago. It’s worth 
examining Siedentop’s account, because understanding how 
mistaken it is may help us to appreciate better the universality of 
the ideas of liberal individualism. In his recent book Inventing the 
Individual: The Origins of Western Liberalism, Siedentop hints 
that Christian doctrine, in the form of the ideas set forth by St. 
Paul (hereafter “Paul”), is the necessary foundation for liberal in-
dividualism and that the ideas of rights not only emerged from 
a particular context, but could not have emerged elsewhere, and 
perhaps could not be realized without the necessary theological 
context. Siedentop argues that it was Paul’s message that made 
liberal individualism possible. According to Siedentop, Paul’s 
understanding of the meaning of Jesus’ death and resurrection 
introduced to the world a new picture of reality. It provided 
an ontological foundation for “the individual,” through the 
promise that humans have access to the deepest reality as 
individuals rather than merely as members of a group.236
Starting with the writings of Paul in an account of “the in-
vention of the individual” may seem somewhat unpromising, 
because Paul’s writings seem to suggest not the recognition of 
the individual as a unique moral being, but the submergence 
of the individual in a collective identity through her or his 
incorporation into the greater body of the Church: “For just as 
the body is one and has many members, and all the members 
of the body, though many, are one body, so it is with Christ” 
(1 Corinthians 12, Revised Standard Version).237 Moreover, in 
his letter to the Romans, Paul instructs them that all political 
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authority is vested with the authority of God: “Let every person 
be subject to the governing authorities. For there is no author-
ity except from God, and those that exist have been instituted 
by God. Therefore he who resists the authorities resists what 
God has appointed, and those who resist will incur judgment” 
(Romans 13, Revised Standard Version). (Learned scholars have 
pored over those texts and concluded that they can indeed be 
reconciled with liberal individualism, but the wording of Paul’s 
letters suggests that substantial interpretive apparatus is required 
to do so.) Siedentop does not deal with those issues, but instead 
provides a not very clear account of how faith undermined ratio-
nality, which—surprisingly—he understands not as a universal 
characteristic (recall Innocent IV’s comment about how “these 
things were made not only for the faithful but for every rational 
creature as has been said”) but instead with aristocracy, moral and 
legal inequality, and privilege! According to Siedentop, in the 
ancient world and for very long thereafter, “Reason or rational-
ity—logos, the power of words—became closely identified with 
the public sphere, with speaking in the assembly and with the 
political role of a superior class. Reason became the attribute of 
a class that commanded. At times reason was almost categorically 
fused with social superiority.” He invokes throughout the book 
an alleged “ancient association of rationality with inequality.”238 It 
is a very perplexing account and reverses the usual understanding 
of the relationships.
But even without going into the subtleties of theology, the 
proper interpretation of Paul’s views on the church as the body 
of Christ, the presumptive legitimacy of established political 
powers, or whether reason should be understood to be egalitarian 
or hierarchical, there is a gaping and obvious hole in Siedentop’s 
historical account: Paul’s letters are also accepted as part of the 
Bible by Orthodox Christians, among whom liberal individual-
ism did not emerge and flourish as it did in Latin (“Western”) 
Christianity. Yet Siedentop, who puts emphasis squarely on the 
words of Paul, never bothers to consider why the same texts in 
other contexts did not produce the same outcome.
Siedentop quite unfairly tars any objections to his thesis as 
mere “anti-clericalism” and insists that “texts are facts. And the 
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texts remain.”239 Indeed, for Siedentop, it’s just a matter of ideas 
unfolding and revealing their implications:
Centuries would be required for the implications of Christian 
moral beliefs to be drawn out and clarified—and even more 
time would pass before long-established social practices or 
institutions were reshaped by these implications.240
Why were “the implications” of the same texts “drawn out and 
clarified” in some contexts and not in others? Siedentop seems 
oblivious to the problem. (Throughout the book Siedentop also 
refers to “Christian moral intuitions,” a term which is far more 
vague than the implications he thinks he has discovered in the 
writings of Paul. He even asserts that the Gregorian Reformation 
and the freedom of the Church, which was accomplished in 
Roman Christianity but not among the Orthodox, was a case of 
Pope Gregory VII “drawing out the deepest moral intuitions of 
the church.”241) One might ask why it took thousands of years 
for the implications that allegedly led to toleration to be made 
explicit.242 Further, the emergence of liberal individualism cannot 
be merely the drawing out of the implications of texts or even in-
tuitions when the same texts (and presumably the same intuitions) 
did not seem to have the same implications elsewhere. Rather, 
different ideas became dominant for a long time in countries 
in which Orthodox traditions were the norm.243 When liberal 
individualism reached those countries it was more often adapted 
from ideas that had germinated in Europe. Siedentop’s story of 
the “texts” of Paul’s Epistles (or the rather vaguer “Christian 
intuitions”) grounding liberal individualism fails utterly to ac-
count for its emergence on this account alone: Paul’s letters are 
not only considered part of the Christian Bible among Latin (or 
Western) Christians, but among other Christian traditions, as well, 
including the Coptic and Orthodox Churches, yet the ideas and 
intuitions that Siedentop claims were implicated or intuitable did 
not result in liberal implications or intuitions being drawn from 
them in those other traditions that also embraced Paul’s Epistles.
To his idiosyncratic theological and historical accounts 
Siedentop tacks on a controversial and untenable philosophical 
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one, namely, that the philosophical tradition of “nominalism” 
(i.e., the idea that what exists are individuals and not timeless es-
sences and that universals are mere names) of the great European 
medieval thinkers Peter Abelard and William of Ockham was 
another necessary foundation for individualism. Nominalists 
are held to believe that what exists is the individual entity “Larry,” 
and not the essence “man.” If “essences” do not exist, but only a 
multitude of individuals (Moe, Larry, and Curly, for examples) do, 
then—voilà!—individualism. Ockham was both a nominalist and 
a pioneer in the development of modern theories of individual 
rights; he was also a “voluntarist” in theology, meaning that he 
explained God’s creation of the world and its laws by recourse 
to God’s will, rather than to God’s timeless essence or intellect. 
The problem with Siedentop’s account is that Ockham’s ideas on 
individual rights neither rest on nor invoke either his nominalism 
or his voluntarism, as Brian Tierney (ironically, Siedentop’s main 
source on Ockham) makes very clear: “Ockham is presented in 
my [Tierney’s] work as an important figure in the development 
of natural rights theories; but I argue that his characteristic 
teachings were not derived from his nominalist and voluntarist 
philosophy, but rather from a rationalist ethic applied to a body 
of juristic doctrine available to him in the canon law collec-
tions that he knew well and cited frequently.”244 As Tierney and 
other scholars have demonstrated, parallel theories of individual 
rights were being developed by thinkers who did not share either 
Ockham’s nominalism in philosophy or his voluntarism in theol-
ogy. Siedentop cites Tierney as a source, but seems not to have 
followed, or perhaps even read, Tierney’s argument.245
None of that is to suggest that either Christianity or nominal-
ism were unimportant in the history of thought (which would be 
absurd), nor to denigrate any particular interpretation of either 
nominalist philosophy, theological metaphysics, or the ideas of 
Paul, but merely to point out that Siedentop’s attempt to establish 
his curious interpretation of Paul and his claims about nominal-
ism as necessary and sufficient conditions for the emergence of 
liberal individualism fails.246
Why is all of that important? For three reasons: 
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A) Because respect for the universally valid rights of each and 
every unique individual is compatible with a wide array 
of philosophies, religions, and cultures and the limitation 
of liberalism to only one cultural context is incompatible 
both with the historical evidence and with the universal 
claims of liberalism itself; 
B) Because Siedentop’s account ignores or downplays im-
portant institutional innovations that were significant 
conditions for the development and triumph of individual 
liberty and because those institutional innovations may 
be necessary for the maintenance of liberty; the innova-
tions of greatest concern include constitutional limits on 
government power, checks and balances among competing 
powers, freedom of trade and freedom of exit, respect for 
property, and accountability of authorities to the law and 
to their publics;
C) Because Siedentop implies that Christianity, or at least his 
understanding of it, is a necessary element in the defense 
of civil liberty and, moreover, that “Islam” (rather than in-
tolerant political Islamists) is “challenging” Europe, which 
he identifies with liberty. Siedentop rather excitedly claims 
that “Europe is now faced with the challenge of Islam” 
and asks “Will Europeans come to understand better the 
moral logic that joins Christianity with civil liberty?”247 
thus suggesting that defending civil liberty requires the 
embrace of that which is joined to it by “moral logic,” i.e., 
a particular interpretation of a particular religion. That 
unjustified claim is in conflict with liberalism itself.
Siedentop’s puzzling reconstruction of liberal individualism’s 
origins may in fact be quite harmful to the very liberalism he seems 
eager to defend, for it suggests a closed club of cultures that are 
open to liberalism; others need not apply. Liberal individualism 
is not an exclusive property of European Christians; nor is it an 
inevitable consequence of “Christian intuitions,” nor a necessary 
implication of an eccentric interpretation of Paul’s writings, nor 
an outcome of European philosophical disputations over realism 
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and nominalism. It is a philosophy open to people of all faiths 
or none who embrace the moral principles of respect for the 
rights of others.
Origins of Liberal Individualism
The historian Walter Ullman presented a strong rebuttal to 
Siedentop’s thesis, long before Siedentop formulated it. Ullman 
traced the transformation of the passive “subject” to the active 
rights-bearing and rights-asserting citizen of liberal society and 
did not find it in implications of the texts of Paul: “Most, if not 
all, of the basic principles relative to the individual as a subject 
to higher authority are contained in the Bible, notably in the 
Pauline letters.”248 For example, the transition from subject to 
citizen, from obeying laws that were imposed on one to follow-
ing rules that in the creation and maintenance of which one had 
some role, is not an obvious implication of Paul’s letter to the 
Romans, which maintains that all earthly authority is ordained 
by God. In Paul’s account, the power of kings comes not from 
the consent of the people, but from God:
The king received his powers as a concession from divinity—
another Pauline principle was concretely applied: there is no 
power but of God—and what he had received through the 
grace of God in the shape of public power, he could concede 
to his subjects. The individuals as subjects had no rights in 
the public field. Whatever they had, they had as a matter of 
royal grace, of royal concession.249
Ullman focused attention not on the theories of government that 
were shared by rather small numbers of upper-class people, but 
on the actual practices and functioning institutional arrangements 
by which most people ordered their lives. After the collapse of 
the Roman imperium, European political orders splintered and 
military defense had to be reorganized to fend off raids and 
invasions. Following the withdrawal of the Roman legions (or 
their replacement by Germanic mercenaries) and the greater 
vulnerability to invasion from the North (the Norsemen), the 
South (the “Saracens”), and the East (the Avars and Magyars), 
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the old order could not be maintained. Military decentralization 
was followed by political and legal decentralization, as well.250
The institutions that emerged to solve problems of social co-
ordination (including defense against aggression) helped to set 
the stage for liberal individualism and modernity.
If one wishes to understand why and how it came about that 
from the late thirteenth century the individual gradually 
emerged as a full-fledged citizen, it would seem profitable 
to look at two rather practical facets of medieval society: on 
the one hand, the manner in which those far away from the 
gaze of official governments conducted their own affairs and, 
on the other hand, the feudal form of government which was 
practiced all over Europe.251
Both of the facets of medieval society that Ullman identified 
were matters of practice and trial-and-error, rather than theoreti-
cal speculation. Merely intellectual history without attention to 
the emergence of practice is unable to explain what happened, 
for without attention to the actual legal practices of the people, 
“it would seem well-nigh impossible to explain why there was 
the somewhat radical change toward the end of the thirteenth 
century, a change that in more than one respect ushered in the 
period which we like to call modern.”252 The fracturing of kingly 
power through the system of political contract that came to be 
known as “feudalism,”253 and the emergence of a multitude of 
legal systems with competing and overlapping jurisdictions254 
all contributed to an ever-wider space for individual action and 
more restrictions on the power of rulers.
The growth of cities was especially important; it was from the 
cities that the key institutions of “civil society” were to emerge. 
The legal order of the cities, or “communes,” was focused on 
peace and freedom. As Henri Pirenne described the citizens 
(“burghers”),
The burghers were essentially a group of homines pacis—men 
of peace. The peace of the city (pax villae) was at the same 
time the law of the city (lex villae).255
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The city was a place of peace (certainly relative to the coun-
tryside outside its walls) and the citizens enjoyed liberty, at least 
relative to the peasants who resided outside their walls: “just as 
agrarian civilization had made of the peasant a man whose normal 
state was servitude, trade made of the merchant a man whose nor-
mal condition was liberty.”256 If you could get into a city and stay 
for a year and a day, you became a free person: “City Air Makes 
One Free” was a distinguishing feature of the cities of Europe.257
The replacement of war and subjugation with peaceful com-
merce and contractual relationships corresponded to, indeed, 
demanded, increases in rational self-control, notably the ability 
to ignore or control harmful impulses, especially aggression, and 
to delay gratification. As Benjamin Constant noted, “A man 
who was always the stronger would never conceive the idea of 
commerce. It is experience, by proving to him that war, that is 
the use of his strength against the strength of others, exposes 
him to a variety of obstacles and defeats, that leads him to resort 
to commerce, that is to a milder and surer means of engaging 
the interest of others to agree to what suits his own. War is all 
impulse, commerce, calculation.”258 The gradual replacement of 
war by commerce went hand in hand with the replacement of 
impulse by calculation, zero-sum games by positive-sum games, 
short-term by long-term thinking, and subjection to power by 
personal responsibility and liberty.259 The gradual replacement 
of violence and repression has been facilitated by commerce.260
According to Siedentop, authority and legal order descended 
from above in accordance with theories set out in books, but 
the historical record suggests that the legal orders of modernity 
emerged from forms of association generated through practice 
and trial and error, in other words, from the bottom up. In 
Ullman’s words,
[T]here were throughout the Middle Ages numerous associa-
tions, unions, fraternities, guilds, and communities which in 
one way or another considered the individual a full member. 
What these truly numberless associations exhibit is the urge of 
individuals to combine into larger groups: partly for reasons 
of self-protection, partly for reasons of mutual insurance, 
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partly for reasons of pursuing sectional interests, these unions 
were to all intents and purposes communities, which provided 
for the individual the security which he would otherwise have 
lacked. . . . In the village potteries, smithies, tileries, quarries 
et cetera, working conditions were laid down by the village 
community itself. In other words, we have here a “system” 
at work which shows all the characteristic features of the 
ascending theme of government and law, according to which 
original power resided in the members of the community, in 
the individuals themselves.261
A major element in the decentralization of power (military, 
political, and legal) was the rivalry between the church and the 
empire and other political authorities, which set the stage for a 
competition that distinguished Western Europe from the other 
political systems of the Eurasian landmass in a way that religious 
texts did not (as both Latin and Orthodox churches accepted the 
Pauline Epistles that Siedentop considers so important). Harold 
Berman terms the change the “Papal Revolution” and it set in 
motion changes that are still playing out.262 Notable among them 
was the formulation of the idea of the supremacy of law (the “rule 
of law”) and of what has come to be known as “constitutional-
ism.” Magna Carta, which doesn’t merit a mention in Siedentop’s 
book, looms large in the history of nations deriving their political 
institutions from English law; it was itself strongly influenced 
by the Papal Revolution.263 That raises a problem similar to that 
raised by Siedentop’s account. Focusing exclusively on Magna 
Carta reveals the danger of a different kind of essentialism, which 
asserts that “only the English” understand liberty, because Magna 
Carta, some assert, was unique.264 But as important as Magna 
Carta is, it was not the only such charter of liberties; it was an 
important part of a movement that was European in character, and 
not merely English.265 One could mention its many precedents, 
including Henry I’s “Charter of Liberties” issued in 1100, which 
made various concessions to the English barons and knights;266 
the Assizes of Ariano, promulgated in 1140 by King Roger II of 
Sicily;267 and shortly after 1215 the Golden Bull of Hungary of 
1222, signed by King András, which instituted a long period of 
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constitutionalism in central Europe;268 the Constitutions of Melfi 
issued by Emperor Frederick II in 1231;269 and numerous others. 
Even the important terms regarding “the law of the land” and “trial 
by one’s peers,” which later reappeared in the US Constitution, 
predated Magna Carta, for example, in a constitution agreed to 
by Emperor Conrad II in 1037, which declared that no vassal 
should be deprived of an imperial or ecclesiastical fief “except in 
accordance with the law of our predecessors and the judgment 
of his peers.”270
Not only was law important, including limitations on arbi-
trary power of the sort instituted in the items just listed, but 
also important was the decline of hierarchy and the emergence 
of a more fluid social order, that is, a civil society. Recognition 
of individuality is not sufficient by itself for a liberal society, nor 
even is a system of predictable laws, although both are necessary 
conditions. A third necessary condition is a society in which 
even the poorest and most humble is allowed “to pursue his own 
interest his own way, upon the liberal plan of equality, liberty, 
and justice,” as Adam Smith put it when contrasting the liberal 
approach with the “extraordinary privileges” and “extraordinary 
restraints” of the “mercantile system.”271 The liberal plan of equal-
ity, liberty, and justice had to replace the extraordinary privileges 
and extraordinary restraints to make possible the modern world 
and the enormous “great enrichment” and personal freedom it 
has ushered in. As Deirdre McCloskey notes, “A society can be 
individualistic in a thoroughgoing way but still honor only noble-
men, not letting ordinary people have a go at spinning jennies 
and desktop computers.”272
It was not inevitable that liberal individualism would emerge 
among European Christians (and Jews), nor were the ideas of 
Paul (or “Christian intuitions”) sufficient to germinate liberal 
individualism among the countries in which Orthodoxy held sway. 
To identify the processes that gave rise to liberal individualism 
entails identifying those that could have produced it elsewhere, 
as well. We should remember that ideas do not have to be cre-
ated or germinated independently by each person or group for 
them to be shared commonly; having once been produced, ideas 
may be communicated in poems, songs, and books, through art 
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and science, in blog posts and Tweets, and they may be under-
stood, embraced, or followed by people whose ancestors did not 
themselves produce the ideas. In the case of the moral, legal, and 
political principles of liberalism, that’s especially obvious; refugees 
from tyrannies often embrace the norms of the freer societies in 
which they find refuge, including the expectation of respect for 
their rights and willingness to respect the rights of others, even 
if their societies of origin had had little tradition of such respect.
Once learned and embraced, principles and ideas can be forgot-
ten; their transmission may require certain ongoing experiences. 
Habits and practices generally require repetition for them to be 
sustained and transmitted to new generations. At least some of 
the conditions that made liberalism possible may be necessary for 
its maintenance, as well, such as free exit from legal and political 
orders and competition among political and legal authorities to 
attract taxpayers and capital. (Thus, federalism, when combined 
with freedom of movement for person and goods, recommends 
itself to classical liberals as a political structure that tends to sustain 
liberty.) Much as some sciences require laboratory experiments 
to be learned, some moral, legal, and political principles require 
continuous manifestations of the institutional conditions under 
which they emerged for their maintenance.
Conclusion
Self-control, individual freedom, and limits on state power have 
their particular intertwined histories, but like other concepts 
and practices, that does not preclude universal application. The 
history of self-control is one of increasingly voluntary association 
for liberty, a process whereby individuals secured their liberty 
and respect for their own choices as individuals by creating rule-
governed relationships with others. As Antony Black put it of the 
guilds and communes of Europe,
The crucial point about both guilds and communes was that 
here individuation and association went hand in hand. One 
achieved liberty by belonging to this kind of group. Citizens, 
merchants, and artisans pursued their own individual goals 
by banding together under oath.273
148
A society is not an entity separate from the members of society; 
it is not a big person like the persons who constitute it, or even a 
great body of which the “members” are like the “members”—the 
hands, feet, kidneys, head—of a human body. Groups, associa-
tions, churches, clubs, societies, and governments are made up 
of individuals and their complex and multifarious relationships. 
There is no individual who is completely unrelated to any others 
who joins similarly unrelated individuals to form human society, 
but within the context of their inherited relationships humans do, 
in fact, form myriad associations, connections, and relationships. 
The more complex the social order, the greater the need for its 
members to exercise self-control.
The right to self-control is not limited only to inheritors of 
one or another tribe or culture, or to practitioners of only one or 
another religion, or to speakers of one or another language. It is 
the right of all human beings as such, regardless of religion, color, 
language, nationality, or other features. It offers the choice to live 
one’s life as one chooses in association with others in communi-
ties one chooses. Some exercise their self-control to live in highly 
structured voluntary communities (monasteries and convents are 
the obvious examples), others in fluid urban neighborhoods; some 
like to live in stable and rooted communities and others prefer 
to roam the world and experience many ways of life. Free and 
self-controlling persons make such choices for themselves. They 
are not dictated to by others. The self-controlling individual is 
neither atomistic nor anomic, but creates or accepts relations 
based on choice and voluntary agreement.
The legal historian Sir Henry Sumner Maine described well 
“the movement of the progressive societies” as “a movement from 
Status to Contract.”274 Creating contracts, rather than merely 
acquiescing in what is assigned to one by birth, means acquiring 
the habit of self-control. The philosopher Robert Nozick called 
it a “framework for utopia,” meaning not one perfect and blissful 
utopia, but a framework of choices from within which people 
may choose their own preferred arrangements.275 It’s not perfec-
tion, but it is far better for the vast majority of human beings 
than being subjected to controls imposed on them by others 
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who are generally no wiser, no smarter, no more moral, and no 
better informed about the life situations of those others whom 
they control.
Self-controlling individuals pursue happiness by using their 
own knowledge to achieve their own ends. Those who pursue 
happiness may not always achieve it, but when someone does, it 
is his or her achievement, which is something that slaves, serfs, 
subordinates, subjects, and those subjected to the coercive will 
of others cannot say.
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Philosophical Issues of 
Freedom and Responsibility
By Tom G. Palmer
For what am I responsible? Can there be freedom without respon-
sibility or responsibility without freedom? How is freedom of choice 
possible in a world governed by causation? What kind of self is 
free and responsible—an individual self or a collective self ? Many 
philosophers have sought to understand the relationship between 
freedom and responsibility—from Aristotle to Immanuel Kant to 
Martin Heidegger, Harry Frankfurt, and Daniel Dennett. Their 
contributions and others are examined in the search for a coherent 
philosophy of freedom.
“Liberty not only means that the individual has both the op-
portunity and the burden of choice; it also means that he must 
bear the consequences of his actions and will receive praise or 
blame for them. Liberty and responsibility are inseparable.”276
—F. A. Hayek
The discussion of self-control has a long history, and many difficult 
questions have engaged thinkers over the millennia, including 
what constitutes a self, the nature of freedom, whether freedom 
is a necessary or sufficient condition for responsibility (and vice 
versa), whether freedom and responsibility are even possible in a 
world governed by scientific laws or God’s will, and how a set of 
principles that have a distinct history can be said to be universally 
true or valid. There is no way I could hope to cover all such topics, 
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especially in a short essay, but I introduce and address some of 
the important issues that are relevant to the choice between state 
control and self-control in the hope that others will be induced to 
take up those issues and to provide new insights into the relation-
ship between individual freedom and responsibility.
The alternative to controlling oneself is to be controlled by oth-
ers. By control I don’t mean persuasion or example, such as may be 
provided by friends and family, or moral suasion and inspiration, 
such as may be provided by philosophies and religions, but the 
use of force to override one’s own choices.277 Many persons and 
groups, from patriarchs to tribal councils to warlords to parliamen-
tary majorities to generals (and many others), have systematically 
exercised force against others. In the past, those who used force 
to control others were usually slave masters, tribal chieftains, and 
warlords, but in the modern age, the main alternative to self-
control is control by “the state,” or by government, as Americans 
tend to say. We face a choice of state control or self-control.
The “self,” as it is used in common language, is also known as 
the “I”—when we speak in the first person, we say “I,” whether the 
one speaking is you, me, or the person walking down the street. 
Each of us, while sharing things in common, has a unique identity.
Fiction provides a means to imagine the world differently. 
A number of works have explored a world in which states ani-
mated by collectivist ideologies attempt to eradicate individuality. 
Yevgeny Zamyatin’s We was first published in English in 1924 
(he wrote it in Russian, but it was suppressed in the USSR). In 
We, the mathematician D-503 records his thoughts in a world 
in which individuals are reduced to mere numbers. The slogan 
of the OneState is “Long live OneState! Long live the numbers! 
Long live the Benefactor!”278 In 1937 the Russian émigré writer 
Ayn Rand theorized an even more radical vision of collectivism 
in which the pronoun “I” had been abolished. She published a 
short novel, Anthem, about the rediscovery of individuality in a 
world governed by a state dedicated to a simple creed:
We are one in all and all in one.
There are no men but only the great WE,
One, indivisible and forever.279
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In her novel, everyone refers to himself or herself as “We,” for 
“I” is unknown. In a key turn in the story, the main characters 
discover their love for one another.
Today, the Golden One stopped suddenly and said:
“We love you.”
But then they frowned and shook their head and looked 
at us helplessly.
“No,” they whispered, “that is not what we wished to say.”
They were silent, then they spoke slowly, and their words 
were halting, like the words of a child learning to speak for 
the first time:
“We are one .  .  . alone .  .  . and only .  .  . and we love you 
who are one . . . alone . . . and only.”280
George Orwell’s novels articulated the incoherence and futil-
ity of attempts to abolish the self, which inevitably degenerated 
not into harmonious collectivist egalitarianism, but into brutal 
oppression by small groups of people. In Animal Farm (1945) 
he showed how the attempt to suppress individuality led merely 
to another form of domination of the majority by a minority, as 
the “Seven Commandments” of the revolution, including “All 
animals are equal,” were compressed to the more accurate “All 
animals are equal, but some are more equal than others.” In 1984 
(written in 1948 and originally titled “The Last Man in Europe”), 
Orwell artfully laid bare the colossal and unending efforts neces-
sary to crush the human spirit under the system of “Oligarchical 
Collectivism” (officially titled “Obliteration of the Self ” in one of 
the three competing, but otherwise identical, collectivist states). It 
is possible to kill, oppress, imprison, and psychologically cripple 
millions or billions of people, but it is ultimately impossible to 
suppress the reality of the individual self.281
The individual is real and cannot be eradicated. The state, on 
the other hand, is an abstraction, not a materially individuated 
person like you and me. The state is “real,” but not “material.” 
“State” is the term we use to refer to “that human community 
which (successfully) lays claim to the monopoly of legitimate 
physical violence within a certain territory, this ‘territory’ being 
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another of the defining characteristics of the state,” to use the 
canonical definition of the sociologist Max Weber.282 State enti-
ties are made up of individual persons exercising power through 
violence and their complex relationships amongst themselves 
and with others. It turns out that when the state decides for us, 
a big person we refer to as “We” doesn’t end up deciding for “Us,” 
but instead some—the most manipulative, articulate, powerful, 
wealthy, numerous, or intimidating—decide for others. That is 
always the case. In most contemporary political orders those 
who decide then typically insist that it was the others—the ones 
on whom decisions were imposed—who really were making the 
decisions. It is a myth, at best one of Plato’s “noble lies,” that serves 
to keep most people in line.
A free person makes her own choices and manages her own life; 
an unfree person’s life is managed by someone else. The free person 
bears responsibility for her acts and the unfree person does not. If 
we want to be free, it’s not enough merely to demand freedom: we 
must also demand the responsibility for our own actions and our 
own lives. And if we wish to be moral and upstanding people, we 
must embrace the freedom to make our own choices and to take 
the praise or the blame—that is, the responsibility—for them.
Levels of Freedom and Responsibility
The relationship between freedom and responsibility is manifested 
on many levels, from the most abstract and metaphysical to the 
most practical and everyday. We are free persons, rather than 
mere material objects, because we can be held accountable for 
our acts. We are distinguished as individuals by what we do—the 
very things for which we are responsible. Responsibility for our 
actions and the freedom to choose for ourselves foster social 
cooperation, coordination, and harmony, and when our freedom 
and responsibility are overridden, social order is disrupted and 
conflict replaces harmony. When others, most notably, but not 
exclusively, those who are organized as “the state,” force others 
to do this or not do that, the responsibility for what was done 
or not done shifts to those who used the force. If your money 
was transferred to another person because it was taken by taxes, 
you weren’t being “generous.” If you abstain from what may be 
154
a “vice” merely because of fear of arrest by the vice squad and 
imprisonment, you’re not being virtuous. If you do something 
dangerous because you were drugged without your consent, 
you’re not responsible for the harm you caused while under the 
influence of the drug.
The sign of morality, according to one influential and deep 
thinker, is praise and blame. His language may be somewhat 
dense, but it’s worth quoting Aristotle at length. 
It is clear that all the acts of which man is the principle 
and controller may either happen or not happen, and that 
their happening or not happening—those at least of whose 
existence or non-existence he has the control—depends on 
him. But of what it depends on him to do or not to do, he 
is himself the cause; and what he is the cause of depends 
on him. And since excellence and badness and the acts that 
spring from them are respectively praised or blamed—for 
we do not give praise or blame for what is due to necessity, 
or chance, or nature, but for what we ourselves are causes 
of; for what another is the cause of, for that he bears the 
blame or praise—it is clear that excellence and badness have 
to do with matters where the man himself is the cause and 
source of his acts. We must then ascertain of what actions 
he is himself the source and cause. Now, we all admit that 
of acts that are voluntary and done from the choice of each 
man he is the cause, but of involuntary acts he is not himself 
the cause; and all that he does from choice he clearly does 
voluntarily. It is clear then that excellence and badness have 
to do with voluntary acts.283
When voluntary choices are overridden by force, neither the 
excellence nor the badness of the outcome can be morally attrib-
uted to the person who was forced. One is not fully responsible 
for what one was forced to do. If we want to be credited either 
way, voluntary choice is necessary.284
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Can There Be Moral Responsibility without Freedom?
Many thinkers have tested Aristotle’s description of responsibil-
ity, some by suggesting that nothing is truly voluntary, others by 
suggesting that there may be very odd cases in which we may still 
be responsible for choices despite not being able to change the 
outcome. Some of those challenges raise interesting questions 
for logicians and may help to test our intuitions by raising odd, 
bizarre, or marginal cases, but none of them successfully uncouple 
freedom and responsibility.
Aristotle noted that while we may investigate many things, we 
only deliberate about those things that “are in our power and may 
be done,”285 that is, we only deliberate about and make choices 
regarding what is, in popular language, “up to us.” An especially 
influential critic has denied that whether something is “up to us” 
is a necessary condition for moral responsibility; it may help to 
understand moral responsibility and freedom by considering that 
objection. Harry Frankfurt rejects the criterion of moral respon-
sibility according to which “a person is morally responsible for 
what he has done only if he could have done otherwise”; he calls 
that “the principle of alternate possibilities.”286
Frankfurt argues that “A person may well be morally responsible 
for what he has done even though he could not have done other-
wise.”287 He poses a problem about a hypothetical person, Jones:
Jones decides for reasons of his own to do something, then 
someone threatens him with a very harsh penalty (so harsh 
that any reasonable person would submit to the threat) unless 
he does precisely that, and Jones does it. Will we hold Jones 
morally responsible for what he has done? I think this will 
depend on the roles we think were played in leading him to 
act, by his original decision and by the threat.288
If Jones “acted on the basis of his own decision and not because 
of the threat  .  .  . I think we would be justified in regarding his 
moral responsibility for what he did as unaffected by the threat 
even though, since he would in any case have submitted to the 
threat, he could not have avoided doing what he did.”289 Thus, 
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whether the act is “up to us” is, for Frankfurt, irrelevant to whether 
we should be held responsible.
The central problem in Frankfurt’s account is that it merely 
displaces, outside the arbitrarily demarcated boundaries of the 
problem he has set, the point at which one “could have done 
otherwise.”290 Let’s examine two cases:
A) At t1 Bill decided to steal $10 (and was then threatened 
with death by a master criminal if he were not to steal the 
$10, meaning that Bill could not have done otherwise than 
steal the $10) and at t2 Bill does steal the $10; Bill is held 
responsible for stealing the $10.
B) At t1 Mary decided not to steal $10 (and was then threat-
ened with death by a master criminal if she were not to steal 
the $10, meaning that Mary could not have done otherwise 
than steal the $10) and at t2 Mary does steal the $10; Mary 
is not held responsible for stealing the $10.
Besides the obvious practical problem with such scenarios—
which is acknowledged by Frankfurt—i.e., that it may be very 
difficult to untangle the various motives from which a person acted 
(e.g., an undocumented decision to take $10 or a desire to avoid 
being killed),291 Frankfurt has not denied moral responsibility, 
but at most merely suggested that the condition of being “up to 
us”—namely, whether we acted freely—is not a necessary condition 
for moral responsibility. He concludes that “When a fact is in this 
way irrelevant to the problem of accounting for a person’s action 
it seems quite gratuitous to assign it any weight in the assessment 
of his moral responsibility. Why should the fact be considered in 
reaching a moral judgment concerning the person when it does 
not help in any way to understand either what made him act as 
he did or what, in other circumstances, he might have done?”292
But, assuming that the ascriptions of responsibility above are 
correct (Bill is responsible, and Mary is not), whatever it is that 
distinguishes cases A and B (and there must be some factor that 
would lead us to different conclusions in the two cases), it still must 
depend on there being some earlier point at which Bill or Mary 
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“could have done otherwise.” There must have been something 
that Bill “could have done” that would have allowed Bill to join 
Mary in avoiding moral responsibility, and following that alternate 
course of action would be to have done otherwise. He could have 
decided earlier (at t1) not to steal the $10, before the threat was 
revealed to him, and in that case, i.e., had he done otherwise, he 
would not have been held responsible at t2 for stealing the $10. 
Bill’s moral responsibility would still hinge, as Aristotle and a 
long tradition have maintained, on an act being up to him.293
Intentions are central elements in the ascription of moral re-
sponsibility for acts, but Frankfurt has raised another objection 
regarding common understandings of the relationship between 
freedom and responsibility. He distinguishes between desires as 
normally understood (e.g., “I desire to eat an apple”) and “second-
order desires” or “desires of the second order,” e.g., the desire “to 
have (or not to have) certain desires and motives.”294 Frankfurt 
argues against commonsense notions of moral responsibility by 
claiming that “It is not true that a person is morally responsible 
for what he has done only if his will was free when he did it. He 
may be morally responsible for having done it even though his 
will was not free at all.”295 That is so, he argues, because:
A person’s will is free only if he is free to have the will he wants. 
This means that, with regard to any of his first-order desires, 
he is free either to make that desire his will or to make some 
other first-order desire his will instead. Whatever his will, 
then, the will of the person whose will is free could have been 
otherwise; he could have done otherwise than to constitute 
his will as he did. It is a vexed question just how “he could 
have done otherwise” is to be understood in contexts such 
as this one. But although this question is important to the 
theory of freedom, it has no bearing on the theory of moral 
responsibility. For the assumption that a person is morally 
responsible for what he has done does not entail that the 
person was in a position to have whatever will he wanted.296
Frankfurt does not seek directly to undermine moral respon-
sibility, but to disconnect it from freedom. He claims that “it is 
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irrelevant to the evaluation of his moral responsibility to inquire 
whether the alternatives that he opted against were actually avail-
able to him,”297 a claim in line with his rejection of the “principle 
of alternative possibilities” as a criterion of moral responsibility. 
The key move that Frankfurt makes and others have taken up 
suggests that, say, a cigarette smoker who smokes but who at the 
same time wishes that she did not have the desire to smoke is 
not choosing freely when choosing to smoke. Frankfurt does not 
deny the moral responsibility of the smoker, but he does deny the 
freedom he or she exercises in choosing to smoke. That approach 
has been deployed by others to undermine both the freedom of 
the chooser and the moral responsibility for the choices he or 
she makes and, as a consequence, has provided support for in-
terventionist “nanny states.” A disjunction between freedom and 
responsibility undermines both; if there is no moral responsibility, 
why should freedom of choice be important (and thus protected 
in law), and if there is no freedom of choice, why worry about 
ascribing moral responsibility? It is hardly self-evident that the 
presence of an unwanted desire makes the will unfree. People 
choose regularly to ignore unwanted desires; the fact that some 
choices are more difficult than others does not by itself reduce 
or increase the freedom exercised in making choices to follow 
or to ignore them.
Freedom and Responsibility in Society
Freedom and responsibility are unavoidable in a world in which we 
recognize other people as other “I’s” and not merely as machines 
or pieces of meat. Other people are not mere objects. They are 
participants with us in a wide variety of interactions. To see other 
people as “other I’s” is to see them as beings capable of owning 
their acts and of being held accountable for them, as we are held 
accountable for ours.
We inevitably see other agents in what P. F. Strawson refers 
to as the “participant” attitude, in contrast to the “objective” at-
titude.298 Seeing other agents in the participant attitude entails 
such attitudes as “gratitude, resentment, forgiveness, love, and 
hurt feelings.”299 The objective attitude entails seeing others, “as 
something certainly to be taken account, perhaps precautionary 
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account, of,” but without “resentment, gratitude, forgiveness, 
anger, or the sort of love which two adults can sometimes be said 
to feel reciprocally, for each other.”300 We are capable of holding 
both attitudes toward the same people, but the objective attitude 
is not sustainable and represents an aberration or a temporary 
suspension of the participant attitude:
The human commitment to participation in ordinary inter-
personal relationships is, I think, too thoroughgoing and 
deeply rooted for us to take seriously the thought that a 
general theoretical conviction might so change our world 
that, in it, there were no longer any such things as interper-
sonal relationships as we normally understand them; and 
being involved in inter-personal relationships as we normally 
understand them precisely is being exposed to the range of 
reactive attitudes and feelings that is in question.301
Strawson’s point is that, regardless of what theories we may 
hold about freedom or determinism, under normal circumstances 
if someone were to punch me in the nose, I would resent it, and 
I would expect to hold the person responsible, unless there were 
some mitigating factor: perhaps she was suffering from a brain 
tumor that impaired her judgment or eliminated her impulse 
control, or she was threatened with a horrible punishment if she 
did not punch me, or her arm was moved forcefully by another, 
in which last two cases I would resent the person who threatened 
her or moved her arm. In the absence of mitigating factors, we 
do hold people responsible for their behavior; we do evaluate 
the acts of others on the basis of whether they could have done 
otherwise. Our acts and their consequences can, at least under 
normal circumstances, be traced back to us. Even the most con-
vinced behaviorist would be unlikely to respond to a personal 
insult or assault from another person in the same way as she 
would respond to a bacterial infection or a stumble over a stone 
that she had not seen on the path before her.
Regardless of the complexities of which moral and legal re-
sponsibility may admit, the fact is that interacting with other 
human beings means, in almost all cases, recognizing that they 
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can be held responsible for their acts when they are free to act 
otherwise.302 Were someone to assert otherwise, possibly on the 
basis of an idiosyncratic philosophical theory, she should be 
invited to imagine her reaction if another human were to slowly 
and evidently deliberately grind a spiked shoe into her hand; 
resentment seems quite impossible to avoid—it is a natural reac-
tion—and the implication of such resentment is that the other 
agent is held responsible for the act. The presence of an unwanted 
desire to harm another would not reduce the freedom of the one 
doing the harming, nor the resentment of the one being harmed.
Is There Freedom in a World of Causes and Effects?
Responsibility and freedom are principles that are applied in 
contexts. Not everything that involves one’s own body is one’s 
own responsibility. Even in cases in which it looks like a person is 
acting, and not merely being pushed, there may be other causes 
to which responsibility should be attributed. For example, a brain 
lesion may lead someone to act impulsively or violently and, once 
it’s removed, the person becomes his or her old peaceful self. 
Accidental ingestion of a drug may lead to impulsive behavior 
or cause hallucinations that lead someone to think that others 
can fly unaided, after which the victim of the drugging pushes 
people out of the window, perhaps even laughing while doing so. 
In such cases we don’t hold the person responsible for the actions, 
but instead “blame” the identifiable cause.303
Some have suggested that all human behavior has causes that 
can, at least in principle, be identified and that if modern science 
has proven that reality is governed deterministically, then so 
are our actions, so that it could never be the case that we could 
do otherwise and thus, we could never be free.304 And without 
such freedom, then how could we ever be held accountable for 
our acts? Moreover, if we’re not free and responsible, why treat 
other people as if they are moral beings at all, rather than just 
things to be manipulated as we desire? It’s an old debate and it’s 
unlikely that I could introduce a completely new approach here, 
but I will argue that it may, in fact, not be relevant to the practical 
issues of freedom and responsibility in human interactions in the 
way that many people fear it would. Even in a fully deterministic 
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world, both freedom and responsibility would be characteristics 
of human interaction.
Many of those who have wrestled with the problem have been 
inspired by Immanuel Kant’s distinction between experience, 
which is conditioned by the category of causality, and things as 
they are in themselves, prior to being understood as structured by 
categories. Empirically understood (that is, as a part of our expe-
rience), everything is caused, but understood “transcendentally,” 
that is, through reason alone and thus shorn of the categories 
that provide structure to experience, at least some things can be 
understood to be uncaused: our choices, which proceed from a 
free will, are the causes of our acts but are not themselves caused 
by anything antecedent to them. According to Kant, it is this 
“transcendental idea of freedom on which the practical concept 
of freedom is grounded.”305 The practical freedom we enjoy as 
moral agents lies in the fact that our moral choices cause our moral 
acts, but are not themselves caused by anything we can perceive. 
To follow reason is to act freely. The immediate problem is that 
it would seem to follow that only choices that are morally right 
are free, a position also upheld by some theologians. But if that 
were the case, it would seem to follow that immoral choices would 
not be freely made and, if not free, they would not be choices for 
which we might be held responsible.306 But the free and respon-
sible person is held accountable for his or her choices, whether 
good or bad, moral or immoral. If one can only be praised for 
the right choices, but never blamed for the wrong choices, “praise 
and blame” cease to have any function. Freedom and responsibil-
ity are linked not only through the freedom to make the right 
choices and be praised for them, but through the freedom to 
make the wrong choices and to be blamed for them, as well. As 
the philosopher Daniel Dennett puts it, “Blame is the price we 
pay for credit, and we pay it gladly under most circumstances.”307
Some deny the principle of causal predictability altogether, or 
appeal to quantum indeterminism as a way to allay the fear that a 
deterministic world would void moral freedom and responsibil-
ity. The problem with that approach, in a nutshell, is that if our 
choices are determined randomly, in what way could we be said 
to be responsible for them?
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Perhaps someone has a truly brilliant and original new approach 
to the issue of freedom of the will and determinism and if so, he 
or she is welcome to add it to the discussion. A more modest, but 
still helpful, approach is to acknowledge that science does indeed 
rest on the search for causes and that, indeed, in some cases we 
can identify physical causes (brain lesions and accidental drug 
interactions, for examples) on the basis of which we do not hold 
people responsible for their actions (because they weren’t “their” 
chosen actions at all), but that that need not undermine our 
general belief in each others’ freedom to make choices and our 
responsibility for them. We may live in a deterministic universe, 
and the state of that universe includes the states of our brains, but 
that by itself need not undermine our freedom or our responsi-
bility. There may be at this instant only one physically possible 
future, but it does not follow from that that the past states of the 
world were necessary conditions for the present or the future.308
More directly relevant to the issue, we can ask the question 
“Why” of our fellow humans and of ourselves: “Why did you do 
X and not Y?” We can also provide answers that involve choices 
we made, choices that could have been otherwise. Human beings 
(and perhaps other moral agents, if there are any) are distinctive 
in our ability to give accounts of what we are doing. That sets 
us apart from machines, which “do” things when we manipulate 
them in the right way, and even from other animals, who may 
respond to requests, but who can’t explain to each other or to 
us why they do so.309
Unlike machines or even other animals, humans do not always 
require extensive training to learn to do things, much less condi-
tioning by painful or pleasurable stimuli, as behaviorists suggest. 
We can speak, meaning that we can tell each other how to do 
things. As Daniel Dennett points out, 
We human beings not only can do things when requested 
to do them; we can answer inquiries about what we are do-
ing and why. We can engage in the practice of asking, and 
giving, reasons.310
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Speech—logos—is a key to human freedom. Aristotle in his 
treatise on Politics observed that
man alone among the animals has speech. The voice indeed 
indicates the painful or pleasant, and hence is present in other 
animals as well; for their nature has come this far, that they 
have a perception of the painful and pleasant and signal these 
things to each other. But speech serves to reveal the advanta-
geous and the harmful, and hence also the just and the unjust. 
For it is peculiar to man as compared to the other animals 
that he alone has a perception of good and bad and just and 
unjust and the other things of this sort; and community in 
these things is what makes a household and a city.311
Human beings have an evolved capability that the other evolved 
things we encounter and engage with don’t seem to have; we can 
talk to each other and give reasons. And that is sufficient to hold 
us accountable; we can tell why we did something and thus, what 
else we could have done. In short, when we explain our choices, 
we acknowledge that we could have done otherwise, that our 
choice is “up to us.” Even in a causally determined world, we still 
ask and give accounts of our behavior. It is for that reason that 
humans have been able to transform the world and themselves 
in so short a period of time. It is because we have freedom and 
the capacity to coordinate our acts for common purposes that we 
are able to live together in large numbers, cooperate through the 
division of labor, and hold one another responsible for our acts.312 
Asking and giving accounts of our behavior is the foundational 
act of moral responsibility and it is the inescapable foundation 
of social life. Creatures incapable of controlling their impulses or 
justifying their behavior to their fellows are incapable of achieving 
substantial levels of social coordination; speech and the freedom 
and responsibility it makes possible are the evolutionary secrets 
of human success.
People flourish when they are free and responsible. The aware-
ness of responsibility is a powerful boost to social cooperation. 
Conversely, convincing people that they are not free and not 
responsible reduces cooperative behavior and makes people less 
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successful in life. Experimental psychology is helping us to under-
stand how a world in which people embrace their freedom and 
responsibility is a far better, more cooperative and social, more 
honest, less violent, and more peaceful world.313
The idea that one could have done otherwise is not the same 
as saying that what he or she does is contrary to the laws of cause 
and effect that govern the universe. When we assert the freedom 
and responsibility of ourselves and of our fellow humans, we are 
doing so in a moral and social context, not in a laboratory study 
of physical interactions.314
As empirical psychologist Roy Baumeister notes, “Perhaps 
ironically, free will is necessary to enable people to follow rules.”315
Responsibility to Others
One could write at great length about the relationship between 
freedom and responsibility and many writers have done just that. 
The upshot of a lot of complicated philosophical arguments is 
an insight that was reached long ago in a variety of languages 
and traditions.
Zigong asked, “Is there one expression that can be acted upon 
until the end of one’s days?”
The Master [Confucius] replied, “There is shu 恕: do not 
impose on others what you yourself do not want.”316
And 
When a heathen who wished to become a Jew asked him for 
a summary of the Jewish religion in the most concise terms, 
Hillel said: “What is hateful to thee, do not unto thy fellow 
man: this is the whole Law; the rest is mere commentary” 
(Shab. 31a).317
Both Confucius and Hillel were expressing the very cornerstone 
of civility. It’s sometimes called the “Silver Rule,” to distinguish it 
from the more exacting “Golden Rule,” as expressed by Jesus of 
Nazareth in the Book of Matthew: “So whatever you wish that 
men would do to you, do so to them; for this is the law and the 
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prophets.”318 The Silver Rule is less demanding than the Golden 
Rule, but all the more a necessary condition for humans to live 
together peacefully.
We move among our fellow humans not as we move among 
machines, but in a context that presupposes mutual recognition. 
Rational agents share not only a common nature, as do lobsters 
with other lobsters and cabbages with other cabbages, but in ad-
dition we make possible for one another an apprehension of the 
world as objective reality. That is an apprehension of the world 
that is not similarly facilitated by interaction with inanimate or 
non-rational entities.
We interact with other humans in the knowledge that they 
are moral agents, in the awareness that, for example, they have 
values and can engage in strategic behavior. Even the slave masters 
did not treat slaves simply as automata, as Descartes was said to 
have treated a dog crying in pain (as he casually dissected it) as 
no different from a machine that needed oil. The philosopher 
Edmund Husserl sought in the fifth of his Cartesian Meditations 
to understand the relations of humans and to “discover in what 
intentionalities, syntheses, motivations, the sense ‘other ego’ 
becomes fashioned in me and, under the title, harmonious ex-
perience of someone else, becomes verified as existing and even 
as itself there in its own manner.”319 Our “transcendental clue,” 
or clue to what makes such an appreciation possible, is that we 
don’t see other people as just “things” in the world, but as other 
agents who also experience the world:
In changeable harmonious multiplicities of experience I experi-
ence others as actually existing and, on the one hand, as world 
Objects—not as mere physical things belonging to Nature, 
though indeed as such things in respect of one side of them. 
They are in fact experienced also as governing psychically in 
their respective natural organisms. Thus peculiarly involved 
with animate organisms, as “psychophysical” Objects, they 
are “in” the world. On the other hand, I experience them at 
the same time as subjects for this world, as experiencing it (this 
same world that I experience) and, in so doing, experiencing 
me too, even as I experience the world and others in it.320
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For individuals the identity (or sameness) of an object is 
achieved only within a manifold of different views, perceptions, 
and so forth; the identity of an object is that which remains the 
same as the percepts change, and that identity is not just another 
perception or impression, as David Hume assumed (he despaired 
of finding that impression of the identity of an object). When 
we first meet, I see the front of your head, but not the back; I see 
the back after you turn around. The identity of your head is not 
one of those impressions—not one impression among many—but 
the pole of sameness within that changing manifold of impres-
sions. The identity of an object can only be understood through 
a “transcendental move” of consciousness, in which we appreciate 
the interplay of sameness and otherness through which identity 
is achieved. The identity of an object is the immanent pole of 
the “same” within a manifold of differing perceptions; I cannot 
achieve something as an identity until I experience it in two or 
more “slants” or views, and the identity of the object is not just 
another impression among those views.
The appreciation of others as being “subjects for this world” has 
implications for each ego, specifically, for her capacity to experi-
ence the world itself. We make possible for each other the experience 
of objectivity. A completely isolated individual, besides suffering 
from a lack of human cooperation (and thus extreme deprivation), 
would also lack the ability to experience the objectivity of the 
world; she would on her own achieve the identity of objects in 
their manifold impressions, but not in the inter-subjective mode 
made possible by interactions with other minds who also appre-
hend the world. She would lack access to views and perspectives 
on the world that were not hers, but through which she would 
be able to achieve an objective view.
Just as identity is achieved only as the pole of sameness within 
a multiplicity of views of an object, achieving the objectivity of 
the world requires an appreciation of the interplay of sameness 
and otherness made possible by a multitude of perceptions and 
appreciations, not only within one “transcendental subjectivity,” 
but within “transcendental intersubjectivity,” i.e., within a com-
munity of experiencing egos. As Husserl pointed out in his essay 
“Phenomenology and Anthropology,”
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In the course of these studies a fundamental distinction comes 
to light, within the ego’s transcendental sphere of cognition, 
between that which belongs, so to speak, to his own person 
and that which is alien to him. Starting out from myself as ego 
constituting existential meaning, I reach the transcendental 
others, who are my peers, and at the same time the entire 
open, infinite transcendental intersubjective realm. In this 
transcendental community the world as “objective” and as 
the same for everybody is constituted.321
This community of experiencing egos “is an essentially unique 
connectedness, an actual community and precisely the one that 
makes transcendentally possible the being of a world, a world of 
men and things.”322
What is significant for our purposes is that the necessity of 
other humans for the achievement of an objective world rests on 
an apprehension of the importance of other egos: “there is implicit 
a mutual being for one another, which entails an Objectivating equal-
ization of my existence with that of all others—consequently: I or 
anyone else, as a man among other men.”323 If I apprehend each as 
not merely an object in the world, but as a “subject for this world,” 
and a necessary partner in my own achievement of the world as an 
identity and an objectivity, I realize that each other person has a life 
to lead.324 Although one might want or prefer that others submit to 
one’s dominion, they remain unavoidably sources of self-direction, 
capable of being held accountable for their choices and of making 
their own claims. There is an “objectivating equalization” of my 
existence with that of all other rational beings; each has a life to 
lead. As the condemned old leveller Richard Rumbold proclaimed 
from the scaffold before his execution in 1685,
I am sure there was no man born marked of God above 
another; for no man comes into the world with a saddle 
on his back, neither any booted and spurred to ride him.325
The phrase was repeated by Thomas Jefferson in his last let-
ter, regretfully declining the opportunity to celebrate the fiftieth  
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American Independence Day on July 4, 1826: “All eyes are opened, 
or opening, to the rights of man. The general spread of the light 
of science has already laid open to every view the palpable truth, 
that the mass of mankind has not been born with saddles on 
their backs, nor a favored few booted and spurred, ready to ride 
them legitimately, by the grace of God. These are grounds of 
hope for others. For ourselves, let the annual return of this day 
forever refresh our recollections of these rights, and an undi-
minished devotion to them.”326 ( Jefferson died on that fiftieth  
anniversary.)
Each person is an autonomous being, i.e., a being who is self-
ruled, in the sense that she is capable of choosing, of acting one 
way or another, and of being held responsible for her actions. The 
great human rights pioneer Francisco de Vitoria founded his de-
fense of the indigenous people of the Americas on the realization 
that “a person is master of his own actions insofar as he is able to 
make choices between one course or another.”327 It is that ability 
to choose from among courses of action, the possibility that we 
could have acted otherwise, that makes us responsible beings. In 
Husserl’s terms, persons “are in fact experienced also as governing 
psychically in their respective natural organisms.”
Despite many interesting and subtle complications, the basic 
issue is rather straightforward: We hold each other accountable 
because we recognize moral agents. Freedom and responsibility 
are inescapably bound up with our social interaction. They may 
be suppressed or violated or denied, but they are always there.
Responsibilities for Outcomes
Without responsibility freedom is, at best, fragmentary and un-
stable. Without freedom people are discouraged from claiming 
their responsibility. Freedom and responsibility wax and wane 
together.
Some have argued that what we are responsible for is not only 
our own lives, over which we exercise our free choices, but overall 
social outcomes and thus, for making choices for others. One 
outspoken advocate for responsibility for aggregate outcomes 
is Robert Goodin, who has argued that any claims about what 
individuals should do are relevant neither to what collectives 
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should undertake, nor to the powers that they should exercise 
over individuals: 
[S]tatements about your personal responsibilities are first 
and foremost statements about what you should do. Nothing 
necessarily follows from those propositions as to what oth-
ers should do, if you fail to do what you should have done. 
Sometimes others should make you do it; other times it seems 
better for them simply to do it for you or do something 
else altogether in the place of what you were supposed to 
have done; still other times it seems better for them to do 
something that will put you in a better position to do it for 
yourself subsequently. It is simply impossible to read off of 
statements about what you should do any automatic conclu-
sions about what, failing that, we should do.328
Thus, the point is that regardless of whether individuals should 
be responsible for their own spheres of action, “we” are respon-
sible for the behavior of others and for the overall or aggregate 
outcome of all of those behaviors together. Indeed, Goodin 
insists that it’s our inordinate attention to our own affairs that is 
the greatest cause of injustice: “Working within the constraints 
set by natural scarcity, the greatest practical obstacle to achieving 
as much justice as resources permit is, and always has been, the 
supposition that each of us should ‘cultivate his own garden.’ . . . 
It is our particular obligations that all too often blind us to our 
larger social responsibilities. Whatever claim the world at large 
may have upon us, it inevitably takes second place behind the 
claims of particular others: our families, friends, colleagues, 
clients, compatriots, and so on.”329 Collective responsibility is 
what matters, not individual responsibility, although notably it is 
individuals who are jailed by the state for not obeying, and not “us” 
in the sense of the entire collective. (Who would be the jailer and 
who the jailed in the case of authentic collective responsibility? 
Collectivists apotheosize collective action, but it is individuals 
whom they punish for failing to obey their commands.)
Many thinkers and students of social relations have turned 
their attention to the reason why such collective assumption of 
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responsibility fails, but few have added substantially to the in-
sights of Thomas Aquinas, who argued for a system of justiciable 
individual rights and responsibilities on the following grounds:
First because every man is more careful to procure what is for 
himself alone than that which is common to many or to all: 
since each would shirk the labor and leave to another that 
which concerns the community, as happens where there is a 
great number of servants. Secondly, because human affairs 
are conducted in more orderly fashion if each man is charged 
with taking care of some particular thing himself, whereas 
there would be confusion if everyone had to look after any 
one thing indeterminately. Thirdly, because a more peaceful 
state is ensured to man if each one is contented with his own. 
Hence it is to be observed that quarrels arise more frequently 
where there is no division of the things possessed.330
There is a crucial difference between one being dependent on 
the support of one’s friends, family, association, or community and 
being dependent on the decisions of “us.” Just as things possessed 
must be divided (“several property,” as it used to be called), there 
must be apportionment of responsibilities, such that “externalities” 
are “internalized.” David Schmidtz, with whom Goodin debated 
in their book Social Welfare and Individual Responsibility, clari-
fied that what mattered for material progress “has less to do with 
responsibility and more to do with internalized responsibility,”331 
that is, that we not create messes for others. The responsibility 
may be internalized individually (I create a mess in the kitchen 
and I clean it up) or through any of the collective enterprises and 
associations through which people realize common objectives, 
whether families, or firms, or temples, or Scout troops, or any 
of the myriad other ways in which people voluntarily cooperate. 
Goodin phrases his concerns in terms of “once X has happened” 
then “we” must do something; Schmidtz phrases his in terms of 
how we should expect people to behave when their responsibili-
ties are known to them.332
When “we” are responsible for all of “us,” then responsibility 
is diluted to the point where it is hard to know who among “us” 
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deserves credit for success or blame for failure. Moreover, oppor-
tunities are also created for the politically well connected and the 
astute to benefit.333 Collectivist and statist ascriptions of rights 
and responsibilities frequently merely open the door to unscru-
pulous cronyism. Evading individual and voluntarily assumed 
responsibility in the name of collective, i.e., state responsibility, 
doesn’t generally have a very happy ending.
Empirical Freedom vs. Higher, Truer, Authentic Freedom
Some identify submission to state control with real or true or 
higher freedom. They sometimes even opine that true freedom is 
not the freedom of the person you experience yourself to be, the 
mere “empirical self,” because true freedom is the realization of 
the “real” or “higher” or “rational” self. Those motivated by the 
ideology of Karl Marx, for example, insist that those who disagree 
with them suffer from “false consciousness,” which is what causes 
them to resist the attempts by followers of Marx to “liberate” 
them. Others condemn individual freedom as “inauthentic” or 
as a threat to the “unity” of the nation, or the class, or the race, or 
the masses, or the faithful, or the people, or some other collective.
It is frequently argued that true freedom means only doing 
what we ought to do; not what we in fact choose to do, but what 
reason, morality, religion, racial or class consciousness, or our 
betters tell us we should do. To the extent that we deviate from 
those standards, they argue, we are not acting freely. The standard 
of freedom for the philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau was the 
“general will,” which is “always rightful.”334 Given that, “whoever 
refuses to obey the general will shall be constrained to do so by 
the whole body, which means nothing other than that he shall 
be forced to be free.”335
Those who believe one or another version of that thesis are 
convinced that when people are subjected to state control (of the 
right sort) they are in fact being liberated. They are being forced 
to be free. As Isaiah Berlin, one of the most important intellectual 
opponents of dictatorship in the last century, pointed out,
Once I take this view, I am in a position to ignore the actual 
wishes of men or societies, to bully, oppress, torture them in 
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the name, and on behalf of, their “real” selves, in the secure 
knowledge that whatever is the true goal of man (happiness, 
performance of duty, wisdom, a just society, self-fulfillment) 
must be identical with his freedom—the free choice of his 
“true,” albeit often submerged and inarticulate, self.336
As a general matter, that story does not end well. That is true 
not only in murderous dictatorship of the far “left” and the far 
“right,” but in less collectively dramatic (although individually 
catastrophic) ways in generally freer societies, as well. Various 
forms of political “paternalism” and “maternalism,” victimless 
crime laws, vice squads, welfare statism, censorship, nanny stat-
ism, labor conscription, and other substitutions of state control 
for self-control generate systematically negative consequences: 
prohibition of intoxicating or mind-altering substances gener-
ates violence, lawless black markets, organized crime, numerous 
deaths from overdosing and impurities, and anti-social behav-
ior; welfare states tax to provide (frequently monopolistically) 
through political means what could be provided and chosen 
voluntarily—from retirement income, to medical care, to housing, 
to education—and in the process induce people to reduce their 
savings, engage in riskier behavior, abandon voluntary mutual 
aid organizations, and pay less attention to securing their own 
well being and that of their families and communities; nanny 
states suppress both personal freedom and the development of 
good habits; censorship to “protect us” from bad or impure or 
untrue thoughts quashes critical thinking and the search for truth. 
Replacing self-control with state control rarely generates any of 
the benefits claimed by its enthusiasts and always generates other, 
unintended, consequences.337
From “Higher Freedom” to “Collective Self ”
Frequently combined with the claims of protecting “true” or 
“higher” freedom are assertions that freedom is necessarily col-
lective, the freedom of the collective against other collectivities 
and over the individual. As such, freedom is not really a property 
of individuals, but of collective entities, whether the nation, the 
country, the people, the state, the class, the race, or some other 
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abstract entity. Michael Sandel promotes a kind of philosophi-
cally soft collectivism (although the coercion is quite real and 
hard when visited on people) and has suggested that to the extent 
that our identities are constituted by shared “aspirations and at-
tachments,” “our constitutive self-understandings comprehend a 
wider subject than the individual alone, whether a family or tribe 
or city or class or nation or people.”338
The greater or more encompassing “subject” (or self ) that is 
apotheosized by such thinkers is then treated as if it had the 
attributes of a natural person, like you or me. The freedom of 
the group is then seen not as the freedom among its members, 
but as the freedom of the group as such, as if it were a person 
who had the right and the expectation of respect and autonomy, 
which it most decidedly is not. One hears such language repeat-
edly from spokespeople for various tyrannical governments, who 
insist that any person, whether a “domestic” private individual, 
a global religious leader, or a “foreign” individual, who dares to 
criticize the violent or oppressive acts of those governments, is 
thereby infringing on the freedom of the nation over which that 
government rules. Thus, merely issuing a statement in support 
of dissidents is “interfering” in the affairs of the other country, 
as if the dissidents being harassed, imprisoned, beaten, tortured, 
or executed were of no account, and their treatment something 
like my treatment of my hair, which I cut periodically.
The fact is that a family, nation, tribe, state, firm, association, 
club, etc., etc., is not a person like the persons who constitute it; 
it is made up of those persons and all of their complex relation-
ships.339 In fact, treating a group, whether a state or a chess club, 
as a big person merely blinds us to the complex relationships that 
make up the subject matter of journalism, political science, and 
the search for truth generally.340 It obscures who is deciding for 
whom, which is the interesting question.
Some philosophers have argued that individual freedom is an 
illusion, personal responsibility a delusion, and the individual 
herself a mere fiction, the intersection of social “forces” that are 
more real than the ephemeral flesh-and-blood organism we call 
a human being.
Indeed, some have argued that only the nation, the race, the 
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class, or the state is real, is the true self, and that the individual 
human being is less a self than a single cell of an organism. Karl 
Marx insisted that man is a “species being,” that is, that he exists 
as such only in and through a community and that individual 
rights subvert human existence by separating humans from each 
other. For Marx,
Human emancipation will only be complete when the real, 
individual man has absorbed into himself the abstract citizen; 
when as an individual man, in his everyday life, in his work, 
and in his relationships, he has become a species-being; and 
when he has recognized and organized his own powers (forces 
propres) as social powers so that he no longer separates this 
social power from himself as a political power.341
The claims of classical liberals on behalf of individual liberty 
were dismissed by Marx in his famous tract on the Jews342 as “the 
liberty of man regarded as an isolated monad, withdrawn into 
himself ”: moreover, classical liberal arguments for political equal-
ity were disposed of as having “no political significance. It is only 
the equal right of liberty as defined above; namely that every man 
is equally regarded as a self-sufficient monad.”343 Unsurprisingly, 
Marx called for making such individuals “impossible,”
by “individual” you mean no other person than the bourgeois, 
than the middle-class owner of property. This person must, 
indeed, be swept out of the way, and made impossible.344
It remains a wonder that so many were so surprised when 
followers of his ideas, who proclaimed themselves “Marxists,” 
proceeded in the twentieth century to carry out that vision of mak-
ing individuals impossible: they marched millions of individual 
human beings into slave labor camps and “liquidated” tens of 
millions in the name of “liberating” an abstract “species being.”345
All such theories lead, in the end, not to the realization of some 
higher and greater being, call it the nation or the people or the 
race or the state, but to the domination of some flesh-and-blood 
individual humans by others.
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Martin Heidegger was one of the most influential of all 
twentieth-century philosophers; his anti-individualist ideas have 
infused and motivated the far right, the far left, radical and violent 
“Islamism,”346 and other collectivist movements. He was at the 
same time one of the least understood of philosophers because he 
was, on the one hand, so efficient at concealing his ideas behind 
clouds of impenetrable prose, and, on the other, quite success-
ful in falsifying after the war his record of support for National 
Socialism from 1933 to 1945.347 Decades of post–World War II 
writers puzzled over his writings about “existence” (“Dasein” in 
German) and thought that Heidegger was writing about what 
it means to “be” a human or to exist as a human and that that 
question provided the access to the question of being. In fact, 
as he made more clear during the period of National Socialism 
(Nazism), when he could speak more openly about his ideas, 
Dasein is something of which one can speak only in the collec-
tive “we,” and specifically, the Dasein of a particular people, the 
German Volk. As Heidegger declared in his lectures after the 
National Socialist seizure of power,
The German people is now passing through a moment of 
historical greatness: the youth of the academy knows this 
greatness. What is happening, then? The German people 
as a whole is coming to itself, that is, it is finding its leader-
ship. In this leadership, the people that has come to itself is 
creating a state.348
That is to say, in “finding its leadership,” the leader (“der 
Führer”) will decide for all of the people. And, indeed, that 
collective Dasein, by finding its leadership, will be infused with 
power: “Only when we are what we are coming to be, from the 
greatness of the inception of the Dasein of our spirit and people, 
only then do we remain fit for the power of the goal toward 
which our history is striving.”349 René Descartes, famous for his 
“Cogito ergo sum” formulation (“I think, therefore I am”) was 
denounced by Heidegger because, for Descartes (in Heidegger’s 
words), “The I of the thinking human being thus moves into the 
center of what can truly be humanly known.”350 Heidegger wished 
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to displace the “I” with the “We” of a collective. As he stated in a 
very strange lecture course on logic delivered under the National 
Socialist regime, which had little to do with what is normally 
understood as logic and much to do with Heidegger’s enthusiastic 
racism and National Socialism, “we have . . . the advantage that 
the question of who we ourselves are is timely, as distinguished 
from the time of liberalism, the I-time. Now is the We-time.”351
The “We” was not merely this or that “nameless crowd” or “re-
volting mass,” but the Volk. As for Marx, for Heidegger, Dasein, or 
existence, was not the existence of an “isolated” and “self-forlorn” 
individual, nor of mere collections of them, but of a self-conscious 
collective, in Marx’s case the class and state, and in Heidegger’s 
case the Volk and state: “it becomes clear why the character of 
the self does not consist in the reflexivity of the I, of the subject; 
for it is precisely the blasting of I-ness and of subjectivity by 
temporality, which delivers Dasein, as it were, away from itself 
to being and thus compels it toward self-being.”352 The entire 
performance is mired in non sequiturs, opaque language, unjusti-
fied leaps of inference (often justified by whether words sound 
similar), and other moves, but Heidegger considered it one of 
his most important works, although not published until many 
years after his death, as his explicitly Nazi convictions started to 
re-emerge from the archives.
Heidegger set the stage for the rejection of individual freedom 
and responsibility among intellectuals of both the far “left” and 
the far “right” (which have more in common than the “left-right” 
spectrum suggests) in recent decades by insisting that the center 
stage should be occupied by a We, in his own case the We of the 
German People (Volk), which he considered a historical people 
with a historical mission. Heidegger’s elevation of the concept of 
“authenticity” as the test of true existence set the stage for a wide 
range of anti-individualist movements: nationalist, racist, socialist, 
ethnic, and even the recent surge of “politically correct” identi-
ties. Others have merely substituted for the German Volk other 
collectivities, consistently with Heidegger’s polylogism (the idea 
that there are different truths for different groups) and rejection 
of universal truths.353 In each case, it is an authentic existence 
that is asserted to be collective, as distinguished from the mere 
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“I” in the company of other individuals that characterizes classical 
liberalism. Metaphysical collectivism, the assertion that existence 
itself is inherently collective, was eagerly taken up by aggressive 
anti-individualist extremists of left and right, all of whom as-
sert that their ideological submersion of the individual into the 
greater whole represents the embrace of “authentic” Dasein, and 
all of whom are united in their rejection of the idea of individual 
freedom and responsibility. Of course, such absorption of the 
individual into the “We” always means subordination of some 
individuals, usually the majority, to other individuals, usually 
a small and well-organized clique of people who have seized 
power for themselves in the name of the collective. (That was 
one of Orwell’s insights in 1984: the doctrine of “Oligarchical 
Collectivism” refers precisely to that inevitability.)
Collectivism invariably means the destruction of both freedom 
and responsibility. The freedom of the individual is shattered by 
coercion and violence and, ultimately, responsibility is dissipated. 
The people, the race, the party, the community, the masses, the 
nation, or some other collective entity is held to be the agent of 
action. Displacing freedom and responsibility from the individual 
human being to some allegedly greater or higher entity merely 
evaporates both into nothing. The German novelist Robert Musil 
pondered the idea of the “Nation” in his essay “ ‘Nation’ as Ideal 
and as Reality,” which was written shortly after at least seventeen 
million people had been killed in the First World War. “Germany,” 
as the defeated power, was blamed by the victors for the war. 
Musil asked who was really responsible for the horrors of the war.
How false the childish excuse, which is, unfortunately, of-
ten heard in Germany: We didn’t do it! The Emperor, the 
generals, the diplomats did it! Of course we did it: we let it 
happen; it happened without our interfering. Here as in other 
countries. How false too the other excuse one often hears: 
We simply weren’t firm enough, we let ourselves be fooled. . . . 
The individual . . . simply showed himself incapable of any-
thing, and allowed it all to happen. In the complete illusion 
of his own free will, he followed without exercising his will. 
We did it, they did it; that is, no one did it, just “it” did it.354
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Collectivism represents the extreme form of the denial of both 
freedom and responsibility. Indeed, collectivists insist that true 
freedom is the abandonment of individual responsibility and sub-
mission to the state. For Heidegger, that entailed that “Freedom is 
not the independence of doing and letting, but carrying through 
the inevitability of being, taking over the historical being in the 
knowing will, reforming of the inevitability of being into the 
dominance of a structured order of a Volk. Care of freedom of 
the historical being [Seins] is in itself empowering of the power 
of the State as the essential-jointure of an historical mission.”355 
As Musil, a classical liberal critic of emergent collectivism, noted, 
in collectivist orders, the independent human being is absolved of 
responsibility, for no one really acts or is responsible for crimes; 
“it” does them. That’s the conclusion of all forms of collectivism. 
And when their regimes come crashing down, the leaders who 
exercised power in the name of the collective do all they can to 
avoid any personal responsibility when their crimes are revealed. 
“It” did it, which means that no one is accountable at all.
Of course, individuals do act in coordination with others to 
achieve collective goals, whether good, bad, or indifferent. We 
speak of groups “acting,” whether those groups are chess clubs, 
peace societies, trade unions, business enterprises, parliaments, 
universities, or states. But although it’s meaningful to speak of 
such groups acting, those groups are not individuals like the 
members who make them up. They are, in fact, made up of indi-
viduals and all their relationships among themselves. Groups are 
not entities like the constituents that form them. Nor are they 
higher forms of consciousness; if anything, they may represent 
a degradation of human consciousness, as Musil noted; they are 
frequently the means by which people evade their own freedom 
and responsibility.
If we wish to locate the responsibility for actions, it is in the 
human beings who think, deliberate, plan, speak, move, and act. 
The individual human being is the locus of moral agency; the 
group is the network within which it may be exercised, but when 
misunderstood, it becomes the vaporous cloud within which it 
is dispersed, denied, disappeared.
At least outside of science fiction stories, very unusual cases of 
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multiple personalities, hypothetical philosophy thought-experi-
ments, and brain injury and other rare medical situations, each 
self is distinctly embodied, that is, each of us is associated with 
one materially individuated body. It is through our bodies that we 
interact with the material objects of the world and it is through 
our bodies that we learn to distinguish what is us from what is 
not us. Thomas Hodgskin, a journalist and radical free-trade 
and peace agitator who wrote for the The Economist, grounded 
personal identity in the fact that one’s body belongs to oneself:
Mr. Locke says, that every man has a property in his own 
person; in fact, individuality—which is signified by the word 
own—cannot be disjoined from the person. Each individual 
learns his own shape and form, and even the existence of 
his limbs and body, from seeing and feeling them. These 
constitute his notion of personal identity, both for himself 
and others; and it is impossible to conceive—it is in fact a 
contradiction to say—that a man’s limbs and body do not 
belong to himself: for the words him, self, and his body, 
signify the same material thing.
As we learn the existence of our own bodies from seeing 
and feeling them, and as we see and feel the bodies of oth-
ers, we have precisely similar grounds for believing in the 
individuality or identity of other persons, as for believing 
in our own identity. The ideas expressed by the words mine 
and thine, as applied to the produce of labour, are simply 
then an extended form of the ideas of personal identity and 
individuality.356
The individual human being, the living form of a single organic 
body, is the natural foundation of responsibility and freedom. 
Even if I do, might, or should “identify” with some group, there 
is no way in which I could “identify” with the other members in 
quite the same way that I identify with myself, for I cannot feel 
and perceive, nor control, the motions of the bodies of others in 
the way that I do my own. I have control and possession of my 
body in a way that I can never have over another’s. (One is free to 
speculate about artificial intelligences that may be loci of freedom 
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and responsibility, alien beings with collective identities, and so 
on, but embodied agents are all we now encounter.)
“Bodily self-ascription” has the marked advantage of “immunity 
to error through misidentification.”357 As Gareth Evans notes,
we have what might be described as a general capacity to 
perceive our own bodies, although this can be broken down 
into several distinguishable capacities:  .  .  . . Each of these 
modes of perception appears to give rise to judgments which 
are immune to error through misidentification. None of the 
following utterances appears to make sense when the first 
component expresses knowledge gained in the appropriate 
way: “Someone’s legs are crossed, but is it my legs that are 
crossed?”; “Someone is hot and sticky, but is it I who am 
hot and sticky?”; “Someone is being pushed, but is it I who 
am being pushed?” There just does not appear to be a gap 
between the subject’s having information (or appearing to 
have information), in the appropriate way, that the property 
of being F is instantiated, and his having information (or 
appearing to have information) that he is F; for him to have, 
or to appear to have, the information that the property is 
instantiated just is for it to appear to him that he is F.358
Epictetus considered such bodily self-ascription the most cer-
tain kind of knowledge. In his response to the skepticism of the 
Pyrrhonists and the Academic philosophers, Epictetus argued, 
“But that you and I are not the same persons, I know very cer-
tainly. Whence do I get this knowledge? When I want to swallow 
something, I never take the morsel to that place, but to this.”359
Each person is identified with one and only one body, spatio-
temporally distinct from all others. Each person is a source or 
principle of motion for one body. Each body provides demarca-
tion of a sphere of “ownness.” The values that one acts to attain 
or preserve are the values of materially individuated agents; they 
may be held in common with others, but they are “agent-relative.” 
Each person is responsible for those acts in cases in which she 
“could have done otherwise.” Each person is responsible for the 
acts of her own body, but not (excepting special cases, such as 
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guardianship of minors and the mentally deficient) for the acts 
of the bodies of others, for these are the responsibility of other 
agents, i.e., those whose spheres of “ownness” are defined by 
these bodies.360
•
Responsibility and freedom ultimately are entwined together in 
the locus of human action, the individual human being. Attempts 
to undo the connection between freedom and responsibility 
have failed, while philosophers who conjure up and endow with 
personality mythical collective selves have had enough political 
success to cause enormous harm to individuals and to social 
relationships in the real world. The former have been murdered 
in the hundreds of millions in the last century alone, while the 
latter have been suppressed, disrupted, and generally displaced by 
organized states whose propagandists claim that they are really 
“us.” A world of free and responsible individuals cooperating in 
voluntary association is a far better alternative to the suffering 
and the social atomization created by state control.
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Increasing and Improving 
Your Own Self-Control
By Tom G. Palmer
What practical implications does embracing freedom and responsibil-
ity have for the conduct of one’s own life? How can one improve one’s 
self-control and effectively grasp one’s freedom and responsibility? 
Research is providing not only answers to scientific questions, but 
techniques for achieving greater self-control, success, and happiness. 
Here is a short guide to some of the key techniques and guides to 
self-control.
“There is something magnificent about control directed upon 
oneself, resulting in an independently operating, intelligent, 
responsible, and persevering agent. The self-motivating person 
who takes no commands from others and needs no others to 
command comes close to the best the human race has produced. 
In such an individual, habits of independence are coupled with 
deep respect for the independence of others. The tendency to 
leave others alone is rooted not in indifference to the fate of 
people, but in the conviction that under normal circumstances 
we can benefit them most by letting them pursue their own ends 
without interference.” 361
—John Lachs, Centennial Professor  
of Philosophy, Vanderbilt University
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“[P]eople and societies can cultivate the faculty of self-control 
over time and thereby drive down their rates of violence.”362
—Steven Pinker, Johnstone Family Professor  
of Psychology, Harvard University
“Man wants liberty to become the man he wants to become. 
He does so precisely because he does not know what man he 
will want to become in time. Let us remove once and for all the 
instrumental defense of liberty, the only one that can possibly be 
derived from orthodox economic analysis. Man does not want 
liberty in order to maximize his utility, or that of the society 
of which he is a part. He wants liberty to become the man 
he wants to become.”363
—James Buchanan, Nobel Laureate  
in Economic Science
Self-control is attainable. It’s not something one just has or doesn’t 
have. It can be increased, cultivated, improved, and made a foun-
dation for lives of freedom, compassion, achievement, earned 
self-respect, and happiness in community with others. For those 
who lament that we just are what we are and cannot change, there 
is very good news. We have the freedom to change ourselves, to 
replace harmful habits with useful ones, to achieve our purposes, 
to become less violent and more respectful of others, to become 
the people we want to become. We can grow in compassion and 
improve our lives and the lives of those around us. And there’s 
a true silver lining: improvement in self-control and spiritual 
growth are possible not only for young people, but for old, as well.
Before looking into how we can improve our self-control, 
though, it might help to dispel some popular misunderstandings 
about what self-control is. Once that’s done, we can look to the 
burgeoning science of self-control (sometimes also referred to 
as “willpower”) to draw some practical lessons that we can use 
to improve our self-control, serve our enlightened self-interests, 
and secure our liberty.
For some people the term “self-control” evokes the image of a 
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steely-eyed person staring down some temptation, with perhaps 
a bead of sweat slowly trickling down his or her face and shaking 
hands hidden under the table, or an incredibly brave hero refus-
ing to betray the resistance—or even to cry out in pain—while 
enduring the most terrible of tortures. Those images are very 
misleading. Except in very unusual circumstances (and movies) 
self-control isn’t about steely resolve and doesn’t entail lots of 
pain and suffering. It’s not about being “rugged” or unemotion-
ally logical, either. It’s about being mindful of what you hope to 
accomplish and how your goals fit together. It’s about acquiring, 
sometimes slowly and over long periods of time, the habits that 
are conducive to reaching your goals. It’s about being aware of 
those who are around you and of their interests, perceptions, 
and rights. People with self-control acquire the ability to avoid 
temptations without having to shake and sweat.
Thinking about self-control goes back a very long time and is 
found in many philosophical and religious traditions. It has long 
been understood that with effort we can make ourselves into the 
people that we want to be. We become the people we want to 
be by acting as we should. Aristotle noted that the word “ethics,” 
which has come from ancient Greek to modern English, derives 
from ἦθος, or habit. He contrasted “those things in us by nature,” 
such as our faculties of sight and hearing, which we use because 
we have them, with virtues, which we have because we use them: 
“the virtues we come to have by engaging in the activities first, as 
is the case with the arts as well. For as regards those things we 
must learn how to do, we learn by doing them—for example, by 
building houses, people become house builders, and by playing 
the cithara, they become cithara players. So too, then, by doing 
just things we become just; moderate things, moderate; and 
courageous things, courageous.”364
Habituating ourselves to doing the right thing allows us to 
become the people we want to become. The habits we already 
have are, as it turns out, virtually impossible to simply eliminate; 
they have become integrated into the physical structures of our 
brains. We can, however, deliberately acquire habits we want and, 
even if we can’t eliminate the bad habits we have, we can replace 
them with others that we prefer.365 Modern neuroscience now 
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explains better than Aristotle was able to do how those habits are 
incorporated into the structures of our brains. The brain is capable 
of change, and even of being consciously changed, throughout life. 
The modern term for that capacity for change is “neuroplasticity,” 
and it refers to the ways in which brain structures that underlie 
our habits, our personalities, our perceptions, and more are alter-
able. The good news is that we can alter the physical substrate 
of our selves at our own initiative. The material substrate of our 
selves places limits on what we can do, but that materiality does 
not eliminate our freedom. We have the metaphysical freedom 
to shape our own lives, to become the people we want to become. 
Doing so takes work, even struggle. Achieving greater self-control 
yields benefits not only in better lives, but also in greater abil-
ity to struggle for our freedom as legal equals in free societies. 
Greater self-control is something we can acquire, something we 
can integrate into our lives, something we can learn.
• Learning to make better decisions helps us to avoid failure 
and secure our independence;
• Learning to be mindful of the interests of others helps us 
to become better at cooperating voluntarily to benefit our-
selves, our families, our communities, and all of humanity;
• Learning to save more for the future helps us to avoid 
entrapment by and dependence on the welfare state;
• Learning to be mindful of the rights of others, including 
people with very different values or ways of life, helps us 
to respect them and with them to secure mutual liberty;
• Learning to control our impulses helps us to achieve our 
deeper and more rational purposes and to enjoy lives of 
meaning and dignity;
• Learning to plan and guide our own lives helps us to stand 
up against the nanny state and its prohibitions, controls, 
and behavioral mandates;
• Learning to be aware of our own dignity helps us to turn 
down bailouts and subsidies extracted by force from oth-
ers and to reject the mentality of “rent-seeking,” or “loot 
before you are looted,” and to stand with our neighbors 
as free citizens of free countries;
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• Learning to improve our self-control helps us not only to 
live, but to let live.
Achieving greater self-control helps us to assert our freedom, tell 
the politicians and bureaucrats that we can make our own choices, 
and take back both our freedom and our responsibility.
Appendix
Useful Guides and Tips for Increasing Self-Control
It would be presumptuous of me to write a guidebook on how 
to improve one’s self-control. As a work in progress, I’m better 
prepared to provide a guide to some important books on the topic, 
with a few lessons drawn from each. That both saves me from 
shameful immodesty and offers the reader a chance to explore the 
issues herself or himself. Most of the books I’ve selected are easy 
to read and contain very useful pointers. (I’ll indicate some of the 
more useful in bold text.) They offer practical exercises, as well.
If you were to acquire only one of the following works, I’d recommend 
one of the first two. (You might buy both, but then you might let 
them both sit on the shelf staring at you, so I’d recommend choos-
ing one and being sure to read that one. Then you might want to 
buy the other.)
Training and Maintaining the Willpower Muscle
Willpower: Rediscovering the Greatest Human Strength, by Roy 
Baumeister and John Tierney (New York: Penguin Books, 2011)
An experimental psychologist, Roy Baumeister, and a science 
writer for the New York Times, John Tierney (who contributed a 
chapter to the book you are reading now), teamed up to produce 
a book that is fascinating, grounded in empirical scientific study, 
delightfully written, and useful. They show that willpower, the 
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capacity for self-control, is strongly related to our brain chemistry, 
in particular, to our available supply of glucose. They show that 
willpower is in limited supply and that it can be depleted. 
Every time you make a decision, you spend some of your scarce 
willpower, so it’s wise to avoid spending it on unimportant 
decisions that will leave you depleted when you face a really 
important decision. Moreover, rather like a muscle, willpower 
can be strengthened by practicing it, even with practicing small 
things such as sitting up straight. (Your parents knew a thing 
or two when they admonished you not to slouch.)
Exercising your willpower can increase your supply of it overall. 
Setting realistic goals and then revisiting them (to see how 
unrealistic they were, so you can scale them down to achievable 
goals the next time around) is a key step to self-control. Part of 
setting a goal is to establish a reward for yourself for meeting 
it; merely using self-control to deny ourselves pleasures leads to 
failure, whereas the positive incentive of rewarding yourself is 
more likely to motivate you (that is, the desiring parts of your 
brain) to do what you want to do.
Monitoring your own behavior can help you to achieve self-
control; financial software such as Mint.com helps me to control 
my finances (it shows me what I’ve spent, in detail and in the 
big picture, reminds me of bills, and strengthens my willpower 
to avoid impulse purchases), while simply having (and regularly 
stepping on) a simple bathroom scale is one of the most power-
ful aids for dieters who are struggling to control their weight.
Promising ourselves that we will indulge in something we want 
(such as food) later, rather than saying “Never!” turns out to help 
us to satisfy our craving; when we do try a bit later, we tend to 
indulge less, whereas when we say “Never!” we tend to indulge a 
lot more when the occasion presents itself; delaying, rather than 
denying, gratification can be a more effective means of cutting 
back. The authors describe the enormous scientific research of 
recent years into willpower and apply that science to understand 
why we fail and how we can succeed.
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The Power of “I Won’t,” “I Will,” “I Want”
The Willpower Instinct: How Self-Control Works, Why It Matters, 
and What You Can Do to Get More of It, by Kelly McGonigal 
(New York: Avery/Penguin, 2012)
Stanford University psychology instructor Kelly McGonigal 
teaches courses on self-control and has written a user-friendly 
manual on how to manage our selves. She draws on recent discov-
eries in neuroscience and applies those lessons to the challenges 
we all face in managing our lives. McGonigal starts with simple 
exercises to achieve greater self-knowledge, asking you to focus 
(even if only briefly) on the times you wish you would say “no,” 
the times when you wish you would say “yes,” and, as a framework, 
what you want to achieve in life: “I will,” “I won’t,” and “I want.”
You can strengthen your “I will” power by committing yourself 
to some small task, such as discarding daily one useless thing 
that is cluttering up your home or quietly sitting and breathing 
(meditating) for five minutes a day. You can strengthen your “I 
won’t” power by committing yourself to not doing some small 
thing, such as using swear words or slumping in your chair. 
You can strengthen your “I want” by committing to regularly 
monitoring yourself, either with a bathroom scale and a paper 
and pencil, or with Mint.com, or with some of the mechanisms 
available at QuantifiedSelf.com.
Avoid traps that encourage behavior you want to avoid, 
such as when you buy apparently virtuous “organic” or “green” 
products that turn out to be high in calories (trading off one 
virtue for another) or when you feel “licensed” after a workout 
to eat a high-calorie meal. Reward yourself for difficult, but 
desirable, behavior by linking it with something you really 
like and anticipate. Put the power of imagination to work for 
you by imagining very clearly and visually your future self and 
how grateful he or she will be to you (“present you”) for being 
so helpful and nice to “future you.”
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Changing Habits
The Power of Habit: Why We Do What We Do in Life and Business, 
by Charles Duhigg (New York: Random House, 2014)
New York Times reporter Charles Duhigg started to notice the 
importance of habits when he was a war-zone reporter and saw 
how riots were avoided by police paying attention to habits 
(namely, the habit of eating; you can read the book to learn 
more). He started investigating the neuroscience of habit and in 
his book he shares what he learned and applies it to a number of 
historical and everyday occurrences.
There’s one big takeaway from the book: once you’ve acquired 
a habit, you really can’t get rid of it. It’s “wired” into your brain, 
as it were, and when the right occasion (the “cue”) comes, you’ll 
slip back into it. The good news is that you can lay down a 
new habit that will replace the habit you don’t want. To do so 
you need to identify the elements of your habit: the routine 
into which you habitually slip (snacking or biting your nails 
or smoking or snapping back at your spouse or whatever it 
might be); what triggers it (the “cue”), and what reward you 
receive for doing it.
Duhigg offers not only a clear explanation of the neurosci-
ence behind habits, but very practical techniques for acquiring 
good habits and for replacing bad habits with better ones. As he 
explains, “to modify a habit, you must decide to change it. You 
must consciously accept the hard work of identifying the cues 
and rewards that drive the habits’ routines, and find alternatives. 
You must know you have control and be self-conscious enough 
to use it.”366
Thinking Clearly . . . and Avoiding Mental Potholes
The Art of Thinking Clearly, by Rolf Dobelli (London: Sceptre, 
2013)
Rolf Dobelli is a businessman, novelist, and writer and a careful 
reader of behavioral economics. He has drawn from such sources 
as Daniel Kahneman and Nassim Nicholas Taleb ninety-nine 
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lessons, presented as very short and enjoyable chapters.367 Dobelli 
alerts you to such common mental errors as the “conjunction 
fallacy,” “confirmation bias,” the “law of small numbers,” and 
“availability bias.” Once you’re aware of how common and natural 
such mistakes are, you can take special care to avoid them in mak-
ing your own decisions. You can read one short chapter per day 
for a little over three months and avoid a lot of mistakes in life.
Meditate Your Way to Self-Control
Buddha’s Brain: The Practical Neuroscience of Happiness, Love, & 
Wisdom, by Rick Hanson, with Richard Mendius (Oakland: New 
Harbinger Publications, 2009)
Many religions and spiritual communities have developed tradi-
tions of contemplation and activities that are intended to bring 
one closer to the divine. Buddhism has provided a foundation for 
contemplative practice (i.e., meditation) for thousands of years. 
Buddhist techniques of meditation emerged from a particular 
religious context,368 but the techniques can be applied to achieve 
greater self-control even without the religious background within 
which Buddhist practitioners developed those techniques. Rick 
Hanson ties in Buddhist meditative practices with neuroscience to 
understand the “self-transforming brain.” Buddhist practices can 
help us to achieve a state of calm and “mindfulness,” to increase 
our compassion (starting with our compassion for the person 
who is often last on our list: our own self ), to increase steadiness 
of purpose, and to create peace.369
There’s Always More to Read
For those who really want to dive into the literature on self-control, 
there is a wealth of interesting and useful works. The following I 
found especially interesting and helpful:
 
A Mind for Numbers: How to Excel at Math and Science 
(Even If You Flunked Algebra), by Barbara Oakley (New York: 
Jeremy P. Tarcher/Penguin, 2014); 
and
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The Marshmallow Test: Understanding Self-Control and How 
to Master It, by Walter Mischel (London: Corgi/Penguin, 
2015).
The following two very useful books can help you to achieve a 
more organized—and thus purposeful and effective—life:
Getting Things Done: The Art of Stress-Free Productivity, by 
David Allen (New York: Penguin Books, 2001); 
and
Never Too Busy to Cure Clutter, by Erin Rooney Doland 
(New York: William Morrow, 2016). 
(Clutter is a major problem for me, and Erin Rooney Doland’s 
books have helped me; but as with all of the above—and 
as a peek into my office would show—I’m definitely just a 
work-in-progress.)
Online
Finally, there’s also a wealth of online resources. Lifehacker.com,  
Mint.com, QuantifiedSelf.com, and other sites offer tools that 
enable us to achieve greater self-control. At a much deeper 
level, systems thinking and decision analysis offer means whereby 
rational processes can be made explicit and even habitual. They 
were developed to help in logistics and business, but they are 
helpful in assisting anyone to make better decisions for his or 
her personal life, as well. Three integrated educational programs 
apply advanced business practices to life problems generally and 
translate tools developed for logistics and business into useful 
lessons that are packaged for young people. (They may be pack-
aged for youth, but they’re also used in the training programs 
and strategic planning processes of some of the largest and most 
successful business firms in the world.)370
Systems Thinking in Schools: Sponsored by the Waters 
Foundation, systems thinking draws on work done at MIT on 
systems dynamics and helps people to visualize and incorporate 
into their decision-making the consequences of their choices. The 
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programs, including modules for personal and for classroom use, 
can be found at www.watersfoundation.org.
Decision Analysis: Decision analysis was pioneered at Stanford 
University and is applied to business decisions by such firms as 
the Strategic Decisions Group (www.sdg.com). Two educational 
foundations offer extensive programs to teach decision skills to 
students in elementary, middle, and high school; the programs are 
crafted for young people, but the contents are useful to anyone 
at any age or stage of life. The Decision Education Foundation 
offers their programs at www.DecisionEducation.org and How I 
Decide offers their programs at www.HowIDecide.org. 
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From the Dhammapada, one of the oldest texts of Buddhism:
 Others do not understand
  That we must control ourselves here;
 But for those who do understand this—
  Through it, their quarrels cease.371
 By self alone evil is done;
  By self one is defiled.
 By self evil is not done;
  By self one is purified.
 Purity and impurity are individual matters:
  No one can purify another.372
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